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ABSTRACT
I explore the relationship between partisan votes and
partisan seat allocation in U. S. state lower-house elec
tions.

Specifleally, I measure the representational form

(the rate of partisan seat changes given particular parti
san vote changes) and partisan bias (asymmetry in the
seats-votes relationship) of 441 lower-house state legisla
tive elections in 46 states from 1968 to 1987.

I then test

a number of hypotheses that have been advanced to explain
variation in representational form and partisan bias.
Values for representational form and partisan bias are
generated by creating simulations from actual election
results.

I simulate seat gains made by Republicans given

one percent uniform party vote swings across all districts
and assuming Republicans would win between 35% and 65% of
the mean district vote.

After generating 31 data points

for each election year, I use a logit equation to opera
tionalize representational form and partisan bias for each
election year in each state.

These data then become depen

dent variables in pooled, cross-sectional time-series
analyses used to explain variation in representational form
and partisan bias across time and across states.
As in previous studies, I find that representational
form is declining over time.

1 also find that representa

tional form is a function of party competition across
election districts.

In elections having a large number of
xiv

competitive districts, there is a rise in the value of
representational form.

The size of election districts (by

population) as measured by Taagepera's Index has a positive
but substantively weak effect on representational form.
Effective district magnitude (the existence of multimember
districts) also has a positive but substantively weak
impact on representational form.
It was thought that partisan bias would result from
partisan gerrymandering during redistricting.

While party

control of redistricting does have the hypothesized effect
in eight of the nine even-numbered election years, only in
1970, 1976, and 1982 did gerrymandering effects reach
statistical significance.

The results for partisan bias

support recent studies that suggest that gerrymandering at
the state level is not pervasive but does occasionally
occur.

xv

CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION

Over the past several years, legislative elections
have become the focus of a great deal of scholarly
research.

Students of Congress and of state legislatures

have produced a voluminous literature on legislative elec
tions.

This study is another contribution to the growing

body of research concerning state legislative elections.
Specifically, this study is concerned with the rela
tionship between partisan votes and partisan seat alloca
tion in U. S. state legislative elections.

Following the

pathbreaking work by King and Browning (1987), I measure
the form of representation and the level of partisan bias
found in elections in the states.

Finally, I test hypothe

ses pertaining to factors explaining the levels of partisan
bias and representational form found in these elections.
A few efforts have been made to identify partisan bias
and representational form in the U. S. states.

However, my

study expands previous work by including more states (46)
over a more inclusive time period (1968-87).

Also of

importance is the fact that I use individual elections in
each state as the units of analysis and employ a pooled
cross-sectional time series analysis to test my models.

1

2
SEATS-VOTES RELATIONSHIPS AND REPRESENTATION
Components of Representation
In much of the previous work on representation, the
emphasis has been placed on the activities of elected
representatives.

Representation, in essence, is what

representatives (usually defined as legislators) do.

In

Pitkin's words, representation is "acting in the interest
of the represented,
2 06).

in a manner responsive to them"

(1967,

This behavioral definition of representation is

believed to have a number of components.
Policy responsiveness refers to the extent to which a
legislator's committee activities, roll-call behavior, and
oversight activities conform to the policy views of his or
her constituents (Eulau and Karps 1978, 63; Fiorina
1974, 1; Jewell 1982, 18).

The legislator serves as the

conduit through which constituency demands are transformed
into public policy.

The question of policy congruence

between legislator and constituents has been the subject of
a number of scholarly endeavors (See, for example, Clausen
1973; Erikson 1978; Glazer and Robbins 1985; Herring 1990;
Jackson and King 1989; Kingdon 1977; Kuklinski 1977;
HcCrone and Stone 1986; Miller and Stokes 1963; Sullivan
and Uslaner 1978; Wright 1989; Wright and Berkman 1986).
Allocation responsiveness pertains to the efforts of
the representative to provide public goods and services to
his or her constituents as a group or as individuals (Eulau

3
and Karps 1978, 65-66; Jewell 1982, 19-20).

To use the

vernacular, this component of representation concerns the
extent to which a legislator is able to "bring the bacon"
(i.e., public projects) back to the district.

As noted by

Eulau and Karps (1978, 65), this component of representa
tion was traditionally viewed as a "public good;1' however,
"with the expansion of the government's role in all sectors
of society, the distinction between public and private
benefits is difficult to maintain."

Furthermore, some

individuals within the district may "make more use of the
benefits" than others (1978, 65).

The legislator attempts

to anticipate constituents' needs and may even stimulate
their wants.

The point is that, as with policy respon

siveness, the emphasis is on the behavior of the individual
representative.
Service responsiveness concerns the legislator's
ability to provide specialized benefits to an individual or
group of individuals within the district (Eulau and Karps
1978, 64; Fenno 1978, 101-135; Jewell 1982, 20).

This

could involve assistance in dealing with a government
agency, pressuring bureaucrats to skirt rules, providing
government jobs, or intervening with landlords or utility
companies on behalf of a constituent.

The idea is that

representatives can use their positions to solve conflicts
that have little to do with policy considerations.

4

Finally, there is a type of responsiveness that
involves communication between legislator and constituency
(Fenno 1978; Jewell 1982, 20-21).

Some have dubbed this

component of representation "symbolic responsiveness" and
have defined it as a psychological attachment of constitu
ents to legislator (Eulau and Karps 1978, 66-67).

others

have emphasized the belief that representatives can
heighten their support by visiting their districts and
"presenting" themselves to the voters, allocating staff to
the district to keep in touch with constituents, and by
taking the time to explain their work and their policy
stances to the "folks back home" (Fenno 1978, 31-99,
136-46, 242).
Importance of the Electoral System
In addition to the behavior of legislators, it is
possible that the electoral system has an affect on repre
sentation.

For example, before representatives are free to

take actions that may (or, for that matter, may not) pro
vide benefits to their respective districts, elections
determine who will and who will not be present in the
legislature in the first place.

Candidates in the United

States and other democracies compete in elections to see
who will be in a position to "represent."

Only candidates

who pass the hurdles placed before them in the electoral
system win the opportunity to practice representation.

In the United States and in other democratic political
systems, parties serve as the vehicles through which candi
dates compete for legislative seats.

Though the general

ization may be less applicable to legislative elections in
the U. S. than to those in Western European nations, candi
dates are judged to a greater or lesser degree by their
party affiliation and by their consequent attachment to
their party's platform.

In turn, the voters' desires are

implemented by the winning legislative party or parties
through the legislative machinery.
The fact that members of the winning party usually
have the ability to pass their policies and provide bene
fits to their supporters highlights the importance of the
method in which seats are translated into votes in legisla
tive elections.

Far from being a trivial matter destined

for status as an endnote in the annals of representation,
the relationship between seats and votes in legislative
elections could have a direct bearing on politics and
policy in any democratic polity.

Thus, the electoral

system is itself an important subject of study to political
scientists and to other scholars who may be concerned with
representation.

The literature on the swing ratio (e.g.

Browning and King 1987; Campagna 1991; Caropagna and Grofman
1990a; Campagna and Grofman 1990b; King and Browning 1987;
Lijphart 1990; Niemi and Fett 1986; Ragsdale 1983;
Taagepera and Shugart 1989) is testimony to the importance

6
that researchers place on electoral structure as an element
in representation.
Seats, Votes, and Democratic Theory
In addition to empirical theorists, normative politi
cal theorists have also acknowledged that the seats-votes
relationship is at the very heart of the issue of represen
tation in a democratic polity.

In some quarters it is

thought that proportional representation is the representa
tional form that is "fairest" or that best represents the
entire polity.

In proportional representation systems, the

percentage of seats allocated to a party equals the per
centage of the votes won by that party (i.e., a one percent
increase in votes results in a one percent increase in
seats).

Others, however, suggest that a majoritarian form

of representation is best.

Majoritarian forms of represen

tation expand the leading party's share of legislative
seats beyond the percentage of the vote won (at least when
the vote is close to the 50% range)
Shugart 1989).

(See Taagepera and

The inflation of seats to votes under

majoritarianism is believed to provide stability in the
legislature (and government) by producing a stronger legis
lative majority (and ruling coalition). This seat inflation
in a majoritarian system also provides the winners with a
sense that they have a mandate to implement the party's
agenda, even if the mandate is built on a seat advantage
that is artificially high when compared to their votes.
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Although majoritarian systems do inflate the allocation of
seats in favor of the dominant party,

it is arguable that

such systems should not be deemed unrepresentative.

As

long as each party can win the same percentage of seats by
winning a certain percentage of the vote, a majoritarian
election system may be viewed as unbiased, and hence repre
sentative.
Dahl (1956, 63-89) is concerned with the democratic
dilemma of encouraging minority representation within a
framework of majority rule.

Dahl does not proscribe a

particular system of representation; in fact, he appears to
be somewhat ambivalent on the issue.

On one hand, one

could argue that he seems to favor a majoritarian pattern
of representation.

He insists that a democracy must guar

antee that candidates or policies with the most votes
should displace alternatives with fewer votes.

In a multi

party democracy with a proportional representation
electoral system,

it is possible that the party that wins

the most votes and engages in formation of the government
failed to win a majority of the votes.

Depending on the

governing coalition negotiated by party leaders,

it is

conceivable that some policies that are favored by a major
ity of the voters will not be enacted.

While policies that

are favored by a majority of voters may not be enacted in
two-party systems either, this is more a result of weak
partisanship among voters and officeholders than the result
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of institutional arrangements.

For example, in two-party

systems (which usually have a majoritarian electoral sys
tem) parties may not have a policy agenda that is ideologi
cally consistent, voters may not consistently link policy
alternatives with the respective parties, or voters may
engage in split-ticket voting (thus minimizing the possi
bility for effective policymaking by the government).
However, these "flaws" in the policymaking ability of the
government in two-party democratic systems do not result
from electoral laws.
On the other hand, however, one could argue that Dahl
appreciates the inclusivity that is present in proportional
representation systems.

Dahl believes that the ability of

an individual or group to have their preferences included
in the policy agenda is critical in a democracy.

While one

might have difficulty determining whether a majoritarian or
proportional system of representation better facilitates
policy discussion before an election,

it appears that more

diverse groups will be better represented in policy discus
sions after elections in multiparty, proportional represen
tation systems.

Legislators and party leaders must keep

each party in the government satisfied for the governing
coalition to survive.

Ultimately, Dahl concludes that

minority interests will be represented adequately by either
arrangement in a socially complex society because of over
lapping patterns of individual interests.

His assumption
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seems to be shared by Pitken (1967), who argues that repre
sentation is guaranteed so long as elections are frequent
and fair.
While it is not inconceivable that proportional repre
sentation could result from plurality systems with single
member districts (such as is found in some elections in the
U. S. states), it seems more likely that the seats-votes
ratio will differ from the proportional representation
value in these particular election systems.

The fact that

the great majority of U.S. state legislative elections are
conducted in single-member districts with a "plurality
winner" rule means that losing candidates can poll a rela
tively high percentage of the vote but not win the seat.
Thus, while losing parties can win as much as 49% of the
total vote, they can conceivably win no seats.
Finally, there is the issue of the dynamic relation
ship between seats and votes under different forms of
representation.

In election systems where there is a

proportional relationship between seats and votes, many
scholars would argue that vote changes are adequately
translated into legislative seats.

In single-member dis

trict, plurality election rule systems, however, a
proportional relationship between seats and votes in the
aggregate might suggest that the allocation of seats is not
as responsive to changes in the partisan choice of voters
as some might wish.

Assuming that an inflated majority is
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desired to facilitate the winning party's ability to gov
ern, one might argue that a system in which seat changes
are more responsive to vote changes is preferred.
addition,

In

if a relatively large shift in the aggregate

partisan vote does not result in a relatively large seat
change in a single-member district plurality winner sys
tems,

it may be the case that one party has benefitted from

partisan gerrymandering or that incumbents from both par
ties have benefitted from redistricting arrangements.
THE CONCEPTS OF PARTISAN BIAS
AND REPRESENTATIONAL FORM
In an election system with proportional representation
rules, obviously, the percentage of votes won by a party
will equal the percentage of legislative seats allocated to
that party.

There are two characteristics of the seats-

votes relationship that can cause the partisan percentage
of seats to deviate from the partisan percentage of the
votes.

This deviation could result from the representa

tional form found in the election system or from partisan
bias that may exist in the election system.
Representational Form
Gary King and Robert X. Browning (1987) suggest that
there is a distinction between two important aspects of the
relationship between partisan votes and partisan seat
allocations in legislative elections.

Partisan representa

tional form pertains to the change in seats associated with
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the change in the partisan percentage of the vote.

Repre

sentational form can be proportional, winner-take-all, or
variations on a majoritarian form.
Proportional representation refers to an election
system in which the percentage of the votes won by a par
ticular party yields the exact same percentage of seats for
the party.

Alternatively, a winner-take-all system is

characterized by the situation in which the party that wins
50% plus one vote wins all the legislative seats.

Some

where in between the proportional system and the winnertake-all system is the majoritarian election system.

In

such a system, there is an exaggeration of seats won by the
winning party, although the discrepancy between percentage
of seats and votes won by the winning party is not as great
as in the winner-take-all system.

A party in a majori

tarian system usually wins few seats until it approaches
50% of the vote; each incremental percent of the vote won
close to the 50% mark results in a seat gain of greater
than one percent.

As the party's percentage of the vote

continues to increase above the 50% mark, at some point
seat gains will again be smaller than one percent for each
incremental percent of votes won.
Partisan Bias
King and Browning define partisan bias as

"asymmetry

[in] the seats-votes relationship, resulting in an unfair
partisan differential in the ability to win legislative
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seats:

the advantaged party will be able to receive a

larger number of seats for a fixed number of votes than
will the disadvantaged party (1987, 1251-52)."

They

believe that partisan bias is absent in a system in which
"x% of the Democratic votes produces an allocation of y% of
the seats to the Democrats, then in another election under
the same system x% of the Republican votes would yield the
same y% Republican allocation of seats (1987, 1252).

In

other words, a system in which the Democrats won 55% of the
votes and 60% of the seats would not necessarily be a
biased system.

Only in the case in which Republicans won

55% of the votes and won more or less than 60% of the seats
would there be a partisan bias according to the standard
proposed by King and Browning.
According to King and Browning, then, the measure of
bias is independent of the estimation of representational
form.

The techniques I use to measure form and bias and to

test to see whether the losing party would win more or
fewer seats than the winning party at a certain percentage
of the vote are explained in detail in a later chapter of
this work.

In addition, the empirical distinctions between

form and bias are graphically displayed in Chapter Three of
this dissertation.
THE PURPOSE OF THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation has a twofold purpose.

First, I

estimate bias and representational form for 46 U. S. state
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legislatures from 196B to 1986.

Every lower house election

for these states in each year will be studied.
After the levels of partisan bias and representational
form have been measured for each election in the time
series, the second purpose of the research is to explain
variation in bias and representational form over time and
across states.

This portion of the project involves the

use of pooled data in an attempt to explain the causes of
changes in bias and form from state to state and from one
time period to the next.
There are a number of reasons why such a study is
warranted.

First, there has not been an attempt to measure

partisan bias and representational form for individual
elections in the U. S. states for a twenty-year period of
time.

In past attempts to measure bias and representa

tional form, researchers have aggregated elections to
generalize about an election system for an extended period
without noting the pecularities of individual elections
(King and Browning 1987; Niemi and Jackman 1991).

In those

studies where individual elections are analyzed, only a
small number of states are used (Browning and King 1987;
Campagna 1991; King 1989).
Second, there have been relatively few attempts to
explain variation in representational form and partisan
bias in the U. S. states.

King and Browning (1987) have

tested very parsimonious theories about representational
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form and bias in congressional elections and Taagepera and
Shugart (1989) and Rae (1967) have studied representational
form and partisan bias in national elections in a number of
nations.

Campagna (1991) has measured bias as a result of

partisan redistricting but, as noted above, only for a
small number (15) of states.

Niemi and Jackman (1991) have

examined changes in the swing ratio.
have

Niemi and Jackman

also analyzed changes in partisan bias as a result of

partisan redistricting for almost all the states over
decades but not in individual election years.
however,

As yet,

in no single study has a researcher utilized the

King and Browning measure of representational form and
partisan bias and sought to test variation in both of these
components for individual elections in each of the U. S.
states.

Furthermore, previous models used to explain

variation in representational form have been simplistic.

I

examine variation in representational form using a more
comprehensively specified model.
THE EMPHASIS ON THE U. S. STATES
Why should one be interested in such a study at the
U. S. subnational level?

The fact is that since district-

level data for U. S. state legislative elections over a
twenty-year time period have become available in computerreadable format, state legislative elections have become an
area of increasing scholarly attention.

Certainly data

availibility tends to spark interest in an area of
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research.

However, aside from the fact that available data

often results in scholarly inquiry, there are at least two
other more important reasons why state legislative elec
tions might become topics of interest to political scien
tists and other scholars.
First, the U. S. states provide an excellent laborato
ry within which comparative political and social research
can be conducted.

As electoral systems continue to be of

interest to political scientists, the existence of the U.
S. states and their 50 electoral systems (each with their
own political and social idiosyncracies) offer opportuni
ties to test seats-votes relationships in a comparative
setting.

It is possible to test the generalizability of a

number of hypotheses that have been found to apply to
legislative elections throughout the world.
The ability to conduct such comparative research is
important in extending scientific Knowledge about partisan
votes and partisan seat allocation in legislative elec
tions.

Few examples of comparative research on partisan

bias and representational form exist (with the exceptions
noted above).

As new cases are examined over longer time

periods and new variables are introduced to explain the
seats-votes relationship, our Knowledge of legislative
election processes should be expanded.
Second, the present study should shed some light on
the political process in the U. S. states.

Only recently
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have the electoral systems of the states been studied
systematically.

Little is known about the seats-votes

relationship in the states, and almost nothing is known
about why certain patterns exist.

In fact, researchers

have only recently studied individual elections over a
lengthy period of time for 15 states.

Furthermore, no

attempt seems to have been made to explain representational
form in U. S. state legislative elections.
Because the great bulk of the literature on the swing
ratio is confined to research on the U. S. Congress,

it is

possible to study the seats-votes relationship at the U. S.
state level in light of previous findings concerning con
gressional elections.

In a sense, there is the opportunity

to compare U. S. state-level processes with U. S. nationallevel processes.

Implicit in this discussion is the

assumption that the U. S. states, with their social, eco
nomic, cultural, and political diversity, are worthy in
their own right to serve as units of analysis in social
science research.

Therefore, the present study is intended

to provide knowledge about election systems in general and
about state legislative election systems in specific.
PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION
The research findings presented in this dissertation
are divided into seven chapters including the first,
ductory chapter.

intro

The second chapter consists of a discus

sion of the literature concerning the various approaches
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taken to study the seats-votes relationship in legislative
elections.

In Chapter Two, I also summarize the substan

tive findings of previous work on the seats-votes relation
ship.
In the third chapter, more detail is provided on the
theoretical bases of partisan bias and representational
form, with particular attention paid to the King and
Browning conceptualizations.

In addition,

in the third

chapter I submit theoretical explanations for why certain
patterns of representational form should exist and why
partisan bias may or may not exist in legislative elec
tions.

I suggest that representational form in a state

will be a function of partisan competition at the district
level and of such election rule variables as district size,
number of seats, and the presence or absence of multimember
districts.

Partisan bias is believed to be the result of

party control of the redistricting machinery and intent to
manipulate the district boundaries for partisan gain.
In Chapter Four, I discuss the data and the methods I
use to estimate bias and representational form.

In addi

tion, I also operationalize the independent variables used
to test my hypotheses about why partisan bias and represen
tational form vary from state to state and from one year to
the next in any given state.

In Chapter Five, I present a

description of the findings concerning the magnitude and
frequency of the values of representational form and
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partisan bias.

Chapter Six contains the results of my

analysis for the representational form model and for the
partisan bias model.

In the final chapter, Chapter Seven,

I discuss the implications of my findings and the conclu
sions that can be drawn from the research.
CONCLUSION
One of the important assumptions made in this disser
tation is that an electoral system is as important a
component of representation as is the behavior of elected
representatives.

The allocation of partisan seats in a

legislature according to partisan votes is an important
element in a democratic form of government.

As such,

election systems are political phenomena worthy of study.
This research project fills a gap in the literature on
U. S. state legislative elections by analyzing data from
441 elections in 46 states from 1968 to 1987.
Of specific interest in this study are two character
istics of seats-votes relationships that are identified by
King and Browning (1987) as being conceptually and empiri
cally distinct:

representational form and partisan bias.

My first goal is to measure partisan bias and representa
tional form for each election in the time series.

My

second purpose is to explain variation in representational
form and partisan bias over time and among states with
models that incorporate variables related to partisan
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competition at the district level, election rules, and
partisan ability and intent to engage in gerrymandering.
This study is warranted by the relative inattention
paid to election systems at the U. S. subnational level.
In previous attempts to study seats and votes in the U. S.
states, researchers have utilized only a few states, a
relatively short time period, or have aggregated elections
to generalize about an election system as a whole rather
than analyzing individual elections.

Additionally, there

have been no attempts to explain representational form and
few attempts to explain partisan bias at the state level.
These oversights in the scholarly literature on legislative
elections are particularly striking considering the rich
possibilities for comparative research with the U. S.
states as units of analysis.

Finally, I argue that the

states are important political entities that are worthy of
study in their own right.

This dissertation then is both

an attempt to understand better the process of seat alloca
tion by votes in legislative elections in general and an
attempt to fill gaps in the literature on U. S. state
politics.

In the next chapter, I review the literature

relating to the seats-votes relationship in legislative
elections.

CHAPTER TWO:

LITERATURE REVIEW

As stated in the first chapter, the purpose of the
second chapter is to examine the literature concerning the
seats-votes relationship in legislative elections.

I

describe the attempts to define the seats-votes relation
ship in terms of a "swing ratio" and the various formula
tions of partisan bias.

Special attention is paid to the

King and Browning method of measuring representational form
and partisan bias.

I also examine the various approaches

to the use of data in this line of research and discuss the
strengths and weaknesses of each method.

A summary of the

findings pertaining to representational form and partisan
bias in U. S. national, U. S. state, and non-U. S. national
elections is provided.
EARLV APPROACHES TO DEFINING THE SWING RATIO
Early attempts to measure the seats-votes relationship
have stressed the importance of the swing ratio, which can
be defined as the number or percentage of seats that will
change party hands given a particular change (usually one
percent)

in the percentage of the vote won by the party

under consideration.

There are several approaches avail

able for measuring the swing ratio.

One involves using

actual election data from two elections (Nayhew 1978).

In

this manner, one simply calculates the change in a party's
seat shares divided by the party's change in vote shares
20
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from one election to the next.

Using regression analysis,

the swing ratio (analogous to representational form) would
be determined by the slope of the regression line charted
through only two points (elections).
Figure 2.1(a)

illustates the biyearly method of calcu

lating the swing ratio.

Using hypothetical data, one can

assume that Republican candidates in 1990 poll 48% of the
votes and only win 40% of the seats.

In 1992, Republicans

win 52% of the votes and 52% of the seats.

Rather than

calculating the regression line between the two points, one
can more easily determine the swing ratio in the manner
noted in the preceding paragraph.

The swing ratio using

these two elections would be 3.00 since the change in seats
of 12% corresponds to the change in votes of 4% (i.e.,
12/4=3).

If one used the 1992 and 1994 elections to

calculate a swing ratio, the results would equal one since
an eight percent change in votes (from 52% to 60%) produces
an eight percent change in seats (from 52% to 60%).
Another approach is to use actual multiyear election
data to measure system responsiveness and party bias.

The

difference between this technique and the biyearly form is
that the multiyear approach involves charting the regres
sion line through a number of data points (Niemi and Fett
1986, 77-78).
(1967).

Such an approach is undertaken by Rae

Rae uses data from 1945 to 1964 from Australia,

Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West

Figure 2.1(a)

Figure 2.1(b)

Biyearly Calculation of Swing Ratio with
Hypothetical Data, 1990-94

Multiyear Calculation of Swing Ratio
with Hypothetical Data, 1980-98
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Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United States.

Rae does not utilize

regression in his study, but he does identify patterns of
deviation between seats and votes using bivariate regres
sion.
Tufte (1973) also uses the historical data method.

He

employs longitudinal data on legislative elections from
Great Britain (1945-70), New Zealand (1946-69), the United
States (1868-1970), and the states of Michigan (1950-68),
New Jersey (1926-69), and New York (1934-66).

Tufte illus

trates that changes in the representation coefficient can
be charted over time using groups of three successive
elections (or election "triplets") and by producing a
representation coefficient for each four-year period of
time in U.S. congressional elections (See Tufte 1973, 550,
table 6).
Figure 2.1(b) provides an example of how a multiyear
swing ratio is produced.

The data points in this figure

represent results for Republicans in hypothetical elections
from 1980 to 1998.

The percentage of seats and the per

centage of votes for these 10 elections are plotted on a
chart.

A regression line representing the best fit among

the data points is created.

This regression line is then

used to calculate the swing ratio.

In the example in

Figure 2.1(b), one can quickly calculate the approximate
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awing ratio value by examining the seat change given some
change in vote increment.

It can be observed that a change

in Republican vote from 4 5% to 50% corresponds to an
approximate increase in seats from 41% to 51%.

This sug

gests that a 5% change in votes causes a 10% change in
seats; therefore, the swing ratio for this 10-year election
series is 2.00.
Some of the early work in the subject area stressed
more advanced approaches to the study of the swing ratio.
James P. Smith, who published as early as 1909, discovered
that the relationship between seats and votes in British
legislative elections could be calculated by the formula:
A / B - C3 / D\

(2.1)

where A = number of seats won by winning party, B * number
of seats won by losing party, C = % votes for winning
party, and D - % votes for losing party.

Kendall and

Stuart (1950) note that this "law of cubic proportion" or
"cube law" operated in Britain in 1935 and 1945 and in New
Zealand in 1949.

However, Kendall and Stuart point out

that the heavily Democratic vote in the southern United
States during the 1944 U.S. congressional election caused a
lack of uniformity in the distribution in proportion of
votes won by the Democrats across the country.

Neither did

the cube law apply to U.S. House of Representatives elec
tions in 1888-92 or 1966-70 (Tufte 1973).

A number of

approaches to the study of the translation of votes into
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seats have emerged as a result of these earlier research
efforts.
FORMULATIONS OF REPRESENTATIONAL FORM
AND PARTISAN BIAS
The early approaches to calculating the swing ratio
are overly simplistic.

The biyearly and historical methods

assume a linear relationship between seats and votes.
Likewise, the cube law specification suggests that the
swing ratio will always be close to 3.00 in single-member,
plurality winner districts.

The notion that vote changes

always produce seat changes in some linear or cubic propor
tion has been challenged by researchers over the last
several years.
The King and Browning Formulation
King and Browning (1987) believe that there are two
distinct,

important characteristics of the seats-votes

relationship in legislative elections:
form and partisan bias.

representational

They suggest that one can measure

the representational form (formerly known as the swing
ratio) and the partisan bias in an election system using
only one model.

They apply to congressional elections from

1950 to 1984 a variation of a model first suggested by
Tufte in 1973.

The popular version of the King and Brown

ing formulation that is commonly used by most practitioners
is:
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(S / [1 - S]> = b (V / [1 - V] )c

(2.2)

where S is a particular party's share of the legislative
seats, v is the same party's percentage of the vote won in
the election, b is the parameter that measures partisan
bias, and c is the parameter for representational form.
The advantage of this model is that it captures the range
of possible functions that can characterize the relation
ship between partisan votes and partisan seats.
In their equation, King and Browning explicitly dif
ferentiate between the form of representation and partisan
bias.

The form of representation is represented by a

coefficient ranging from 0 (no responsiveness of seat
changes to vote changes) to infinity [o€ ] (with the infi
nity value representing a winner-take-all form of repre
sentation) .

A representational form parameter of 1.0

indicates a system of strict proportional representation.
A coefficient between these extreme values (usually thought
to be close to 3.0 by those who identified tne "cube law"
of British elections) exemplifies a majoritarian form of
representation, where vote percentages close to 50% (but
not equal to 50%) result in exaggerated seat gains for the
winning party.

Thus, as c increases (controlling for b ) ,

the election system takes on a more majoritarian form.
These ideal types of seats-votes curves can be visualized
in Figure 2.2.

The nuances of these ideal types will be

discussed in more detail in Chapter Three of this work.

27
Figure 2.2.
Three Examples of Representational Form,
No Partisan Bias
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The parameter for bias is independent of the represen
tational form of the election system and both parameters
are calculated simultaneously.

As the bias parameter

varies, one can identify how the seats-votes curve shifts
in favor of one party or the other.

That is to say, the

bias parameter measures the degree to which parties that
win the same percentage of the vote at any particular
representational form win identical percentages of the
seats in the legislature.

In the case of King and

Browning's equation, a bias parameter of 1.0 equals no
bias, a parameter of less than 1.0 equates to bias toward
the Democrats, and a parameter value of greater than 1.0
indicates that the system gives an "unfair" advantage to
the Republicans.
The Importance of the King and
Browning Formulation
King and Browning's work signals a break with the
early, elementary models of the swing ratio and with the
later, more sophisticated attempts to model the seats-votes
relationship.

They follow up on the suggestion by Tufte

(1973) and Grofman (1983) that there is not always a linear
relationship between seat changes and vote changes.

Like

wise, they agree with Tufte that the seats-votes relation
ship need not follow the cube law pattern.

Rather, they

choose to model the seatB-votes relationship to depict the

29
varying nature of this relationship.

Thus, they are able

to provide operationalizations for representational form
and partisan bias for all types of legislative elections.
Second, the mere idea that partisan bias exists as a
characteristic of the election system that is distinct from
representational form was a break from previous research.
Although Tufte (1973) and Grofman (1983) hinted that this
might be the case, they did not investigate this possi
bility with election data to the extent that King and
Browning did.

In fact, this theoretical and empirical

breakthrough is closely related to the fact that King and
Browning do not specify any particular representational
form parameter in their model.

In essence, by assuming

that the seats-votes relationship was linear, previous
researchers had identified as bias any deviation between
the percentage of the seats and the percentage of the votes
won by a particular political party.

King and Browning

attribute some of this deviation to the fact that the
representational form may not be proportional.

If the

system were majoritarian in nature, then some deviation
between the proportion of the seats and votes garnered by a
party would be expected (assuming that one were examining
the relationship at other than the 50% vote point on the
continuum).
Therefore, King and Browning suggest that early
attempts to measure bias were not measuring bias at all
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(or, at least, not exclusively).

Partisan bias exists only

as asymmetry in the actual representational form found in
the system.

Because previous research assumed some parti

cular relationship between partisan seats and partisan
votes, therefore, previous models used to measure bias
and/or representational form were misspecified and did not
correctly measure either characteristic of the election
system.

Because their model allows for the form of bias to

depend on the type of representational form and therefore
allows "for every possible degree of partisan bias and
every possible form of democratic representation," they
believe their model to be more realistic than other models
of the seats-votes relationship (King and Browning 1987,
1256).
Other Formulations of the Seats-Votes Relationship
Other approaches to the study of the seats-votes
relationship that are similar to that of King and Browning
have emerged in the literature.

As a forerunner of King

and Browning, Grofman (1983) compares the mathematical
properties of the measures of bias and proportionality that
had appeared in the literature up until the time of his
writing.

He finds the swing ratio of Tufte calculated "in

the neighborhood" of 50% of a party's votes to be an appro
priate measure of proportionality in the seat-votes rela
tionship.
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However, Grofman believes that "bias as a gini-indexlike measure of the area under seats-votes discrepancy
curves is best able to deal with properties of the seatsvotes relationship over the entire range of [votes]"
(Grofman 1983, 308, 317).

Grofman's equation (1983, 314)

is based on the uniform partisan swing approach to data
collection:
(2.3)
where D is partisan bias, x is vote share, S, (x) is seat
share of party l corresponding to a vote share of x, S2(x)
is seat share of party 2 corresponding to the same vote
share of x, and D4(x)

(obviously) is the seat share of

party 1 if its vote share is x minus the seat share of
party 2 if its vote share is x.

Grofman also notes that if

the seat percentage and vote percentage are linearly
related,

i.e., if:
S - B,V + T,

(2.4)

where S is a party's seats, B, is the regression coeffi
cient for the vote percentage when seats are regressed on
vote percentage, V is a party's vote percentage and is the
error term when seats are regressed on vote percentage,
then Equation 2.3 becomes:
D -
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where D, B,, x, and 04 are defined as in Equations 2.3 and
2.4.

Grofman does "not bother to work out the implications

for [partisan bias] of a nonlinear seats-votes relation
ship .

.

." (Grofman 1983, 314).

He goes on to stress

that a "normalized measure of bias" ranging from -1.0 to
1.0 might be optimal, although such a recalculation of his
"ideal equation" does not appear to be essential.
To illustrate how this technique operates, Grofman
uses data produced by Scarrow (1981).

Scarrow uses the

uniform partisan swing approach to calculate partisan seats
and votes.

However, Scarrow only estimates bias from

hypothetical swings of plus and minus 5% of the vote around
the 50% mark (i.e., from each parties hypothetical vote of
from 45% to 55%).'

In addition, Scarrow does not use

regression but calculates bias as the net difference at
each point.

Grofman takes the data from Scarrow and puts

it in a graph format for purposes of illustration.

Table

2.1 is a reproduction of the Scarrow data from the Connec
ticut Assembly elections of 1970 and 1972.

These data are

produced by excluding uncontested elections and calculating
the two-party vote for Republicans and Democrats.
by Grofman,

As noted

in the 1972 Connecticut Assembly there is a

bias reversal:

"below 53 percent of the votes D4 indicates

a Republican advantage, above 53 percent of the vote D4
indicates a Democratic advantage (Grofman 1983, 310)."

TVir \ . t
DEMOCRATIC AND REPU31ICAN SEAT SHARES IN THE CONNECTICUT ASSIMULY
AT SELECTED PROPORTIONS OT THE STATEWIDE (IWO PARTY) VOIE IN 1 9 / 0 AND 19U
FOR HYPOTHETICAL ELECTIONS BASED ON UNIFORM SWINGS ACR05S ALL DISTRICIS
FROM THE OBSERVED SEAT-VOTE VALUE IN THAT YEAR
Proportion
of Statewido Vote*

Sw ing
45;

461

Deei
1970 Rep
Bias

42.9
34.5
+8.4

45.a
35.6
+ 10.2

\
Oem
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36.4
32.5
+3.9

38.4
37.1
+ 1.3

Source:
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48.0
37.9
+ 10.1
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Scarrow (1981, Table III). Cell entries indicate seat percentages that a party
would have achieved at the (column) specified vote share. Arrows indicate actual
election outcomes. Boxed outcomes represent situations where a party with a vote
share less (more) than .5 would achieve a projected seat share greater Ileus)
than .5.
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Figures 2.3 and 2.4 are Grofman's efforts to graph the
data from Scarrow (1981).

Grofman suggests that the best

measure of bias is the area between the respective party
curves:

"Moreover,

if we use a positive sign for the area

where the curve for party l is above that for party 2, we
have a natural way of capturing in a single number the net
bias over a range of election outcomes (1983, 310)."
There are two differences between the methods of King
and Browning (1987) and the suggestions made by Grofman
concerning the Scarrow data.

First, the former emphasize

the need to allow the representational form coefficient to
be unspecified by the researcher.

Second, King and

Browning prefer to measure bias as deviation from a "no
bias" curve given the particular estimate of representa
tional form found in the election.

In this particular

circumstance, Grofman seems to assume that the system
should be proportional and then measures bias as the devia
tion between points on the curve for each party.
less, asmentioned earlier, Grofman does
election

Nonethe

recognize that

an

system does not necessarily have to be propor

tional; he simply does not test this assumption with data.
Taagepera and Shugart (1989) introduce a twist to the
King and Browning model.

Their equation, which they argue

is applicable to plurality elections is:
(SK /
where n = log V

SL) = (VK / VL)\
/ log E, where SK isthe seats for the

(2.6)
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winning party, s, is the seats for the losing party, VK is
the votes for the winning party, VK is the votes for the
losing party, V is the total number of voters, and E is the
total number of electoral districts.

The authors are not

really interested in producing a parameter measuring parti
san bias.

As shown in Figure 2.5, however, they do plot

curves on a graph with the x-axis as percent vote shares
and the y-axis as the advantage ratio (%

seats / % votes)

to illustrate how different electoral systems deviate from
strict proportionality in the seats-votes relationship.
Taagepera and Shugart are more concerned with measuring the
form of representation and identifying independent vari
ables that explain the representational forms (1989,
166-93).

Their equation could perhaps be transformed to

include a bias parameter.

However, because the present

research program specifies party-related causes of partisan
bias, the work by Taagepera and Shugart is important pri
marily for its contribution to explaining representational
form.
In addition, a number of other researchers have
recently applied the King and Browning approach with slight
modifications to a variety of electoral contexts.

Niemi

and Jackman (1991) apply both the biyearly swing ratio
model and the King and Browning approach to ICPSR election
data in their study of state legislative elections in 45
states in the 1970s and 1980s.

Campagna (1991), Campagna

Figure 2.5. Predicted Proportionality Profiles
at a Number of District Magnitudes

1.0

ADVANTAGE

RATIO

< A > * S '« V )

1.1

100

Source:
Taagepera and
Shugart (1989, 192)
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and Grofman (1990a), and Browning and King (1987) alao
adopt King and Browning's method in their studies of U. S.
state legislative election systems.

Garand and Parent

(1991) use the same approach in their work on the U. S.
electoral college as do Gelman and King (1990)
work on Congress.

in their

In addition, King (1990) borrows the

same technique in his study of multiparty democracies.
Ansolabehere and King (1991) also apply the King and
Browning method to presidential primaries and caucuses in
1976-88.
DIFFERENT METHODS OF USING DATA
In addition to the variety of ways in which seatsvotes relationships can be defined, there is a dispute in
this area of research as to how to use election data to
best represent the relationship.

The two approaches to

employing data for studying the seats-votes relationship in
legislative elections are to use actual election results or
to use hypothetical data that are generated from an actual
election result.

Both of these methods have been used by

scholars of voting behaviour.

Each approach has particular

advantages and disadvantages.
Use of Actual Election Results
As noted previously, one approach to using data to
study the relationship between partisan seats and votes is
to employ actual election data from two elections.

Another
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approach is to use actual election data from multiple
elections to measure system responsiveness and party bias.
The point is that in both cases, data on seats and votes
from actual elections become points through which a regres
sion line is drawn.
Both Rae (1967) and Tufte (197 3) utilize historical
election data.

Other researchers have used the historical

approach to measure partisan bias and responsiveness in
electoral systems.

Niemi and Jackman (1991), Gryski, Reed,

and Elliott (1990), and Browning and King (1987) apply the
historical method to U.S. state legislative election sys
tems.

Taagepera and Shugart (1989, 156-98) and King (1990)

use the historical method to chart seats-votes curves for
national lower house elections in the United Kingdom, New
Zealand, Canada, the United States, Finland, Japan, Aus
tria, Switzerland, Italy, and the Netherlands.

While most

of their findings are calculated using another approach,
Garand and Parent (1991) also report some results for the
U. S. electoral college that are based on historical data.
Use of the Uniform Partisan Swing Method
Alternatively, Butler (1951) suggests that partisan
bias can be discovered by using data from one election.
Taking actual election returns from Great Britain, Butler
makes the case that one could create hypothetical data by
increasing the district vote for the other major party by
certain increments (preferably one percent).

The changes
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in seats provided by the hypothetical incremental changes
in votes should tell the researcher much about which party
benefits from the electoral arrangement.

Butler ultimately

concludes that partisan bias can be identified by examining
the partisan seat distributions when the respective parties
are provided with 50% of the hypothetical two-party vote.
The uniform partisan swing method was eventually adopted by
Campagna and Grofman (1990b) and Gelman and King (1990) to
measure bias and responsiveness for U.S. congressional
redistricting, by Scarrow (1981, 1982, 1983) to measure
bias in state legislative elections in New York and Con
necticut, by King (1989) to estimate responsiveness and
partisan bias in six U. s. state House of Representatives
elections after redistrictings, by Campagna and Grofman
(1990a) and Campagna (1991) to measure responsiveness and
party bias in 15 state upper and lower houses, and by
Backstrom, Robins, and Eller (1978) to identify partisan
bias in the Minnesota state senate election of 1972.

In

addition, Garand and Parent (1991) apply the uniform parti
san swing method to measure partisan bias and responsive
ness in the U. S. electoral college system.
Advantages of Using Actual Election Results
A number of researchers have argued the merits of the
three methods of data application.

Either of the tech

niques using actual election results has the advantage of
data availability.

Even state legislative election data
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are now relatively easy to utilize.

Basically, the use of

actual data means that one does not have to go through the
step of manipulating the data to see how many seats are won
by a party given incremental changes in the partisan vote
percentages.
Aside from being easier to employ, the two approaches
in which election results are utilized are satisfying in
the sense that one is not asking "what might have been” but
is instead dealing with what actually transpired in any
given election.

Election results from the uniform partisan

swing method are simulated.

One is measuring what would

have happened if voters would have changed their prefer
ences at the same rate across all election districts.

Some

researchers might be philosophically opposed to a technique
that makes the latter assumption; others may be in opposi
tion to any method other than one that makes use of only
actual election results.
Disadvantages of Using Actual Election Results
A biyearly measure of the swing ratio is susceptible
to wide fluctuation.
example,

Odd swing ratios would result,

for

in a case in which a party won 50% of the votes

and 49% of the seats in one election and 49% of the votes
and 50% of the seats in the following election [swing ratio
— (49 - 50) / (50 - 49) — -1.001].

Even the use of only 3

or 4 elections, a practice adopted by Tufte, causes very
unstable estimates.

A small sample of cases means that one

43
exceptional election outcome (i.e., an outlier) can unduly
affect the calculation of the swing ratio.

Of course, the

biyearly swing-ratio measure and Tufte's election triplets
can be useful for identifying anomalous elections, but for
providing generalizations about an election system as a
whole a longitudinal approach should be employed.

Niemi

and Fett (1986), however, note that the multiyear form of
the historical approach,

if it involves a large enough

number of elections (certainly more than Tufte's three),
solves this problem of the fluctuating swing ratios.
The multiyear approach also has its limitations,
however.

Findings can be affected by the length of the

time period used.

Scholars must walk a fine line between

choosing a time period that is so long that important
shifts in the swing ratios are masked or so short that
generalizations about the partisan bias and representa
tional form of the system cannot be made.

For election

data collected over long periods of time, divisions in the
time series are encouraged by Niemi and Fett.

Divisions

that are extremely short may make it difficult to determine
what the swing ratio is at the "current" time until newer
data become available.

The researcher must be sensitive to

these problems of temporality and roust be guided by theory
and previous research in making politically-relevant divi
sions of the data.
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A second disadvantage of the historical approach (both
biyearly and multiyear)

is that this formulation of the

seats-votes relationship is especially sensitive to whether
uncontested elections are included or excluded from the
data set.

The variation in uncontested elections over time

means that partisan percentage of the vote will sometimes
be inflated, thus affecting the calculation of the swing
ratio for the time perod.

Suggestions on how to how to

alleviate this problem will be discussed later in the work.
Third, swing ratio or responsiveness parameter values
may differ depending on which seats and votes data are
actually used.

This problem is only faced by scholars of

the U.S. congress, however.

For reasons that are not

entirely clear, the two compilations of data most commonly
employed —

one set accumula- ted by Stokes and Iverson

(1962) from Historical Abstracts and U.S. Statistical
Abstracts and the other compiled by Clubb and Austin (1984)
from Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections —
have slight discrepancies.

The discrepancies are most

acute before 1930 (Niemi and Fett 1986, 76-79, 84-87).
However, as previously mentioned, this is not a problem for
those who want to study state legislative elections.
Advantages of the Uniform Partisan Swing Approach
The "single-year" or uniform partisan swing method
also has its advantages and disadvantages.

On the positive

side, this method is not dependent on past election
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results.

This makes it particularly useful for judging the

fairness of a redistricting plan after only one election
(Niemi and Fett 1986, 82).

It is also useful in identify

ing an anomalous election without grouping two or three
elections together.

A related advantage is that trends in

bias and representational form can be charted crosssectionally for each election and longitudinally for the
series as a whole (Garand and Parent 1991, 7).
A second advantage to the uniform partisan swing
approach is that the swing ratio or representational form
coefficient is less dependent on how votes are counted
(i.e., whether uncontested elections are included in the
data set) than is the case with the historical approach.
Unlike the historical method, the uniform partisan swing
approach utilizes hypothetical changes in votes from a
single election.

The results from using the latter method

are thus not dependent on how data is coded in the previous
election(s).

Rather, the uniform partisan swing approach

involves the coding of hypothetical data from the actual
results from one election.

One would have to chart seat

changes given a 50% reduction in a party's vote in order
for the winner of an uncontested seat to "lose" that seat.
Thus, it is only at the extreme margins of plotting vote
increments that seat changes will occur (Niemi and Fett
1986, 87).2
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However, measures of partisan bias are sensitive to
the inclusion or exclusion of contested elections regard
less of which method of data collection is chosen (Tufte
1973, 542-43).

For example, under the uniform partisan

swing method, a Republican who ran uncontested would be
listed at 100%, 99%, 98%, etc., for 1% incremental decreas
es in Republican vote.

The resulting percentage of Repub

lican vote at the state level would be different depending
on whether the researcher included uncontested elections.
Third,

if one wanted to do so, one could use the

uniform partisan swing approach to estimate representa
tional form and partisan bias for vote proportions that are
larger or smaller than historical vote proportions.

For

instance, plotting extreme vote proportions would allow one
to test whether or not both parties in any given state
could win all the seats in the state legislature with the
same percentage of the vote (Garand and Parent 1991, 7).
The historical method, of course,

is limited by actual

election outcomes.
Disadvantages of the Uniform Partisan Swing Approach
There are three weaknesses in the uniform partisan
swing approach.

One weakness results from the manner in

which the technique has been applied and the other two are
inherent weaknesses.

Niemi and Fett (1986, 80) criticize

Butler for only using 11 points (plus and minus 5% of the
two-party vote won by a particular party and the actual

two-party percent of the result won by that party) rather
than a larger number of points.

Of course, as noted in the

preceding paragraph, the vote percentage points used by
Butler are not etched in stone.

It is conceivable that

hypothetical data could be charted for a party from 0% of
the vote to 100% of the vote in the districts.

In fact,

one could produce estimates of partisan bias and represen
tation for a number of different data points and compare
results to discover the implications of charting a certain
number of points.
Second, the uniform partisan swing method obviously
contains the assumption that vote changes occur uniformly
across election districts.
for a number of reasons.

This assumption is problematic
If a candidate wins by an

extremely large margin of the vote, then the plotting of
hypothetical increments across all districts could cause a
candidate to receive over 100% or less than 0% of the vote.
In addition, the assumption of uniformity of vote
swings is not necessarily valid empirically.

The appeal of

individual candidates and the possibility that issues that
are salient to the campaign are district-level issues
rather than state or national issues makes it implausible
for one to assume that partisan percentage of the vote
would change uniformly across districts.

For example, a

party with an incumbent of lengthy tenure in one district
would, ceteris paribus, receive a higher percent of the
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vote than would a candidate who carries the party label but
who is running for an open seat.

Another example would be

the case of an incumbent who is penalized by the electorate
due to a scandal while other partisans are judged on the
basis of party label, state issues, constituency service,
or their unscandelous record.

Furthermore, the assumption

of uniform vote swings denies researchers the opportunity
to differentiate between electoral forces that occur at the
national or state level from those that are unique to the
election district (King 1989).
Niemi and Fett, who minimize the problem of unifor
mity, state that the hypothetical approach is simply meant
to be "a general measure of the relationship between votes
and seats won" rather than an explanation of specific
election outcomes (1986, 82).

King (1989), however, incor

porates a complex measure of mean voter preference
distribution.

King's parameters include a measure of the

direction and degree of skewness and the peakedness of the
preference distribution.

King's use of this technique is

an effort to produce district differences in hypothetical
vote swings based on past district diferences in vote
swings.
The third apparent disadvantage to the uniform parti
san swing approach is that, in fact, the data are not
actual election results.

As with the second disadvantage

of this method, however, it should be remembered that the
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hypothetical method is a tool.

As suggested by Niemi and

Fett (1986, 82), "the hypothetical swing ratio [as applied
to U. S. congressional elections] measures what the effect
on the number of seats would be either of electoral forces
not directly controllable by the party (e.g., the state of
the national economy) or of forces that are rather broadly
and uniformly felt (e.g., nomination of an especially
popular or unpopular presidential candidate)."

It should

be noted that King (1989) also argues that the uniform
partisan swing approach to applying data is superior to the
historical data gathering technique.

Furthermore, one

should be reminded that the uniform partisan swing method
does use the values from actual election results as the
basis on which the hypothetical data are plotted.
SUBSTANTIVE FINDINGS ON SEATS AND VOTES
The literature on the seats-votes relationship gene
rally falls into three categories of election studies:
U. S. national elections, non-U. S. national elections, and
U. S. state elections.

In reporting the findings from

these three types of elections, one can also differentiate
between the findings concerning each of the two character
istics of the seats-votes relationship, representational
form and partisan bias.

In this section of the chapter,

the findings concerning representational and partisan bias
in the range of electoral contexts are reported.
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U. S. National Elections:

Representational Form

In this section, the findings pertaining to U. S.
national elections are discussed.
tion contests —

Several kinds of elec

congressional elections, presidential

elections, and presidential nomination contests —
under the rubric of U. S. national elections.

fall

Table 2.2

summarizes the results of studies pertaining to representa
tional form in these elections.
One of the early works on Congress was undertaken by
Dahl (1956).

Dahl examines the swing ratio for both Houses

of Congress in elections between 1928 and 1954 (1952 for
the Senate).

In a foreshadowing of things to come, Dahl

(1956, 148-49) regressed Democratic percent of the twoparty seats on Democratic percent of the two-party vote
(with an error term included), and finds that the coeffi
cient for the independent variable is 2.5 in the House
(RJ= .916) and 3.02 in the Senate (RJ».951) .
Tufte (197 3) illustrates that the responsiveness
coefficient for elections to the U.S. House of Represen
tatives was 2.39 for 1868 to 1970.

For 1948 to 1970,

however, the responsiveness coefficient declined to 1.93.
Using triplets of elections, Tufte shows that the respon
siveness coefficient was declining in U.S. congressional
elections over time (6.01 in 1870-74 and 0.71 in
1966-70).
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Table 2.2. suamary of Results for
R a p r a i n t t t i o u l Pora, O. 8. National Elections
Authors

Political
System

Range of
Scores

Dahl (1956)

Congress
(1928-54)

2.50

Assumes a linear
seats-votes rel .

Senate
(1928-52)

3 .02

Assumes a linear
seats-votes rel.

Congress
(1868-1970)

2 .39

Assumes a linear
seats-votes rel.

Congress
(1948-1970)

1.93

Assumes a linear
seats-votes rel.

Congress
(1870-74)

6.01

Uses election
triplets

Congress
(1966-70)

0.71

Uses election
triplets

Tufte

(1973)

King and
Browning (1987)

Congress
(1950-84)

0. 9 3 - V

King (1990)

Congress
(1946-86)

1.78

Taagepera and
Shugart (1989)

Congress
(1950-70)

2.93

Campagna and
Grofman (1990b)

Comment

Host states are
between 1.0-3.50

congress
(1980)

11-2.18

All states in
agg. produce 1.62

Congress
(1982)

68-1.85

All states in
agg. produce 1.77

King and
Gelman (1991)

Congress
(1946-86)

1.30-2.50

Geer (1986)

Pres. Prim.
(1972-84)

1, 05-3.71

Host values are
between 1.23-2.01

Pres. Prim.
Ansolabahere
and Cauc.
and King (1990)
(1976-88)

0. 96-6.56

Host values are
between 2.16-3.10

Garand and
Parent (1991)

1. 45-8.47

Host values are
between 4.00-6.00

Electoral
College
(1872-1988)
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King and Browning (1987) measure representational form
for each state for the U. S. congressional elections
between 1950 and 1984.

They find that the representation

coefficient ranged from 0.93 (in California) to infinity
(in five states), with 26 states having values ranging
between 1.00 and 3.50.

For purposes of comparison.

Figure 2.6 illustrates the frequency of representational
form coefficients in the states in the King and Browning
study.

The authors also present a short section of

research in which they provide empirical evidence that
Taagepera's index (which measures "the number of districts
relative to the number of voters") and party competition
(measured by a standardized version of the Ranney index)
are strongly, positively correlated with the representation
coefficients.

King (1990) estimates the representational

form parameter in the aggregate for U. S. House elections
(1946-86) to be 1.78.
Taagepera and Shugart (1989) measure the representa
tional form of elections to the U. S. House of Representa
tives from 1950 to 1970.

They examine the coefficients for

the time series as a whole.

They find that the congres

sional election system had a representational parameter of
2.93, closely following what would have been expected under
the cube law.
Campagna and Grofman (1990b) measure bias and repre
sentational form parameters for U. S. congressional

Percent of States

Figure 2 .6 . Frequency of Repreaentational
Form Coefficienta for Eaota State in coagraaaional
Electione, 19S0-S4.
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Source:
King and
Browning (1987)
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elections in 1980 and 1982 and for states categorized toy
party control of the redistricting machinery in the same
years.

They discover that the swing ratio is 1.62 in 1980

and 1.77 in 1982 for states in the aggregate.

In both

these years, elections in states in which one party con
trols all three state institutions (both houses of the
state legislature and the governorship) that are concerned
with redistricting had larger swing ratios than did states
with divided control of government (1990, 1249).

When they

delete states in which redistricting was performed toy the
courts or by a commission, the pattern remains the same for
1980 but changes slightly in 1982 (1990, 1252).

In the

latter election, the form parameter rises to 1.93 and
states with two institutions controlled by Republicans
produce a higher form coefficient (1.82) than do states
with complete Democratic control (1.79)
King and Gelman (1991) estimate representational form
for individual U. S. congressional elections from 1946 to
1986.

They find that every election except 1986 falls

between the 1.50 and 2.50 values for representational form.
In addition, they discern a clear trend in which represen
tational form declines over time.

In fact, the form values

decline from approximately 2.30 in the immediate post-War
years to 1.30 in 1986 (King and Gelman 1991, 126-27).
The consensus for congressional elections is that
representational form seems to be somewhat majoritarian.
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As the coefficients in the previous studies suggest, how
ever, U. S. congressional elections are less majoritarian
than what would be expected if the cube law were applica
ble.

There also seems to be a trend toward decreasing

responsiveness of seat changes to vote changes in the
competitive range as time progresses.
Geer (1986) adopts a "delegates/votes" ratio for
primary elections for the Democrats in 1972-84 and for
Republicans in 1976 and 1980.

He finds that the primary

systems are very close to proportionality, ranging from
1.23 (Democrats in 1976 and 1980) to 2.01 (Republicans in
1976).

An examination of the delegates/votes ratios for

individual candidates also shows that those who win the
nominations also have ratios that tend to be proportional.
Two exceptions to the latter trend are the more "majori
tarian" victories of McGovern in 1972 (responsiveness
coefficient of 2.30) and Ford in 1976 (2.14).
Ansolabehere and King (1990) also study presidential
nomination contests but they employ the King and Browning
technique to measure representational form and bias, they
use data from 1976 to 1988, and they control for election
rules.

They find that Republican contests are more respon

sive to vote changes than are Democratic contests.

Also,

not surprisingly, primaries without rules that demand
proportionality between seats won and delegates won (i.e.,
having district plurality rules) have a higher
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representational form than do proportional rule primaries
and caucuses.

Ansolabehere and King find that the form

coefficients range from 0.96 in Democratic caucuses in 1976
to 6.56 in Republican district plurality primaries in 1976.
While their results are similar to those of Geer, they find
that when they disaggregate partisan contests by type of
election rule district plurality primaries for both parties
are quite majoritarian (with most coefficients ranging from
2.16 to 3.10).
Garand and Parent (1991) study the representational
form of the electoral college.

In this work, the electoral

college is found to be highly responsive to votes, with the
representation coefficient of 5.38 indicating a system
somewhere between majoritarian and winner-take-all.

The

representation parameter for individual presidential elec
tions ranged from 1.45 in 1924 to 8.47 in the hotly con
tested election of 1960.
The results indicate that there is a variety of repre
sentational form patterns for U. S. national elections.
Presidential elections are highly majoritarian, most likely
because such contests involve winner-take-all rules in
relatively large electoral units (the U. S. states).
Presidential primaries with winner-take-all rules also have
relatively large representational form values.

Congres

sional elections, which of course have districts that are
smaller than the electoral units for presidential
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elections, have slightly majoritarian patterns.

Presiden

tial primaries and caucuses with proportional (or nearly
proportional) winner rules exhibit representational form
coefficients that are very nearly proportional.
U. S. National Elections:

Partisan Bias

As is the case with representational form, it is
possible to measure partisan bias in national elections in
the United States.

Most of the authors cited in the pre

ceding section also report findings for partisan bias.
Thus, the findings pertaining to bias in congressional and
presidential elections are discussed in this section.

A

summary of the results of these findings is provided in
Table 2.3.
Tufte (1973) measures partisan bias in elections to
the U.S. House of Representatives from 1866 to 1970.

He

defines bias as the proportion of vote required to give a
particular party of the researcher's choosing a majority of
legislative seats.

He finds that there was a slight bias

in favor of the Democrats in that only 49.1% of the vote
was needed to gain a majority of the seats (i.e., partisan
bias toward the Democrats of 0.9%).
Democratic bias increased to 1.2%.

From 1948 to 1970, the
Using triplets of elec

tions, he finds that the median absolute partisan advantage
was 1.4%, and that the Democrats were benefitted by bias in
10 of the 17 election triplets.
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Tibia 2.3. S u a u r y of Rasulta for
Partisan Bias, u. 8. National Blaetions
Authors

Comment

Political
System

Range of
Scores

Congress
(1868-1970)

0.9%
(Dem.)

Assumes a linear
seats-votes rel.

Congress
(1948-1970)

1 .2 %
(Dem.)

Assumes a linear
seats-votes r e l .

Congress
(1870-74)

1.4%
(Rep.)

Uses election
triplets

Congress
(1966-70)

0.71
(Dem,)

Uses election
triplets

King and
Browning (1987)

Congress
(1950-84)

— .92— H .12

King (1990)

Congress
(1946-86)

Campagna and
Grofman (1990b)

Congress -6.8%— 1-4 .5%
(1980)
(Rep.) (Dem.)

All states agg.
produce Demo, bias
of 4.4%

Congress
(1982)

-5.8%-+1.7%

All states, agg.
produce Demo, bias
of 1.3%

Congress
(1946-86)

-.15— *-.08

Interpreted as in
King and Browning
Most values are in
—0.11—+0.02 range.

Electoral -.98-+.38
College
(1872-1988)

Party direction of
signs is opposite
from King and
Browning 1987.
Most values are in
-0.35-+0.10 range.

Tufte (1973)

King and
Gelman (1991)

Garand and
Parent (1991)

-0.11

Negative values
are natural log of
bias in Repub.
direction;
positive values
are natural log of
bias toward Dems.
Most states have
values between .50
and -0.50.
Value represents
sign. Demo, bias
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Tufte also points the way toward future research.

He

illustrates that the uniform partisan swing method is
applicable to U.S. House of Representatives elections by
charting hypothetical data for 1968.

He finds that the

partisan bias was approximately 4.8% at 50% of the vote (in
favor of the Democrats) rather than the 7.9% bias found for
the 1966-70 election triplet.

He also notes that a logit

model could be used for his exercises, but he abandons this
approach in favor of the more easily interpretable coeffi
cients of the linear model.
King and Browning (1987) measure partisan bias in each
state for U. S. congressional elections from 1950 to 1984.
They do not convert their coefficients into a percentage of
bias at 50% of the vote, but rather report the actual
regression coefficients.
from -0.92

The bias coefficients range

(Republican bias in Maine) to 1.12 (Democratic

bias in Texas).

Thirty-one states had bias coefficients

between -0.3 and 0.3.

Half of the 48 states in the study

exhibit a Republican bias and the other half have Demo
cratic biases.

Only six states have bias coefficients that

exceed their standard errors; of these six states, three
are biased toward the Democrats and three have Republican
biases.

The authors also note that Democratic partisan

bias is significantly related to Democratic party strength
(King and Browning 1987, 1265-66).

Figure 2.7 illustrates

the frequency of partisan bias coefficients in this study.
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Percent of States

Figure 2.7. Frequency of Partisan Bias
Coefficients Cor Each Stats in Congressional
Elections, 1950-84.

16% J

12% H

0.4

Source:
King and
Browning (1987)

0.6
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Campagna and Grofman (1990b) find that the bias para
meters

for congressional elections in 1980 and 1982 were

significant and worked to the advantage of the Democrats.
At 50% of the vote, Democrats would have won 54.4% of seats
in 1980 and 51.3% of seats in 1982.

Excluding states in

which redistricting was performed by courts or commissions,
however, reveals that Republicans received the benefit from
bias:

at 50% of the vote, Republicans win 50.1% of the

seats in 1980 and 50.2% of the seats in 1982.

In cases in

which states with non-legislative redistrictings were
excluded and in cases where these states were included, the
effects of party control of redistricting were the same.
Split-party control resulted in Republican bias in 1980 and
in 1982.

Democratic control of redistricting resulted in

Democratic bias in 1980 and 1982, although bias was statis
tically significant only in the latter year.

Republican

control of redistricting ensured a strong Republican bias
in 1982, but Republican control of redistricting in 1980
surprisingly resulted in a strong bias in favor of the
Democrats (1990, 1249-1252).
King and Gelman (1991), controlling for incumbency
advantage, chart partisan bias in congressional elections
from 1946 to 1986.

The largest bias toward the Republicans

occurs in 1946 (log of bias of -0.14).

The 1984 election

is most biased toward the Democrats (0.07).

Most elections
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show a bias favoring the Republicans.

However, there is a

clear trend in bias over time toward the Democrats.
The differences in findings between Tufte and King and
Browning probably represent methodological differences and
or differences in the time periods each researcher studied.
Since Tufte is assuming a linear relationship between seats
and votes, the Democratic bias he discovers may be due to
the possibility that Democrats benefit from states having
majoritarian systems rather than benefitting from actual
partisan bias.

Additionally, the fact that Tufte is mea

suring bias using election triplets while King and Browning
are using data points from 1950 to 1984 probably account
for some differences in findings.

Finally, it may well be

the case that the difference in the way each researcher
aggregates party votes causes differences in outcomes.
While Tufte calculates party vote as the aggregate vote for
each party, King and Browning employ aggregate district
vote percentages for each party as the starting point for
their analysis.3
In addition, Taagepera and Shugart (1989, 106-107)
determine the deviation from proportionality of U. S. House
elections in 1984.

Their formula is:

D - <l/2)£ | s, - v, |

(2.7)

where [£ ] is the summation over all parties in the elec
tion.

They determine that the deviation from proportional

ity for the election in question is 6.7%.

Taagepera and

Shugart (1989, 138-39) also calculate the "break-even
point" for both houses of the U. S. Congress.

This point

represents the share of votes at which the average seatsvotes curve intersects with the curve that would represent
proportional representation.

For the Senate (1912-1970),

the break-even point is 47%; for the House of Representa
tives, this point is 4 6%.

As an example of what the break

even point represents, one can say that when the minority
party in Senate elections receives 47% of the vote it will
win approximately 47% of the seats.

Should the minority

party win less than 47% of the votes, it will increasingly
win a disproportionately lower percentage of the seats.
Of course, as has been noted previously, researchers
have been accused by King and Browning of confounding
partisan bias and representational form.

Researchers who

assume a linear relationship between seats and votes or who
do not offer empirical distinctions between form and bias
are especially suspect.

It is difficult to know if devia

tion from proportionality and break-even points are results
of partisan bias or a majoritarian representational form.
Garand and Parent (1991) estimate bias for the U. S.
electoral college for each presidential election from 1872
to 1988.

Of these 30 elections, 22 are biased toward the

Democrats and eight are biased toward the Republicans.
Fourteen of the bias coefficients that favor the Democrats
are significant at the .05 level.

Of the eight bias
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coefficients that favor the Republicans, four are signifi
cant at the .05 level.

The bias coefficient for the tine

series as a whole is in the direction of the Democrats but
does not reach even the most liberal level of statistical
significance.

The worst example of bias occurs in 1948,

when if Republicans had won 50% of the popular vote they
would have won only 27% of the electoral vote.
Additionally, Geer (1986) provides evidence of bias in
presidential primaries.

He finds that the vote typically

needed by all candidates to win 50% of the delegates ranged
from 37.7% to 49.7%.

Nomination winners, however, uni-

formally benefit disproportionately from primary rules.
The most extreme example is in 1972 when McGovern needed
only 3 0.7% of the votes to win 50% of the delegates.

The

least amount of bias is found in the Republican primary of
1976 when Ford needed 4 5.9% of the votes to win 50% of the
delegates.
Ansolabahere and King (1990) also find that nomination
winners generally (but not uniformly) benefit from a bias
in the election system.

However, when they control for the

election rules of the nomination process, the magnitude of
the bias is generally small (and not statistically signifi
cant).

For the years 1976 to 1988, significant bias is

found in 25% of cases involving Republican contests and in
29% of Democratic cases.

Republican bias is highest in

primaries with proportional winner rules and Democratic
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bias is highest in district plurality primaries and cau
cuses.

The worst cases of bias occur in 1988:

Bush bene

fits against Dole in 1988 Republican proportional winner
primaries and Dukakis benefits versus Jackson in Democratic
district plurality primaries.

In only one case, the 1988

Democratic caucuses in which Gore receives a bias against
Dukakis, does the eventual nomination winner experience a
significantly large bias to his detriment.
In general, there seems to be a bias toward the Demo
crats in congressional elections.

Tufte (1973) finds a

Democratic bias of approximately one percent from 1866 to
1970, with slightly higher levels of bias later in the time
series.

Campagna and Grofman (1990b) also find Democratic

biases of 4.4% and 1.3% in congressional elections in 1980
and 1982, respectively.

The electoral college system for

presidential elections also appears to be biased by the
Democrats.

Of the 30 presidential elections from 1872 to

1988, 14 were significantly biased in favor of Democrats,
four were significantly biased toward the Republicans, and
12 contained very small levels of bias (generally in the
direction of the Democrats).

In presidential candidate

selection processes, winners generally benefit from levels
of bias that are usually rather small but occasionally are
quite large.
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Non-U. S. National Elections:

Representational Form

Though most of the literature on the seats-votes
relationship is confined to the U. S. context, there is
some research on national legislatures other than the U. S.
Congress.

Because some of the scholars who study compara

tive legislatures do not attempt to identify separate
parameters for bias and form, one must be careful to inter
pret what they are measuring in order to find statistics
that are analogous to the characteristics that are
described by King and Browning.

Nonetheless,

it is possi

ble to discuss in separate sections findings pertaining to
representational form and partisan bias for elections other
than those occurring in the United States.

As such, this

section deals with the results of research on representa
tional form for non-U. S. national legislatures.

Table 2.4

summarizes the results of these findings.
Rae utilizes bivariate regression to identify patterns
of deviation between seats and votes.

In the aggregate, he

finds that regressing seats on votes for 20 Western democ
racies from 1945 to 1964 produces the equation (Rae 1967,
70-71, 89):
Seats » -0.0238 + 1.13(Vote)

(2.8)

For systems that use a plurality winner (or "first-pastthe-postH system) or a majoritarian system (a "winner-takeall" format, which applies only to the Australian lower
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Table 2.4. fluaury of Rcsulti for
Representational Fora, Non-U. S. National Elections
Authors
Rae (1967)

Tufte (1973)

Political
System

Range of
Scores

Comment

20 nations
(ca. 1945-ca. 1964)

1.13

Assumes a linear
seats-votes rel.
Also finds that
plurality winner
systems have swing
ratios of 1.20;
proportional
systems have swing
ratios of 1.07.

Great Britain
(1945-70)

2 .83

Assumes a linear
seats-votes rel.

New Zealand
(1946-69)

2.27

Assumes a linear
seats-votes re l .

Taagepera
and Shugart
(1989)

Canada
1 .01 - 2.86
Japan
Austria
Switzerland
Italy
Finland
Netherlands
(ca. 1945-ca. 1977)

Most nations are
in the 1.05 to
1.30 range.

King (1990)

Great Britain 0.87-1.82
Canada
Austria
Japan
Italy
Netherlands
Finland
(ca. 1919-ca. 1987)

Most nations are
in the 1.09 to
1.61 range.
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house and the first ballot vote for the French National
Assembly), the comparable equation is:
Seats * -0.063 + 1.20(Vote)

(2.9)

The same equation applied to proportional representation
systems (or variants of proportional representation sys
tems ) produces:
Seats - -.0084 + 1.07(Vote)

(2.10)

Rae also illustrates that the average change of vote
shares of 2.58% for all parties receiving greater than 2.0%
of the vote in proportional representation formula coun
tries equates to a 2.68%

average change in

seat shares.

The net

average magnification of changing party

strength is

0.10%.

For plurality and majority formulae, the 3.24%

average change in vote shares produces a 6.86% average
change in seat shares; net average magnification of
changing party strength is 3.62% (Rae 1967, 101).
Using longitudinal data on legislative elections from
Great Britain (1945-70) and New Zealand (1946-69), Tufte
(1973) finds that only elections in Great Britain produce
representation coefficients (analogous to the exponent in
the swing-ratio equation) that are close to the 3.00 speci
fied by the cube law.

In fact, the elections in Great

Britain produce a swing ratio of 2.83.

In New Zealand, the

swing ratio is 2.27.
Taagepera and Shugart (1989, 193) report representa
tional form coefficients for several Western democracies in
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the post-War era.

They find that Canada (1963-74) produces

the rather large coefficient of 2.86.

Other countries

exhibit more proportional forms of representation:

Japan

(1963-76) has a coefficient of 1.30; Austria's (1945-70)
form parameter is 1.20; Switzerland (1947-75) produces a
form value of 1.13; the form parameter for Italy (1958-76)
is 1.05; Finland (1962-75) produces a coefficient of 1.07;
and the Netherlands (1963-77) exhibits a form parameter of
1 .0 1 .

King (1990) examines the electoral responsiveness of
elections in a number of democracies.

He discovers that

election rules generally have an effect on form parameters.
For example,

in a nation such as Canada (1921-1984) that

has electoral systems with single-member districts, repre
sentational form values are relatively large.

The repre

sentational form parameter for Canada is 1.82.

In Austria

(1945-83) and Japan (1958-86), two countries with modified
proportional representation rules, the representational
form parameter values are 1.52 and 1.47, respectively.
Nations having proportional rules produce expected results.
Italy (1946-87) has a 1.11 representational form.
parameter for the Netherlands (1946-86) is 1.09.
(1919-83) produces a form parameter of 0.92.

The form
Finland

Finally, the

value of the form parameter in Switzerland (1919-83)
1 .1 1 .

is
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As one might expect, representational form values for
national legislatures outside the United States vary
between proportional representation and majoritarian pat
terns.

Another unsurprising finding is that election rules

at the district level strongly affect the representational
form coefficient.

Specifically, plurality or majority

winner rules in single-member districts and modified pro
portionality plans produce elections with larger represen
tational form coefficients than pure or nearly pure propor
tional representation plans.

In general, the findings

suggest that single-member district election rules in Great
Britain, Canada, and New Zealand result in representational
form coefficients that are similar

to the

form values found

in U. S. congressional elections.

By the

same token, as

would be expected, the U. S. Congress exhibits
tional form values that tend to be

representa

larger than those in

elections in nations that do not have single-member dis
trict plurality or majority winners.
Non-U. S. National Elections:

Partisan Bias

As is the case in U. S. congressional elections,
another characteristic of national legislative elections
outside the U. S. is the presence or absence of partisan
bias in the election system.

Partisan bias is important

because it can affect partisan seat distribution in the
legislature and can conceivably affect the legislature's
ability to represent the public in the ways discussed in
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Chapter One.

Though the literature on bias

representational form) is less extensive

(as was true of

in the non-U. S.

setting, there are still some research efforts that are
relevant to the discussion.

A summary of the results of

the studies concerned with partisan bias in these elections
is contained in Table 2.5.
Rae equates deviation from proportionality at 50% of
the vote as bias.

in his 20 nation study, he finds that in

systems having plurality or majority winner rules, 50% of
the vote equates to 53.7% of the seats.

In the cases in

which proportional winner rules prevail,

50% of the vote

corresponds to 52.7% of the seats (Rae 1967, 90).
Tufte finds that party bias does exist for Great
Britain in 1945 to 1970 and for New Zealand in 1946 to 1969
(See Tufte 1973, 543, Table 1).

In the former, the Labour

Party requires 50.2% of the votes to win a majority of the
seats.

Thus, Tufte concludes that the bias in Great Bri

tain is 0.2% in favor of the Conservative Party.

In New

Zealand, since the Labour Party needs 51.4% of the votes to
gain a legislative majority, the National Party is the
beneficiary of a 1.4% bias.
As noted earlier, the closest thing to bias that
Taagepera and Shugart (1989) estimate is deviation from
proportionality.
data from 1945-85.

For the 48 countries they study, they use
The smallest deviation from proportion

ality occurs in Greenland (0.2%).

The country with the
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Table 2.5. Suaatry of Results for
Partisan Bias, Non-U. 8. National Blaetiona
Authors

Political
System

Rae (1967)

Range of
Scores

20 nations
2.7%-3.7%
(ca. 1945-ca. 1964)

Tufte (1973)

King (1990)

Comment
Assumes a linear
seats-votes rel.
These f igures
represent what the
typical party
would receive at
50% of the vote in
proportional and
majority/plurality
systems,
respectively.

Great Britain
(1945-70)

0 .2 %

Assumes a linear
seats-votes rel.
Bias is in favor
of the
Conservative
Party.

New Zealand
(1946-69)

1.4%

Assumes a linear
seats-vote rel.
bias is in favor
of the National
Party.

Great Britain
Canada
Austria
Japan
Italy
Netherlands
Finland
(ca. 1919-ca. 1987)

0.00-1.60

Interpreted as in
King and Browning
1987.
The
largest bias is
the Conservative
Party bias vis-avis the Liberal
and Alliance
Parties in Great
Britain.
Host
values range
between 0 and 0.10
(very little
bias).
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largest deviation from proportionality is Sri Lanka (36.7%)
(1989, 106-107).

To use Sri Lanka as an example, the

authors explain that deviation from proportionality can be
interpreted to mean that "compared to perfect [proportional
representation,

36.7%] of the seats are shifted from some

parties to some other parties (1989, 105)."

The median

value of deviation from proportionality in their study is
7.6%.
King (1990, 171-74) calculates bias in multiparty
democracies by first estimating the seats-votes relation
ship for one party assuming an absence of bias and then
applying the same representational form parameter to other
party's seats-votes curves.

If a numerical value is pro

duced for the other parties, then it can be said that bias
exists in the relationships between each pair of parties
(i.e., the original party and each other individual party).
In Great Britain, he finds that the Conservative-Labour
party contest produces a 0.05 bias in favor of the Conser
vatives.

The Conservative Party also enjoys a very large

1.60 bias when pitted against the Liberal and Alliance
Parties.

In Canada, the Conservative Party benefits from a

very small bias against the Liberal Party (0.01) but a
rather large bias against the National Democratic Party and
other parties.

In proportional

and modified proportional

election rule systems, bias between the reference party and
other parties is insignificant.

There are small biases
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against the Socialist Party in Austria, the Liberal Demo
cratic Party in Japan, the Christian Democratic Appeal
Party in the Netherlands (when matched with the other major
parties) and the Social Democrats in Finland (when pitted
against other major parties).

In Italy, there is a small

bias in favor of the Christian Democrats.

Finally,

in

Switzerland, the Social Democrats benefit from a small bias
vis-a-vis the People's Party and other parties but are hurt
by a small bias when matched against the Radical Democrats
and the Catholic Conservatives.

In general, King's work

reveals that nations with single-member districts have
larger biases and biases that work more to the advantage of
the major parties than do modified proportional representa
tion and proportional representation systems.
The general concensus seems to be that bias is more
prevalent in single-member district elections than in
modified proportional representation or pure (or nearly
pure proportional representation systems.

Bias in Great

Britain, Canada, and New Zealand seem to be comparable to
the levels of bias found in U. S. congressional elections
(in particular, see King 1990, Tufte 1973).

Thus,

it seems

that election rules rather than other idiosyncratic,
country-specific variables have a strong effect on both
representational form and partisan bias in national legis
lative elections.
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u. S. State Legislative Elections:
Representational Form
Huch of the research on the relationship between
partisan votes and partisan seats, as has been noted, has
been conducted on the U. S. Congress.

However, the exis

tence of new data now allows for similar research to be
conducted for state legislative elections in almost all the
states.

Due to this new data, a substantial body of liter

ature has arisen in the past few years in which U. S. state
legislative elections have been analyzed.
with national elections,

As is the case

it is possible to identify mea

sures of representational form and partisan bias in legis
lative elections in the U. S. states.

In this sections, I

will discuss the findings on representational form in state
legislative elections.

A summary of these results is

provided in Table 2.6
Tufte (1973) estimates the responsiveness of the
election systems of three state legislatures.

Michigan

(1950-68) had a responsiveness coefficient of 2.06.

New

York (1934-66) had a responsiveness coefficient of 1.28.
New Jersey is found to have had two different patterns.
From 1926-47, the responsiveness coefficient for New Jersey
was 2.10.

In the later period, 1947-69, the responsiveness

coefficient in New Jersey was 3.65.
Two sets of researchers examine legislatures in indi
vidual states.

Scarrow (1982, 232-33) estimates the aver

age swing ratio in the New York State Assembly to be 1.90
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Table 2.6. S u a u r y of Raaulti for
Representational Form, u. a. state Elootion*
Authors

Political
System

Range of
Scores

Tufte (1973)

Michigan
(1950-68)

2.06

Assumes a linear
seats-votes rel.

New York
(1934-66)

1.28

Assumes a linear
seats-votes rel.

New Jersey
(1926-47)

2.10

Assumes a linear
seats-votes rel.

New Jersey
(1947-69)

3.65

Assumes a linear
seats-votes rel .

New York
Assembly
(1952-64)

1.90

Average swing
ratio over time
period

New York
Assembly
(1966-78)

1. 50

Average swing
ratio over time
period

Browning and
King (1987)

Indiana
House
(1972-84)

2 .05

King (1989)

Indiana
0.35-2.84
Connecticut
Pennsylvania
Wisconsin
Iowa
Washington
(1968-80)

Most values for
indiv. elections
range from 0.50 to

Gryski, Reed,
Elliott (1990)

42 states
(1976-84)

0.89-9.36

All states agg.
produce 3.22

Niemi and
Jackman (1990)

46 states
(1970-86)

1.13-2.28

Results are
reported in a g g .,
controlling for
party control of
redistricting and
by decade.

Campagna and
Grofman (1990a)

15 states

0.52-4.62

Most values for
indiv. elections
range from 0.85 to
2.69.

Scarrow (1982)

Comment

1.20
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from 1952-64 and 1.50 from 1966-78.

For the New York State

Senate, the comparable figures for the same years are 2.10
and 1.40, respectively.

Browning and King (1987) find that

the Indiana House of Representatives (from 1972-84) had a
representational parameter of 2.05 (between proportional
and majoritarian).

The Indiana Senate over the same time

period basically operated as a majoritartian system
(responsiveness parameter of 3.26).
King (1989) examines representational form in six
state legislatures from 1968 to 1980.

He utilizes a ver

sion of the King and Browning equation which he upgrades to
"control" for partisan swing and incumbency voting.

He

finds that bipartisan redistricting in Pennsylvania and
Wisconsin resulted in a decrease in responsiveness in the
middle range of the distribution (i.e., the system became
more proportional); this finding is consistent with the
widely-held notion that bipartisan redistricting is used to
protect the incumbents of both parties.

Nonpartisan redis

tricting in Iowa and Washington caused the representation
coefficient to rise dramatically in the election subsequent
to redistricting, meaning that vote swings toward either of
the parties resulted in larger shifts in seat changes than
before redistricting in relatively competitive districts.
King also discovers, however, that the immediate effects of
partisan and nonpartisan redistricting diminished in elec
tions from 1974 to 1980 (King 1989, 813-20).
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Gryski, Reed, and Elliott (1990) estimate the repre
sentational form in general elections to the lower houses
of 42 state legislatures from 1976 to 1984:
In (S / 1 - S) = a + n In (V / 1 - V) + e

(2.11)

They test the null hypothesis that the representation
coefficient did not differ significantly from 3.0.

In only

five states can the null hypothesis for representation be
rejected at the .05 level of statistical significance.

The

five states that deviate from the "majoritarian" pattern
tend toward proportionality (the highest coefficient in
these states was 2.09).

However, in the aggregate, the 42

states had an average representation coefficient of 3.22,
almost mirroring the cube law value of 3.00.

Twenty-three

states produced representation coefficients greater than
2.50, and only three states had coefficients greater than
4.50.

Thus, while the average representational coefficient

was greater than 3.00, most states exhibited a coefficient
very close to what one would expect in a roajoritarian
system.
Niemi and Jackman (1991) are concerned with the
effects of redistricting on the swing ratio in state lower
house elections.

For the purpose this dissertation,

it

should be noted that they measure responsiveness for the
1970s, the 1980s, and 1970 to 1986.

In one set of equa

tions, they control for party control of state government
and in another they control for partisan control of the
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redistricting process.

They find that only in states in

which Republicans dominated state government in 1982-86 and
the redistricting process in 1970-80 did the responsiveness
parameter exceed 2.00.

It is discovered that states exhi

bited representational systems that were more proportional
than had been revealed in studies having shorter time
series.
Finally, Campagna and Grofman (1990a) and Campagna
(1991) measure partisan bias and responsiveness for each
election to the upper and lower houses of California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan,
Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Utah, and Wisconsin from 1972 to 1986.

Since the

present study involves lower house elections, only the
findings for these houses in the Campagna and Grofman study
are noted here.

The median swing ratios for the 15 states

ranged from 0.85 in Kentucky to 2.69 in Connecticut.
The evidence seems to indicate that, on average, the
representational form coefficients for state legislative
election systems are closer to proportionality than are the
representational coefficients for U.S. congressional elec
tions.

However, comparisons from two studies indicate that

median values

from congressional and U. S. state legisla

tive elections do not appear to differ as much as mean
values (See Gryski, Reed, and Elliot 1990, 141, 148-50;
King and Browning 1987, 1269).

The winner-take-all values
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for five states in federal elections most likely inflate
the average representational coefficient values in congres
sional elections.
U. S. State Legislative Elections:

Partisan Bias

U. S. state legislative elections,

like all other

elections, contains certain levels of partisan bias.

The

research pertaining to partisan bias in these elections is
discussed in the following paragraphs.

In addition, a

summary of the results from this literature is found in
Table 2.7
Tufte identifies partisan bias in a number of state
legislative election systems.

He finds that Michigan

(1950-1968) had a partisan bias toward the Republicans of
2.1%.

The election system in New York had a Republican

bias of 4.3% from 1934 to 1966.

New Jersey exhibited a

Republican bias of 11.3% from 1926 to 1947, but the Repub
lican bias had declined to 2.0% in the 1947-1969 period.
Using the uniform partisan swing approach between 40%
and 60% of the two-party vote, Scarrow (1982, 1983) mea
sures partisan bias as the difference in the seats won by
the two major parties given the same percentage of the
vote.

Rather than applying regression to the data, he

simply reports the partisan differences in the seats won
given the raw hypothetical vote at 5% increments.

He

reports findings for the New York State Assembly and the
New York State Senate for 1952-64 and for 1966-78.

He
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Tiblt 2.7. S u u a r y of Results for
Partisan Bias, O. 8. state Elections
Authors

Political
System

Range of
Scores

Tufte (1973)

Michigan
(1950-68)

2.1%
(Rep.)

Assumes a linear
seats-votes rel.

New York
(1934-66)

4.3%
(Rep.)

Assumes a linear
seats-votes rel.

New Jersey
(1926-47)

11.3%
(Rep.)

Assumes a linear
seats-votes rel.

New Jersey
(1947-69)

2.0%
(Rep.)

Assumes a linear
seats-votes rel.

Scarrow (1982)

Comment

New York
Assembly
(1952-64)

0. 6%—12.6%

Range of bias at
various % of vote.
Bias for Repubs.

New York
Assembly
(1966-78)

5. 3%-l1.3%

Range of bias at
various % of vote.
Bias for Dems.

Browning and
King (1987)

Indiana
House
(1972-84)

-0.2 5

Interpreted as in
King and Browning.
Small Rep. bias.

King (1989)

Indiana
Connecticut
Pennsylvania
Wisconsin
Iowa
Washington
(1968-80)

70- + 1 .10

Interpreted as in
King and Browning
1987. Most values
range from -.10 to
+ .35.

Gryski, Reed,
Elliott (1990)

42 states
(1976-84)

Niemi and
Jackman (1990)

46 states -5. 5%-+4.8% Results in agg.,
(1970-86) (Rep .) (D e m .) control. for party
control of redist.
by decade. Most
values, -3.5% to 0

Campagna and
Grofman (1990a)

- .37-+.33

15 states -30.8%-+28.1%

Interpreted as in
King and Browning
1987. All states
agg. produce .02.

Bias at 50% vote.
Most values, -.4 3
to +.43.
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finds that Republicans in the Assembly benefitted from a
bias in the earlier period that ranged from 0.6% at 40% of
the vote to 12.6% at 50% of the vote.

In the Senate in the

earlier period, Republicans were recipients of a large bias
in the 45% to 55% range, but at 40% of the vote and at 60%
of the vote Democrats received a small bias in seats won.
In the 1966-78 period, Scarrow finds that the direc
tion of bias was changed for the Assembly but remained the
same for the Senate when compared with results in the
earlier period.

The bias in favor of the Democrats in the

Assembly in the latter period ranged from 5.3% to 11.3%.
At 45% to 55% of the vote the Republican bias in the Senate
ranged from 0.7% to 4.6% while the Senate Democratic bias
at the 40% and 60% points was 10%.
232-33).

(See Scarrow 1982,

In a later replication of his work, Scarrow finds

that the Democrats benefit from a bias ranging from 12.6%
to 18.6% in the Assembly in 1980.

In the Senate in 1980,

there is no bias in the 45% to 55% vote range but there is
bias towards the Democrats of 11.7% at the 40% and 60%
points (Scarrow 1983, 107).
Browning and King (1987) also report bias findings in
their study of the Indiana state houses.

They find parti

san bias in elections to both the upper and lower houses of
the Indiana state legislature from 1972 to 1984.

The

Indiana House of Representatives had a slight Republican
bias parameter (not percentage of the vote) of -0.25.

The
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Indiana Senate also was slightly biased toward the Republi
cans (parameter of -0.11).
King (1989) measures partisan bias in state legisla
tive elections that followed the 1970 redistricting effort
in six states.

He finds that Republican-controlled

redistricting favored the Republicans in the election
immediately following the 1970 redistricting efforts in
Indiana and Connecticut.

Bipartisan redistricting in

Pennsylvania and Wisconsin resulted in a decrease in parti
san bias.

Nonpartisan redistricting did produce an immedi

ate reduction in the already small Republican bias in Iowa,
but the small Democratic bias in Washington was increased
slightly.

In five of the six states, however, the imme

diate effects of redistricting on partisan bias were dimi
nished as partisan bias fluctuated in elections from 1974
to 1980 (King

1989, 813-20).

Gryski, Reed, and Elliott (1990) discover partisan
bias in a number of states in general elections to the
lower houses of 42 state legislatures from 1976 to 1984.
They find that eight states had levels of partisan bias
that exceed the .05 statistical level.

In addition, there

appears to be more partisan bias in state legislative
elections than in congressional elections when one disag
gregates for the states (with six of the eight state legis
lative election systems being biased toward the Democrats).

Niemi and Jackman (1991) study state legislative
elections in 47 states (in the aggregate)

in the 1970s,

from 1982 to 1986, and from 1970 to 1986 to determine the
effect of redistricting on bias and representation.

Bias

parameters were significant and in the expected direction
(i.e., partisan redistricting produces a bias in favor of
the party in control and other forms of redistricting
restrict bias)

in all the equations in the 1970s and for

the 1970-86 data set.

States with divided control of state

government and bipartisan control of redistricting tended
to have slight biases in favor of the Republicans.

Party

biases at 50% of the vote ranged from 5.5% in favor of the
Republicans in the states in which Republicans controlled
redistricting in the 1970s to almost zero in five of the
six equations dealing with the 1982-86 period.

In the

latter period, curiously enough, only in states in which
control of government was divided did significant bias
exist (2.2% in favor of Republicans).
Campagna (1991) and Campagna and Grofman (1990a)
measure partisan bias in individual state legislative
elections in 15 states from 1972 to 1986.

Significant bias

was found in at least half the elections for 13 of the 15
states.

In the states having bias, both parties benefitted

almost equally in four states, Democrats received the
advantage in five states, and Republicans were the benefi
ciaries in four states.4
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Obviously, there are a plethora of results concerning
partisan bias in the research conducted on U. S. state
legislative elections.

Many of the findings seem to be

contingent on the methods employed, the states used, and
the years of the

study. The only general statements that

can be supported

by the literature are that elections in

Kentucky and California have been biased toward the Demo
crats, elections

in New York from 1934 to 1964 have been

biased in favor of the Republicans, elections in New York
from 1964 to 1986 have seen a Democratic bias, and partisan
control of redistricting seems to produce an increase in
bias toward the controlling party in the election immedi
ately subsequent to redistricting.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has consisted of a summary of the litera
ture on the seats-votes relationship.

In this chapter, I

have described the various methodological approaches and
techniques of using data that have emerged in this line of
research.

I have also attempted to deal with potential

problems that one must face in performing an analysis on
the relationship between partisan votes and party seat
allocation in legislative elections.
Furthermore, this chapter has included a summary of
the results of research conducted on representational form
and partisan bias in U. S. national elections, non-U. S.
national elections, and U. S. state legislative elections.
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In general, the results concerning representational form
suggest that In the United States, the electoral college
system of electing the president has the highest value for
representational form.

Winner-take-all presidential prima

ries also exhibit a highly majoritarian representational
form.

Congressional elections and U. S. state legislative

elections tend to be slightly majoritarian.

Proportional

or nearly proportional winner rules in U. S. presidential
primaries produce representational form values that are the
most nearly proportional of the U. S. election systems.
examining the cross-national results,

In

it was found that

single-member district elections at the national level tend
to produce higher representational form parameters and
higher swing ratios than do national level elections in
countries having proportional representational allocation
of seats at the district level.
The findings for bias are quite eclectic.

The general

consensus is that the Democrats benefit from a bias in
congressional elections and in presidential elections.

The

comparative national election literature suggests that bias
is more likely to occur in elections with single-member
districts than in multimember district elections.

At the

U. S. state level, the findings vary from study to study
and from election to election.

Democratic biases are

prevalent in Kentucky and California and in New York from
1934 to 1966.

Republicans receive a bias in New York after
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1966.

In addition,

in both state and congressional elec

tions in the u. s., party control of redistricting tends to
strengthen the bias toward the party that controls redis
tricting (though this tendency in stronger in state legis
lative elections in the 1970s than in the 1980s).
The differences in findings for the sketchy attempts
to measure bias and representational form in U. S. state
legislative elections call for further research.

Data on

state legislative general elections now exist for 49 states
from 1968 to 1986.

An attempt to measure bias and respon

siveness in each election and for the entire time series
(including the 1968 election) should, therefore, be under
taken.
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NOTES
1.
In two other similar studies by Scarrow <1982, 1983)
based on data from both houses in New York State, the
author uses hypothetical data from 40% of the vote to 60%
of the vote to calculate partisan bias.
2. The usual method of employing the uniform partisan
swing approach, particularly in strong two-party systems,
is to measure the seats-votes relationship using a certain
number of points surrounding the 50% mark (such as the
55%—45% and the 60%-40% utilized by Scarrow). However, as
Grofman (1983) hints, one can measure bias at any number of
points on the seats-votes curve.
One could argue that it
is a more realistic assessment of the election system if
all elections are included and bias is measured at each
point (i.e., from 0% to 100% of a party's vote) on the
seats-votes graph.
This would certainly be the case for
elections in southern states, for example.
In the latter
example, the uncontested elections would certainly have an
effect on the calculation of seats-votes curves via regres
sion; however, this may be a better way to measure the
seats-votes relationship than using only those districts in
which Republicans contest an election (which would cer
tainly overestimate Republican strength in a state).
3.
For a thorough treatment of how use of different meth
ods of aggregating election results could affect seatsvotes calculations see Campbell 1991.
4.
It should be noted that Backstrom, Robins, and Eller
(1973) measure partisan bias without using techniques of
formal modelling.
Their method involves using one or more
previous election(s) to develop a standard for "normal
partisan vote" and then subtracting the winning party's
vote from the normal vote in each precinct.
If the majo
rity party is dominant in exactly 50% of the districts
after the subtraction is made, then the redistricting plan
is judged to be fair.
If the majority party is overrepre
sented or underrepresented but the redistricting formula
met judicially-accepted criteria in regard to compactness
of districts, deviation from population equality, adherence
to subdivision lines, and size of the assembly vis-a-vis
the population, then "gerrymandering" does not exist.
If
the majority party is overrepresented or underrepresented
and there is room for reducing the partisan advantage under
the criteria cited above, then a gerrymander does not
exist.
Using this method, they find that in the 1972
Minnesota Senate election, the dominant Democrats con
trolled only 32 of 67 districts after their totals were
subtracted from their normal vote.
Since the Democrats
"controlled" 48% rather than 50% of the districts, they

received 48/50 or 96% of their "fair representation."
Thus, the Democrats were underrepresented by 4% even though
they won 66% of the seats with only 54.27% of the vote
{1973 1135-38).

CHAPTER THREE:
PARTISAN BIAS AND REPRESENTATIONAL
FORM IN THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
In the last chapter, the discussion centered on the
various ways in which the seats-votes relationship has been
defined by researchers and on the methods used to measure
characteristics of the seats-votes relationship.

One of

the approaches that was described was the King and Browning
formulation of representational form and partisan bias.
this chapter,

In

I explore in more detail the theoretical

foundations of the two characteristics of the seats-votes
relationship studied by King and Browning.
I begin this chapter with two sections containing a
discussion of the theory behind the concepts of representa
tional form and partisan bias, respectively.

Illustrations

are included so that the reader may draw a visual image of
the distinction between form and bias.

I then describe the

general relationship between seat allocation and partisan
votes in an electoral system and the equations that are
used to measure this relationship.
In the fourth section of the chapter, I describe the
concepts that may explain why certain patterns of represen
tational form occur in particular election systems.

These

concepts can be categorized as district-level partisan
competition variables and election rule variables.

The

fifth section of this chapter consists of a discussion of
partisan gerrymandering and other variables that are
90
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thought to explain partisan bias in an electoral system.
Finally, I conclude the chapter with a brief summary.
THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATIONAL FORM
The relationship between partisan votes and partisan
seat allocation to legislatures is a crucial element in the
democratic political process.

Because there is such a

practical importance attached to the seats-votes relation
ship, the relationship should be of concern to those who
are interested in democratic theory and the theoretical
underpinnings of representation.

Two characteristics of

the seats-votes relationship have been cited in the politi
cal science literature as being important to an understand
ing of the issue in question:

representational form and

partisan bias.
Representational form has not only been defined by
political scientists in a number of ways, but different
terms have even been used to identify this concept.

Repre

sentational form, a term made popular by King and Browning
(1987), has been called the "swing ratio" (when it was used
to specify a linear relationship between seats and votes)
and "responsiveness" as well (Tufte 1973).

Regardless of

the name used to describe the phenomenon in question, the
idea refers to the functional relationship between partisan
votes and partisan legislative seats (King and Browning
1987, 1253; Garand and Parent 1991, 2).
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As was noted above, the functional form of the
seats-votes relationship can take on an almost endless
number of patterns.

However, one can visualize the concept

of representational form by examining three ideal types of
seats-votes curves.

Figure 3.1 illustrates these three

different ideal types.
First, the diagonal line is indicative of a propor
tional representational form.

In proportional representa

tion, a particular percentage of votes won by a party will
result in the party winning the exact same percentage of
legislative seats.

Second, a winner-take-all system is

illustrated by the curve that resembles a "straightened Z."
In this case when one party wins 50% plus 1 vote, the party
wins all the seats in the legislature.

Finally, the S-

shaped curve in Figure 3.1 represents the "cube law" type
of majoritarian representational form system.

Technically,

any system that has a representational form value greater
than one and less than infinity is majoritarian; a repre
sentational form parameter value of three is only one of an
almost infinite number of possible majoritarian forms.

In

general, however, a majoritarian form is characterized by a
party winning few seats until it wins close to 50% of the
vote.

When the party approaches the 50% mark, it begins to

win a larger than 1% increase in seats for each additional
1% of the votes it garners.

Likewise, as a party wins more
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Figure 3.1.
Three Examples of Representational Form,
No Partisan Bias
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than a majority of votes, the greater the number of votes
won the fewer additional seats it wins.
King and Browning (1987) suggest that each type of
representation is "fair,” although each type presents a
unique contribution to representation and to governance.
On the one hand, proportional representation best reflects
underlying voter preferences.

Because the percentage of a

party's votes equals the percentage of legislative seats
won by the party, each party is guaranteed representation
in the legislature.

Minority viewpoints are more likely to

be aired since minority parties will hold relatively large
numbers of legislative seats in proportional representation
systems.

On the other hand, a winner-take-all system

allows the winning party to govern more easily since there
will be no opposition party in the legislature.

The major

itarian system perhaps moderates between the other two
ideal types.

In a majoritarian system, voter preferences

are mirrored relatively closely but the winning party does
receive an inflated majority of seats.

While proportional

representation might hamper the ability of a winning party
to govern and a winner-take-all system grossly inflates
voter preferences, the majoritarian system encourages
majorities while protecting minority views to some degree
(King and Browning X987, 1255).
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THE CONCEPT OF PARTISAN BIAS
In addition to representational form, King and
Browning (1987) argue that there is another important
characteristic of any electoral system.

This second cha

racteristic they dub partisan bias, which they define as
(1987, 1251) "[the introduction of] asymmetry into the
seats-votes relationship, resulting in an unfair partisan
differential in the ability to win legislative seats:

the

advantaged party will be able to receive a larger number of
seats for a fixed number of votes than will the disadvan
taged party."

Although Tufte (1973, 542) defines bias as

the difference between 50% and the percentage of the vote
needed by a particular party to win 50% of the legislative
seats, King and Browning (1987), Garand and Parent (1991),
and King (1990) reach the conclusion that bias can be
calculated at any vote percentage if one has a measure of
representational form for the system.

The point, made

clear by King and Browning, is that "the precise effect of
partisan bias depends on the specific form of democratic
representation (1987, 1252)."
While the effect (but not the value) of bias is depen
dent on the measure of representational form, King and
Browning illustrate that the two concepts are empirically
distinct.

They note that many earlier practitioners failed

to draw a distinction between bias and form.

In addition,
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they suggest that some researchers assumed that more
majoritarian systems were inherently biased.
As was the case with representational form, partisan
bias can be depicted in graphic detail.

One can illustrate

bias by charting a party's observed seat-votes curve and
comparing the observed curve with a curve representing the
seats-votes relationship in which no bias is assumed to
exist.

Figure 3.2(a)

illustrates partisan bias in a pro

portional system, and Figure 3.2(b) represents bias in a
majoritarian election system.
In Figure 3.2(a), one can identify the "no bias" curve
as the perfectly diagonal line that is equivalent to the
proportional representation curve in Figure 3.1.

The

convex and concave curves surrounding the no bias curve
represent election systems having certain specified levels
of partisan bias.

The top curve,

in which the natural log

of bias equals l, is indicative of a system that is biased
in favor of the Republicans.

At 50% of the votes, Republi

cans win almost 80% of the seats.

The bottom curve illus

trates a bias in favor of Democrats, with Republicans
gaining slightly more than 20% of the seats despite winning
50% of the votes.

Figure 3.2(b)

is comparable to Figure

3.2(a) except that the former represents a majoritarian
election system.

One can use this technique to visualize

the percentage of the seats that a party would win given
any particular percentage of the vote won by that party.
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Thus, King and Browning suggest that there are two
important characteristics to the seats-votes relationship.
Representational form refers to the general pattern by
which seats change from one party's control to the other
party's control given shifts in the partisan percentage of
the vote.

Partisan bias pertains to assymetry in the

representational form pattern.

In the literature on the

seats-votes relationship, a number of researchers have
advanced hypotheses concerning why certain patterns of
representational form exist and why partisan bias may be
present in an election system.
SEATS AND VOTES AND THE EQUATIONS THAT MEASURE THEM
In early studies (Dahl 1954; Tufte 1973) it was
assumed that the relationship between seats and votes was
linear.

That is to say, it was believed that a one percent

change in partisan percent of the vote would correspond
with a fixed percentage change in seat allocation and that
this relationship would be uniform over the entire range of
partisan vote and seat allocation possibilities.
example,

For

if a shift in Democratic vote from 50% to 51% of

the vote would cause a 3% increase in Democratic seats, it
was assumed that a shift in Democratic vote from 75% to 76%
of the vote would also result in a 3% increase in Demo
cratic seats.

The regression equation that denotes this

relationship is:
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S = b,V + e,

(3.1)

where S Is the percentage of seats for a certain party , V
is the percentage of votes for the same political party, b,
is the regression coefficient for the vote variable, and e
is the error term.
However, Tufte (1973) notes that nonlinear specificationa may better describe the relationship between partisan
vote changes and seat changes, particularly as one moves
away from the 50% point on a seats-votes graph.

As noted

in the last chapter, Kendall and Stuart (1950) popularized
a particular nonlinear specification of the seats-votes
relationship.

Their equation, which denotes the purported

cube law of single-member plurality elections is:
(S / 1 — S) * (V / 1 - V)3,

(3.2)

where S = number of seats won by a party, V = number of
votes won by the same party.
Again, Tufte (1973)

(as well as Grofman 1983; King and

Browning 1987; Garand and Parent 1991) points out that the
cube law does not apply universally to election outcomes in
majority or plurality winner single-member districts.
Additionally, the seats-votes curve suggested by the cube
law is not always characterized by a lack of bias (i.e., at
the 50% vote mark, a party might not necessarily win 50% of
the seats).

Finally, Tufte (1973, 545-46) criticizes the

cube law as being atheoretical and deterministic; thus,
reliance on it tends to hide important political issues.
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A different and perhaps better way to specify a non
linear relationship between seats and votes is to formulate
an equation similar to Equation 3.2 but allow the exponent
on the right-hand side of the equation to remain unspeci
fied.

The exponent will then receive a value based on

empirical configurations of seat changes and vote changes
rather than the atheoretical whims of the researcher.
Equation 3.2 can be transformed to:
(S / [1 - S ]) - b( V / [1 - V] )c,

(3.3)

where S and V are defined as in Equation 3.3, b is a para
meter that measures partisan bias, and c is parameter that
measures representational form.
Tufte (1973, 546-47) describes a futher transformation
of Equation 3.3 thusly;
[A] logit model .
. i s fully as effective as
the linear model and statistically more graceful.
Define the odds in favor of a party's winning a
seat as S / (1-S) and the vote odds as V / (1-V).
The logit model is the regression of the loga
rithm of seat odds against the logarithm of vote
odds . . . .
Since both variables are logged,
the estimate of the slope, b,, is the estimated
elasticity of seat odds with respect to vote
odds; that is, a change of one per cent in the
vote odds is associated with a change of b| per
cent in seat odds . . . .
The logit model also
provides a direct test of the hypothesis that an
electoral system is unbiased, since [a,] =* 0 in
an unbiased system.
The equation to which Tufte addresses his comments is:
S

V
- loga, + bilog.

log*
1-S

(3.4)
1-V

where S and V are defined as in Equation 3.1.
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"Borrowing liberally from King and Browning [1987],"
Garand and Parent (1991, 4) note that ai is the bias para
meter and b, is the representational form parameter.
Assuming an absence of bias in a particular electoral
system (i.e, loga, = 0), one can still test to see if the
election system is proportional.

If b, ™ 1, then the

relationship between seats and votes is proportional.
Since b, can take on any value, it is possible that b, can
be greater than one.

In the latter case, the representa

tional system would be majoritarian; a one percent change
in partisan votes would equate to a larger than one percent
change in partisan

seats in the middle of the distribution.

It should be noticed that if b,

«= 3, then the cube law

specification of majoritarian representation is in effect.
It is possible (but unlikely) that b, will take on an
infinitely large value and thus identify a winner-take-all
electoral system.

In addition, the value of

loga, can be

greater than 0 and

indicate a bias toward one party or

less

than 0 and illustrate a bias toward the other party.
THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF REPRESENTATIONAL FORM
Why are some electoral systems proportional, majori
tarian, or winner-take-all?

In general, scholars have

suggested two categories of explanations for the represen
tational form of an electoral system.

First, party compe

tition at the district level has been identified as a
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variable that affects representational form; competitive
systems have been found to have more responsiveness than
noncompetitive systems.

Second, election rule variables

have been believed to have an impact on representational
form.

Examples of the latter include effective magnitude

of the election system and the number of voters per dis
trict.

In addition, the number of seats in an election

system may have an effect on representational form.
Some scholars have suggested that the seats-votes
relationship is heavily affected by the level of partisan
competition that is found in electoral districts and the
distribution of competition across districts (Tufte 1973;
Garand, Parent and Teague 1991).

This explanation is

especially applicable to representational form.

Assuming

that all the districts in a given state can be placed on a
dimension representing a particular party's percent of the
two-party vote in a given election, each district could
range from Ot to 100%.

Interparty competition would be

highest in districts in which the two-party vote for the
party was 50%.

The further one moves from 50%, the more

interparty competition would decrease.
When competition in the two-party vote is at its
highest, the sensitivity of legislative seats to the popu
lar vote should be high as well.

In a state in which a

large number of districts are competitive, a small shift in
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partisan vote will cause a large number of districts (and
thus, seats) to change hands from one party to the other.
However,

if many districts in a state are noncompetitive,

even partisan shifts of relatively large magnitude could
have little effect on seat change.
As an example, suppose that a state had only two
election districts.

In one district, the Democratic candi

date won the previous election with 75% of the vote; in the
second district, the Republican candidate won with the same
vote percentage.

In order for either party to control both

seats in the state, there must be a vote swing of at least
2 5% toward one of the parties; a shift in the partisan vote
toward either of the parties of only one percent would
obviously result in a zero percent change in seats.

If the

same candidates had won with only 51% of the vote in the
two districts, a one percent swing in the vote would pro
vide a partisan sweep of the two seats.

Clearly,

in the

latter case seat changes are more responsive to vote
swings.

Therefore,

if one measured mean level of district

competition by the mean district margin, such a measure
should have a negative effect on representational form
coefficients.

If one were to create an index of mean

district competition such that states with the most compe
titive districts possible were coded "1" and states with
the least possible competitive districts were coded "0,"
then the index of competition would be positively related
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to the representational form coefficient.

In other words,

if all districts were perfectly competitive in a given
election, then any shifts in votes would result in massive
seats shifts.
However, there are other characteristics of the popu
lar vote distribution that will have an effect on the
number of districts in the competitive range.

These dis

tributional characteristics should have an effect on repre
sentational form.

As Garand, Parent, and Teague explain

(1989, 11-12):
As long as there is some variation in [the par
ty's] vote proportions across [districts], the
distribution on [representational form] will have
a nonzero variance, as well as a measurable
skewness (i.e., measure of the symmetry or asym
metry of the distribution) and kurtosis (i.e.,
measure of the normality of the distribution, or
the degree to which cases are distributed in the
middle of the distribution or in its tails).
Each of these 'moments' of the distribution
should have a theoretical impact on the repre
sentational form of the [state's electoral sys
tem] .
The dispersion of the distribution (measured by the
standard deviation)

is important when it is considered with

the mean level of district competition.

The standard

deviation of the distribution should be negatively corre
lated with the representational form coefficient if mean
vote is close to 50%.

A low standard deviation implies

that the distribution of the districts is close to the
mean; therefore, a shift in party vote should have a dra
matic effect on partisan seat changes.

When the mean vote
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Is competitive but the party's vote proportions do not fit
closely around a mean party vote of close to 50%, the
result will be that only a few seats will actually change
hands.
Alternatively,

if the mean level of district competi

tion is low (i.e., if the mean party vote deviates from
50%), the interaction between competition and the standard
deviation will have a different relationship with represen
tational form.

This is to say that when competition is

low, a high standard deviation means that some districts
may fall in the competitive range and may experience seat
changes.

On the other hand, when the mean level of compe

tition and the standard deviation are both low, then most
districts will be uncompetitive and vote swings will not
result in very many seat changes.

The point is that the

larger the number of seats in the competitive range, the
larger will be the shift of seats given a relatively small
shift in the partisan percentage of the vote; consequently,
the higher will be the value for representational form.
The skewness of the vote distribution across districts
should also affect representational form (Garand, Parent,
and Teague 1989, 13).

The relationship between skewness

and party competition and between skewness and representa
tional form depends on both the mean level of competition
and the partisan direction of the party vote distribution.
For example,

in an electoral system in which there is no
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competition one of the parties has an average district vote
of 100%.

In this case, there is no variation around the

mean district average.

As competition increases (i.e., as

the losing party's percentage of the vote approaches 50%),
the value of the representational form coefficient should
increase.
However, in a case in which the majority party
receives, say, 75% of the average district vote, the effect
of the skewness of the vote distribution on representa
tional form depends on which party wins 75% and which party
wins 25%.

If it is the Republican Party that wins 75% of

the average district vote, skewness will have a positive
effect on the representational form coefficient only if it
is in the direction of greater competition (in this
example, negative skewness).

If Republicans win only 25%

of the mean district level vote (i.e., Democrats win 75%)
then skewness will have a positive effect on the represen
tational form coefficient only if the distribution of the
proportion of the votes won by the Republican Party is
positively skewed.

Therefore, one must consider which

party wins over 50% of the vote in specifying a relation
ship between skewness and representational form.
Assuming a constant mean and standard deviation, the
kurtosis or normality of the distribution of district
competition should be negatively related to representa
tional form.

"Positive kurtosis indicates that a higher
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proportion of cases are found around the mean [of a distri
bution], while a negative kurtosis indicates that the cases
are more likely to be found in the tails of the distribu
tion"

(Garand, Parent, and Teague 1989, 14).

However, the

relationship between kurtosis and representational form is
also dependent on the mean level of competition.

If the

mean level of competition is high and kurtosis is high,
then a large number of districts are in the competitive
range and are likely to be affected by a partisan vote
swing.

If the mean level of competition is low, a positive

kurtosis would indicate that most districts are uncompeti
tive and that there will be a negative relationship between
kurtosis and the responsiveness parameter.1
This is not to say that other variables will not have
an impact on the representational form coefficient.

First,

the number of seats per electoral district (called district
magnitude at the district level and effective magnitude if
averaged over all districts in the election system) should
have an effect on the representational form coefficient
(Rae 1967, 19, 114-25; Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 112-25).
An extreme example can best illustrate this principle.
Imagine a situation in which there are two states:

one

state has 100 seats contested in 100 single-member dis
tricts, and the other state has 100 seats contested in one
huge multimember district.

If the district winner rules

are proportional, then the latter state will probably have
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a more proportional system in the aggregate since each
party wins the same percentage of seats as votes.

In the

former state there will more than likely be a deviation
from proportionality in the aggregate because the party
that wins the most votes in a district will win the only
district seat regardless of the exact percentage of the
vote won in the district.

The problem here is that "seats

come in whole numbers while votes are a nearly continuous
variable (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 19)."

Thus, there

should be a negative relationship between effective magni
tude and deviation from proportionality for systems in
which seats are allocated by proportionality in the elec
tion districts (i.e., a negative relationship between
effective magnitude and representational form).
Theoretically, however,

if the district winner rules

are plurality or majority in nature, one would expect that
the relationship between seats per district and deviation
from proportionality would be reversed.

Using the same two

states in the above example, a party winning 55% of the
votes in the aggregate would likely lose in a number of
district contests (i.e., win less than 50% of the vote in
some districts)

if the election system consisted of one

hundred single-member districts.

On the contrary,

if the

election system consisted of only one district, the party
winning 55% of the votes would win all one hundred seats.
In the plurality or majority winner rule system, then, the
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state with the fewer seats per district would more likely
produce more proportionality between seats and votes in the
aggregate.

U. S. state legislative elections do have

variation in effective magnitude since most states have had
multimember districts at some point in time over the past
two decades.

In addition, all states have used majority or

plurality winner rules rather than proportional representa
tion rules in allocating seats at the district level.
Therefore, one should expect that there will be a positive
relationship between effective magnitude and representa
tional form in U. S. state legislative elections after
controlling for district-level party competition (i.e., a
positive relationship between effective magnitude and
deviation from proportionality).
Incidentally, Jewell and Breaux (1991) have found that
incumbents in southern state legislative multimember freefor-all districts tend to face opposition in primaries and
in general elections more regularly than do incumbents who
run in single-member districts.

Similarly,

in a multi

variate analysis performed on 20 lower-house state
legislatures, Weber, Tucker, and Brace (1991) find that
multimember district elections tend to promote more mar
ginal districts.

Thus, aside from the effects noted previ

ously concerning the translation of votes into seats in
multimember plurality winner districts, multimember
districts may promote more party competition and more
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challenges to incumbents.

Of course, however,

it is the

relationship between district magnitude and representa
tional form rather than the relationship between district
magnitude and party competition that will be tested in this
analysis.
Second, Taagepera and Shugart (1989, 161-67) suggest
that the number of voters per district will have an effect
on the representational form of an election system.

In

general, the more voters per district, the less propor
tional the election system will be.
suffice to explain this point.

Another example should

If there were only one

voter per district, the election outcome would be perfectly
proportional since each person's vote would translate
directly into a seat.

On the contrary,

if there were

10,000 voters per district the chances are much greater
that there would be wasted votes (votes cast for losing
candidates) and that these wasted votes would not be
exactly equal for each party.

Therefore,

in the latter

case, the election system will more likely be majoritarian
than proportional.

By analyzing elections in four nations

(New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States, and
Canada), Taagepera and Shugart discover that the relation
ship between voters per district and representational form
is closer when they measure the log of voters divided by
the log of the number of electoral districts.

Ill

Third, and with all other things being equal, one
might expect that the more seats found in an electoral
system, the more seats will change hands given a particular
vote shift.
bility.

This hypothesis is simply a function of proba

In an election system in which there is only one

seat, at some point on a seats-votes curve a one-unit shift
in partisan vote will cause a change in partisan control of
that seat.

However, the odds are that the point at which a

one-unit shift will cause the seat to swing will not be at
the 50% point on the seats-votes curve.

If another elec

tion system has 100 seats, it is more likely that a oneunit shift at the 50% point will cause at least one seat
(if not more) to change hands.

This hypothesis is posited

tentatively, however, since the number of districts could
conceivably affect the level of party competition at the
district level.

Of course, the demographic distribution of

voters by election districts will be important. Nonethe
less, holding other factors (including district party
competition) constant, a system with a large number of
seats should exhibit a higher representational form coeffi
cient than a system with a smaller number of seats.
Finally, King (1989, 814-19) notices that responsive
ness declines over the course of the 1970s regardless of
the immediate impact of redistricting in six state legisla
tures.

He speculates that this could be the result of a

number of things, excepting redistricting:

"incumbency,
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partisan swing, demographic movements,
decisions'* (King 1989, 819).

[and] candidate

His findings also hold true

for most of the 15 states in the Campagna and Grofman
(1990) study.

Thus, a trend toward more proportionality in

the seats-votes relationship as a decade progresses should
be expected.

In addition,

if the factors mentioned by King

continue to have major impacts over time despite potential
redistricting effects, one might observe a trend toward
proportionality over a time series that is more lengthy
than a decade.

While a time counter should be included in

this analysis,

it may well be that inclusion of the above-

mentioned variables will cause a trend variable to lose its
statistical significance.

Only after multiple regression

is used to test the hypotheses will one be able to make
definitive statements concerning the effects of the vari
ables on representational form.
The literature suggests that party competition at the
district level (which includes the effects of incumbency
and other variables mentioned (but not tested] by King in
the above paragraph), seats per district, and voters per
district should have an impact on representational form.
In addition, controlling for these variables, the number of
seats in the electoral system may affect representational
form.

As is the case with representational form, explana

tions are also offered for the existence or lack of exis
tence of partisan bias.
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THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF PARTISAN BIAS
It is also possible to suggest explanations for parti
san bias.

Perhaps the most likely reason for the existence

of partisan bias is the deliberate drawing of district
lines so as to benefit a particular party.
tricting,

During redis

it is possible that the party in control of the

redistricting machinery will manipulate district boundaries
to enhance the likelihood that the party will gain more
seats in the legislature.

Use of the redistricting machi

nery need not be excessively aggregious to benefit a par
ticular party.
(1989, 17-18)

An example from Taagepera and Shugart
illustrates how reasonable people (in this

case, the two major parties in the U. S.) could disagree
over the best way to reapportion election districts:
Consider the following situation, with eight
equal-sized city quarters to be combined into
four single-seat districts.
The numbers shown
are thousands of potential voters known to have
Democratic and Republican preferences, respec
tively:
40-60
40-60

70-30
70-30

50-50
40-60

60-40
30-70

The total is an even 400:400, and one might
expect each party to obtain two seats.
However,
if the Republicans can control the districting,
they could join the areas vertically:
80-120

140-60

90-110

90-110

The Democrats would win overwhelmingly in the
second district, but the Republicans would have a
moderate but safe majority in the three others.

114
If the Democrats are in control of the district
ing, they would prefer to join the areas horizon
tally:
110-90
110-90

110-90
70-130

Now the Republicans waste votes in an overkill in
the lower-right district, leaving the three other
districts to the Democrats.
By sacrificing some votes in relatively safe districts to
achieve marginal superiority in other districts or by
placing as many voters as possible from the other party in
a small number of districts, a party can possibly win more
legislative seats in the subsequent election.3
In fact, King (1989) finds that partisan redistricting
results in partisan bias in 1972 in the election immedi
ately following redistricting in two states.

However,

it

is often the case that the effects of redistricting do not
last more than one or two elections,

similarly, Basehart

and Comer (1991) find short-lived redistricting effects in
15 single-member district lower house elections after the
1980 redistricting.

Gryski, Reed, and Elliott (1990) find

that partisan bias exists in the election systems of eight
states in a time series from 1976 to 1984.

Niemi and

Jackman (1991) also find significant bias in their 47-state
study in the 1970s.

However, partisan bias virtually

disappeared in the 1980-86 period.

Campagna and Grofman

identify substantial partisan bias in 13 single-member
district states in individual elections from 1972 to 1986.
While it is not always the case that partisan redistricting
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results in bias for the party that controls redistricting,
there is evidence that partisan bias exists in a number of
states at various times over the past 20 years.
Interestingly enough, however, when states are compe
titive and both parties have relatively strong party
organizations, redistricting often does not result in
substantial bias.

Niemi and Jackman (1990, 16) offer the

following assessment of this tendency:
[In competitive states), it may be that parties
exercised self-restraint because of concern over
what would happen were they later to find them
selves in a minority position.
It may [also] be
that because of the close competition in these
states the majority was more closely monitored,
more vigorously challenged in and out of court,
and in other ways prevented from exercising its
nominally complete control.
Another explanation may have more to do with legisla
tive member goals rather than checks from the minority
party.

Legislators from the dominant party may be willing

to maintain the status quo rather than face the uncertainty
of election outcomes that results from increasing the seats
the party may win by cutting into the party strongholds in
the districts already held by party incumbents.
parties

.

.

"Dominant

appear willing to sacrifice some proba

bility of a greater legislative majority for greater cer
tainty of maintaining their current position" (Niemi and
Jackman, 1990, 19).
Tufte posits that different levels of voter turnout
for the parties may affect partisan bias.

He notes that
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"if, in the aggregate of all districts, low turnout or
small districts are aligned with a particular party, there
will be a bias in the seats-votes curve since that party is
winning seats with relatively small numbers of votes (1973,
548)."

He identifies the Democrats in the South as the

prime example of a party that benefits from this type of
bias.

Because of low turnout in many districts and a rela

tive lack of Republican opposition in the South, Democrats
have won a large number of seats with a comparatively small
number of votes.3
Finally, as was mentioned in the preceding paragraph,
Tufte believes that different population sizes of election
districts will have an impact on partisan bias.

Before

Baker y. Carr (1962), overrepresentation granted rural
districts in the South worked to the advantage of the
Democrats.

Bias emerged in the aggregate because unequal

population sizes of districts meant that it took more
Republican votes to guarantee a Republican legislative seat
than was the case for Democrats,

Tufte provides evidence

that even in 1970 the smaller, but still present,

inequi

ties in population sizes of districts works to the
advantage of Democrats in U. S. congressional elections
(1973, 548-49).

Nonetheless, due to the fact that the

federal courts have become increasingly involved in scruti
nizing reapportionment plans because of perceived malappor
tionment, the state elections held from 1968 to 1986 should
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be much more free of this type of manipulation than elec
tions held before 1968 (Baker 1986, 269).
In summary, there are a number of possible explana
tions for partisan bias.

Gerrymandering, the drawing of

district boundaries so as to benefit a particular party, is
certainly a potential cause of partisan bias.

Malappor

tionment, the drawing of districts such that population
sizes are unequal across districts, could cause partisan
bias.

However, since Baker v. Carr (1962) and Reynolds v.

Sims (1964), the threat of judicial involvement in reappor
tionment and the fact of judicial involvement in (particu
larly southern state) reapportionments has curtailed such
inequities.

Finally, if one were to use the total district

votes for both parties as the operationalization of state
partisan vote, it could be the case that turnout differ
ences between voters from the two parties could affect
partisan bias.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have examined the theories underly
ing the two characteristics of electoral systems with which
I am concerned.

First, I defined the concept of represen

tational form and discussed three classic patterns of
representational form.

I also provided an illustration of

the seats-votes curves that are associated with these
patterns of representational form.

Second, I defined and

illustrated the other characteristic of the seats-votes
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relationship, partisan bias.

Third, I noted several pos

sible explanations of representational form.

1 discussed

district party competition, effective magnitude, the number
of voters per district, and the number of seats in an
electoral district as variables that might affect
representational form.

Fourth, I put forward some hypothe

ses that might be used to explain partisan bias.

Partisan

gerrymandering, differences in turnout between voters who
are members of the two major parties, and differences in
district population sizes (if one party is affected more
than the other party) could have an impact on partisan bias
in an election system.
In the next chapter, I describe the data and the
techniques I use to test my hypotheses.

I explain the

procedure for calculating representational form and parti
san bias.

Next, I describe the operationalizations of the

concepts used in Chapter Three and the models used to test
variation in representational form and partisan bias,
respectively.

Finally, I discuss the problems I encoun

tered in my research and how those problems were solved.
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NOTES
1. While it might appear at first glance that a discrete
measure of the percent of districts in the competitive
range might provide a good indicator for the distributional
characteristics cited above, there are two reasons why such
a measure is echewed.
First, how does one identify a
competitive district? Two problems are present here,
initially, the problem with such an indicator is that it is
difficult to identify the exact percentage of the vote (or,
in this case, district margin) by which one can say that
one district is competitive but the next district with a 1%
larger margin of victory is not competitive.
Identifying
the "competitive" district becomes arbitrary.
In addition,
the process is further complicated by the possibility that
competitiveness varies over time.
Previous research on the
U. S. Congress suggests that any "objective" measure (such
as 55% or 60%) of marginality of an election district is
subject to change over time (Garand and Gross 1984; Gross
and Garand 1984; Jacobson 1987; Bauer and Hibbing 1989;
Garand, Wink, and Vincent 1989). That is to say that
incumbents who win by a slim margin in 1980 are defeated
less often in the next election (are "safer") than an
incumbent who won by a slim margin in 1950.
Thus, a com
petitive district identified by a certain percentage of the
vote in 1968 may not be considered competitive in 1986.
Second, and most importantly, one loses information when
one simply categorizes districts as competitive or uncom
petitive.
By charting out the results from all election
districts and measuring the effects of competition, stan
dard deviation of competition, skewness of competition, and
kurtosis of competition on seat allocation, one gets a more
precise picture of exactly what is happening at the dis
trict level.
2.
For another good explanation of the techniques a party
can use during redistricting to enhance its probability of
winning more seats, see Dresang and Gosling 1984, 100-102.
3. As noted by Campbell (1991, 3-4), findings concerning
the effect of voter turnout on partisan bias may hinge on
how one operationalizes partisan votes. Tufte's opera
tionalization of partisan votes as actual votes rather than
as aggregated district vote percentages allows him to test
the effects of turnout on partisan bias in U. S. House
elections.
However, U. S. House elections are all singlemember district contests and there are fewer uncontested
elections here than in U. S. state legislative elections.
In U. S. state legislative elections, the existence of
floterial districts (districts composed of a number of
smaller single-member districts) and a relatively large
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number of uncontested elections calls Into question the
relevance of using total district votes as opposed to
average district votes.
For an example of the uncontested
election problem, in a state (such as Arkansas) where
Democrats may win 50% of their seats uncontested a Demo
cratic "bias” may emerge if one examines total statewide
partisan vote.
This Democratic bias may simply be a result
of the fact that Democratic turnout will be low in those
districts in which a Democrat runs uncontested.
Another
practical reason for choosing to measure partisan votes by
district averages is because four states (Arkansas, Flori
da, Kentucky, and Oklahoma) do not report district election
results in uncontested elections for a number of election
years.

CHAPTER FOUR:

DATA AND METHODS

The last chapter was devoted to the theory underlying
the concepts of representational form and partisan bias.
In this chapter, discussion will revolve around the empiri
cal definitions (i.e., the measurement) of representational
form and partisan bias.

Additionally, I will describe the

models that I use to test the hypotheses presented in
Chapter Three.
In this chapter, I first describe the data I use in
this study.

In the second section of the chapter,

I go

into detail about the steps I have taken to manipulate the
data in such a way as to answer the questions posed in the
preceding chapter.

Third, I describe the model I used to

explain variation in representational form.

In the fourth

section, I present my model for explaining variation in
partisan bias.

In the fifth part of the chapter, I discuss

special problems presented by my study and the techniques I
used to solve these problems.

In this fifth section, I

touch upon the problems of uncontested elections, multi
member districts, and third-party candidacies.
THE DATA
The data that are employed here are the district-level
data on state legislative elections that have recently been
collected and coded in machine readable format by the
Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social
121
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Research (ICPSR).

The data extend from 1968 to 1986 and

Include elections from 49 states for both legislative
houses.

Data are unavailable for Vermont for the entire

time series and for North Carolina for the elections of
1968 and 1986.
These district-level data permit one to study all the
state legislative elections for 48 states with relative
ease.

The district-level nature of the data and the length

of the time series also allow one to include four states
that are excluded by Gryski, Reed, and Elliot (1990)
because the representatives of these states served fouryear terms.

Because they can be used to provide inter

pretable coefficients for individual elections, the
district-level data may also provide the opportunity to
include calculations from Georgia, a state that has often
been excluded because of its "blend of district and county
at-large elections"

(Gryski, Reed, and Elliot 1990, 146).

Finally, these data will facilitate the measurement of
representation and partisan bias for each state over the
entire time series and for individual elections.
THE RESEARCH DESIGN
Estimation of Partisan Bias and Representational
Form Parameters
As noted above, I employ district-level data for
individual state legislative elections.

However, to mea

sure seats-votes relationships, aggregate data must be
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employed.

The historical method of measuring seat-votes

relationships involves the use of aggregate election
returns for partisan seats and votes for a number of elec
tions.

If one uses this approach and plots the data, each

point on the seats-votes graph identifies a particular
party's seats and votes for one specific election.

Using

these points for a number of elections over time, regres
sion analysis is employed to fit a seats-votes curve.
The other approach to measuring seats-votes relation
ships, and the one used in this dissertation, is the uni
form partisan swing method.

This technique has been

accepted in the literature as one of the best ways of esti
mating bias and representational form.

It is also the

choice of many of those who have done current research in
this area (Campagna 1991; Campagna and Grofman 1990a;
Campagna and Grofman 1990b; Garand and Parent 1991; Gelman
and King 1990; King 1989).
Just as with the historical approach, the uniform
partisan swing method generates a number of data points in
order to draw a regression line to measure the fit of the
data points to the seats-votes curve.

Unlike the histori

cal approach, however, the uniform partisan swing approach
uses actual aggregate election results from only one elec
tion.

The other data points are hypothetical election

results generated through simulations based on the uniform
partisan swing method.
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How are hypothetical election results obtained using
the uniform partisan swing approach?

One begins with the

actual partisan district vote percentages or average parti
san district vote percentages and the partisan seat totals
or percentages for each election.

For each election, one

creates a number of hypothetical vote and seat proportions
by adding and subtracting increments of one percent from
the actual vote percentages.

As the partisan vote percen

tages change across all districts at one percent incre
ments, party control of a certain number of seats will
change.

These new "hypothetical" election results serve as

the data points in the regression model of the uniform
partisan swing approach.
Perhaps an example from the Iowa state lower house
election of 1968 will better illustrate exactly how this
method works.

Table 4.1 shows actual election results and

hypothetical election results that are generated by adding
and subtracting, respectively, one percent and two percent
of the mean district Republican vote from the actual dis
trict mean Republican vote.

Columns 1 and 2 provide actual

election results for Republican candidates in 10 state
representative districts in Iowa in 1968.

Here, Republi

cans win 53.6% of the average district vote and 50% of the
seats.

The uniform partisan swing technique will generate

Republican percentages of seats won at 54.6%, 55.6%,
56.6%,

.

.

.

100% of the vote.
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Table 4.1. uniform Partisan Swing Approach Applied to
Republican Candidates in Iowa state House
of Representatives Districts/ 196S

Rep. Vote

+1% vote

Seat%

+2% vote

Seat%

-1% vote

Seat%

-2% vote

Seat%

Seat%

617

1.00

.627

1.00

.637

1.00

.607

1.00

.597

1.00

657

1.00

.667

1.00

.677

1. 00

.647

1.00

.637

1.00

715

1.00

.725

1.00

.735

1. 00

.705

1.00

.695

1.00

545

1.00

.555

1.00

.565

1. 00

.535

1.00

.525

1.00

391

0.00

.401

0.00

.411

0. 00

.381

0.00

.371

0.00

511

1.00

.521

1.00

.531

1,00

.501

1.00

.491

0.00

498

0. 00

.508

1.00

.518

1. 00

.488

0. 00

.478

0.00

498

0.00

.508

1.00

.518

1.00

.488

0.00

.478

0.00

462

0. 00

.472

0.00

.482

0. 00

.452

0. 00

.442

0.00

463

0. 00

.473

0.00

.483

0. 00

.453

0. 00

.443

0.00

.516

0.40

Mean District Republican Vote %
and Aggregate Republican Seat %
.536

0.50

.546

0.70

.556

0.70

.526

0.50

Likewise, one can determine how ninny seats Republicans
would win if the uniform swing was in the other direction:
52.6%, 51.6%,

.

.

.

0%.

As Table 4.1 illustrates, at

54.6% of the vote Republicans win 70% of the seats (Columns
3 and 4).

At 55.6% of the vote, Republicans still win 70%

of the seats in these districts (Columns 5 and 6).

Alter

natively, as the Republican mean district vote declines to
52.6%, Republicans seat percentages decline to 50% (Columns
7 and 8).

An additional one percent decline in mean Repub

lican district vote to 51.6% results in another seat loss;
thus, Republicans win only 40% of the seats at this point
(Columns 9 and 10).

Each of these hypothetical results are

treated as actual election results for purposes of charting
the seats-votes curve for the 1968 Iowa election.
In particular, this technique is clearly superior to
the historical approach for measuring partisan bias and
representational form for an individual election.

One does

not have to make a decision about which election years to
include or exclude and the immediate effects of redis
tricting can be analyzed best using uniform partisan swing.
This approach also presents the benefit of estimating
seats-votes curves using hypothetical election results that
are not bound by historical results.

Finally, the use of a

large number of data points helps insure the stability of
the estimates and gives the researcher confidence in the
accuracy of the findings.

As is illustrated by the example
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from the Iowa election, hypothetical results can be
calculated across the entire spectrum of partisan vote
possibilities (i.e., from 0% to 100% of the mean district
Republican vote) or from a smaller subset of points.

In

this dissertation, seats-votes curves are calculated from
3 5% to 65% of mean district Republican vote.

Thus, the

regression equation in which partisan bias and representa
tional form are estimated utilizes 31 data points.

If

actual election results had been used in this project, only
10 data points (elections every two years from 1968 to
1986) could be used for most states (Gryski, Reed, and
Elliot 1990).
The model that is utilized to measure partisan bias
and representation in the present study is the logit model
that has been used to study state legislatures (Browning
and King 1987; Campagna 1991; Campagna and Grofman 1990a;
Gryski, Reed, and Elliott 1990; Niemi and Jackman 1991),
the electoral college (Garand and Parent 1991), presiden
tial primaries (Ansolabehere and King 1991; Geer 1986) and
Congress (Campagna and Grofman 1990b; King 1990; King and
Browning 1987; Tufte 1973):
loge (S / l - S) - loga, + b,log. (V / l - V) ,
where the variables are defined as in Equation 3.1.

(4.1)
King

and Browning (1987, 1256) stress the reason why a logit
model is superior to Tufte's original attempt to produce an
equation that contains both parameters:
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[Tufte's equation] was a linear approximation of
[ (S / l - S)- (V / l -V)]. We believe [a) non
linear model is a more realistic version than
Tufte's in that [it allows] for every possible
degree of partisan bias and every possible form
of democratic representation.
Unlike the linear
model, even systems with widely varying and quite
extreme values of S and V can be incorporated in
this model . . . . [It is] a more realistic
model of both bias and representation [because it
allows] for the exact form of the bias to depend
upon the specific type of electoral representa
tion.
This quotation highlights two important advantages of
using a logit model rather than a linear model to measure
the representational form and partisan bias parameters.
First, not all seats-votes relationships take on a linear
pattern (Garand and Parent 1991; King and Browning 1987;
Tufte 197 3).

From the point of view of previous empirical

findings, then, it is necessary to use a logit equation to
find the most accurate values for representational form and
partisan bias in cases in which the seats-votes relation
ship is not linear.
Second, the logit equation allows the researcher to
specify all possible relationships between seats and votes.
In other words, whereas the linear equation assumes that
the seats-votes relationship is linear, with the logit
equation both linear and nonlinear patterns can be identi
fied.

In fact, the logit equation allows the researcher to

identify the entire range of values for both partisan bias
and representational form, while the linear equation
specifies that the representational form parameter is one.
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The bias parameter will indicate,

in a relative sense,

which states have systems that benefit one of the two
parties and which states have systems that provide both
parties with nearly equal seat totals at a particular
percentage of the vote won.

The representational form

parameter illustrates the general functional relationship
between seats and votes.

The representational form para

meter will range from 0 to infinity, with 1.0 equating to
proportional representation, a figure between 1.0 and
infinity approximating majoritarian representation, and
[eC ] representing a winner-take-all system.1
The Use of Pooled Data
In this analysis, I use pooled data.

Comparative data

on U. S. states can be analyzed in a number of ways.
Typically, researchers using state data use either a crosssectional research design or a time-series research design.
The cross-sectional research design involves data collected
for all or most of the states from only one time period.
The researcher using such a design is concerned with iden
tifying the relationship among independent and dependent
variables for the states at one point in time.
The time-series analysis research design involves
analysis of only one state over time.

Researchers

employing a time-series analysis are concerned with the
effects of independent variables on a dependent variable
over time.

Comparisons between or among states are not the
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focus of this type of analysis; rather, the researcher
desires to know how dependent and independent variables
collected in a single state covary from one time period to
another.
A third type of research design, the pooled crosssectional time-series analysis, employs elements of the
other two research designs and thereby avoids the pitfalls
of using only one or the other.

The major criticism of

cross-sectional research designs is that they are static
and therefore unable to model processes.

One can only use

such a design to make generalizations about phenomena at
one point in time.
analysis are:

Two criticisms of the time-series

(a) generalizations can be offered only for

the state used in the design;

(b) some variables may not

change over time and cannot, therefore, be included in such
a design.
The pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis
includes data from a number of states at a number of points
of time.

This research design allows one to make general

izations both across states and across time.

Thus, the

pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis contains the
advantages of the other two approaches while avoiding the
disadvantages.

Essentially, one takes advantage of all of

the covariation among dependent and independent variables.
In addition, a pooled data set using the same number of
states as a cross-sectional analysis and the same number of
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years as a time-series analysis includes many more cases
than will either of the other two types of designs.

This

latter advantage should lead to more stable estimates and
should strengthen the researcher's ability to engage in
hypothesis testing (Holbrook 1991, 93-94, Sayrs 1989,
7-14) .
PLAN OF THE ANALYSIS
The analysis conducted for this dissertation requires
four steps, some of which will be explained in greater
detail in a later section of this chapter.

First, the data

for each state are printed out and recoded so that partisan
vote variables can be created.

This first step is neces

sary because the data were coded originally such that
individual candidates served as the cases.

For example, in

Iowa in 1968, one line of data is devoted to Republican
candidate Dennis L. Freeman.

The next line of data per

tains to the Republican candidate from the next district,
Charles E. Grassley.

However, since Grassley ran uncon

tested and there was no third party candidate in Freeman's
district, a line for the Democratic Party candidate and a
third party candidate must be added to Grassley's district
and a third party line must be added to Freeman's dis
tricts.

Only in this way can party votes in these

districts be properly registered.
three lines of information:

Each district contains

The first line contains infor

mation on Democratic candidates, the second line pertains
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to candidates from the

Republican Party, and the third

line is devoted to third party candidacies.

Each electoral

district, then, becomes the case.
In addition, multimember districts are recoded as
quasi single-member districts in the first step.

The

highest vote winners from the Democratic Party are paired
with the lowest vote winners from the Republican Party, and
so on.

Next, the third-party candidate acquiring the most

votes is placed in the district containing the major party
candidate who outpaced his or her major party opposition
but won the fewest votes in doing so.

The procedure

involving the third-party candidate ensures that the thirdparty candidate who actually wins a seat is placed in a
district such that his vote total is the largest of the
three candidates in the quasi single-member district.

At

this juncture it is also necessary to convert raw vote
totals to percentages of the two-party vote.2
After the average partisan district vote and seats won
by both parties are calculated,
second step in the process.

it is possible to begin the

This is the step in which the

uniform partisan swing is applied to the actual election
results.

As noted in the reference to the 1968 Iowa elec

tion in Table 4.1, the average partisan district vote is
manipulated by increments of one percent and the changing
seat totals that correspond to the respective one percent
shifts are noted.

In this way, one can create up to 100
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hypothetical elections results that are generated for each
individual election year.
At this stage, however, I have decided to truncate the
data so that only the mean Republican votes in the 35% to
65% range are included in the calculation of the seatsvotes curves.

Truncating the data limits the number of

districts in which it is actually impossible to add or to
subtract an incremental percentage of the Republican vote.
For example, at the point in which Republicans win 80% of
the mean district vote there may be many districts in which
Republicans have already won 100% of the vote.

Adding

additional percentages of Republican votes to all districts
would push Republican vote percentages over 100%.

While it

might be possible to reallocate Republican vote percentages
to districts in which Republican candidates have not won
100% of the votes, such an undertaking would be difficult
and time consuming.

The most frequently used method is to

limit the data points to some figures close to the 50%
point (usually 40% to 60%).

utilizing the points from 35%

to 65% minimizes the problem of allocating votes to Repub
licans who have already won 100% of the district vote and
at the same time allows one to use more of the data from
the hypothetical elections than one would use if the 40% to
60% range were chosen.
The third step is the calculation of the partisan bias
and representation coefficients using the logit equation
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described previously.

For each state, one partisan bias

coefficient and one representational form coefficient are
produced in each election year.

As noted above, these

coefficients are estimated by applying the seats-votes
model in Equation 4.1 to the hypothetical data derived from
the uniform partisan swing method rather than from histori
cal seats-votes data.
The fourth and final step is the estimation of the
models used to explain variations in representational form
and partisan bias.

The dependent variables in each of

these models are the coefficients produced in the third
step of the procedure.

The specification of the models

will be explained in a later section of the present chap
ter.
ESTIMATING MODELS EXPLAINING VARIATION IN PARTISAN
BIAS AND REPRESENTATIONAL FORM
A Model of Representational Form
The electoral college study of Garand, Parent, and
Teague (1989) provides evidence that the mean level of
party competition in the states has a strong, positive
effect on the representational form of the electoral col
lege in presidential elections; that is, the electoral
college is more responsive to shifts in voting as party
competition increases in the states.

The study highlights

the effects of a number of aspects of the distribution of
partisan votes on representational form.

These aspects of
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partisan vote distribution include standard deviation,
skewness, and kurtosis.

The interaction of these distribu

tional characteristics and the mean level of party competi
tion and their effect on representational form will be
described below.
Garand, Parent, and Teague (1989)

illustrate that when

the mean level of competition is zero, the magnitude of the
standard deviation (or measure of dispersion) of the mean
vote of the Republican party is positively related to
representational form.

This occurs because when competi

tion is zero, that is, when the districts as a whole are
very uncompetitive, a high standard deviation implies that
some districts will have party competition that deviates
from the mean and are therefore competitive.

Thus, a

change in votes should cause some of these competitive
districts to change party hands.
However, specification of an interaction term between
competition and the standard deviation of the Republican
Party's votes across the states shows that, as competition
increases, the effect of the standard deviation on repre
sentational form is strongly negative (i.e., the system is
far less responsive).

This is the case because as competi

tion increases, a large standard deviation illustrates that
there are a number of districts that deviate substantially
from the mean level of competition and are thus uncompeti
tive.

Likewise, in the present study, it is expected that
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the mean level of district competition and the standard
deviation of party vote percentages will have a positive
effect on the representational form of the state electoral
system.

It is also hypothesized that the interaction of

mean district competition and the standard deviation of
party vote percentages will have a negative impact on the
state's representational form.

Quite simply, the higher

the level of party competition is across the districts, the
larger will be the value of the representational form for
the state (Garand, Parent, and Teague 1989, 14, Table 2).
The electoral college study also highlights the importance of skewness (the "heaviness" of a distribution toward
high or low values).

As noted in Chapter Three, the rela

tionship between skewness and representational form is
dependent on which party wins roost of the vote in the
election as well as the level of party competition in the
state.

In general, as party competition rises, the inter

action between state competition and positive skewness
(skewness toward the lower value, or heavy left tail skew
ness) of a party's district vote percentage should have a
positive effect on representational form if one party wins
more than 50% of the vote and a negative effect on repre
sentational form if the other party wins 50% of the vote
(and the opposite is true if negative skewness, skewness
toward the higher value of party vote, is used).

The point

is that a new variable must be created with values of plus
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one and negative one and multiplied with the skewness
variable to control for the partisan direction of the
relationship.

Only in this way will there be consistency

in the findings for skewness.
In the electoral college study, Garand, Parent, and
Teague also suggest that the kurtosis of a party's state
vote will affect representational form.

Kurtosis measures

"the normality of a distribution (Garand, Parent, and
Teague 1989, 10)."

Positive kurtosis (illustrating that

more cases are found near the mean as opposed to the tails
of the distribution) of Republican party vote distribution
is negatively related to representational form when the
mean level of competition is zero.

However, as the mean

level of competition takes on larger positive values, the
interaction between mean level of competition and kurtosis
has a positive impact on representational form (Garand,
Parent, and Teague 1989, 14, Table 2).

Even though the

findings for kurtosis were only significant at the .10
level using a one-tailed test in the Garand, Parent, and
Teague study, the representational form model will include
kurtosis of partisan district-level vote as an independent
variable.
The effective magnitude of the state should have a
positive effect on representational form.

As noted in

Chapter Three, this should be the case because the U. S.
states have plurality winner rules.

Since seats can only
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be partitioned In whole numbers, a state with more than one
seat per district would be more likely to produce election
results that were not proportional than would a state that
had only one seat per district.

This should particularly

apply once one controls for the district partisan vote
variables.
In addition, Taagepera's index should have a positive
impact on representational form.

This variable is usually

specified as the log of voters divided by the log of the
number of electoral districts.

The more voters there are

in a particular district, the less likely is the possibi
lity that there will be a proportional relationship between
seats and votes.

Alternatively, and admittedly at the

opposite extreme,

if all districts contained only one

voter, there would be a perfectly proportional system since
a party's vote percentage would exactly equal that party's
seat percentage.

The larger the election district, the

more unlikely it would be that election outcomes in majo
rity or plurality winner districts could produce a propor
tional relationship between partisan seats and votes in the
aggregate.
It may also be the case that the more Beats there are
to win, the more seats will change hands given a particular
vote.

This assumes that the effects of other variables are

held constant.

Because there are single-member seat dis

tricts and multimember-seat districts in this election
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series, it might be useful to differentiate between seats
and districts in determining whether there is an effect on
representational form.

Thus, in addition to including a

variable for the number of seats,

it might be useful to

include a variable on the number of districts.

Care will

be taken to test for collinearity between the "number of
districts" variable and other independent variables; should
collinearity be a problem, a more parsimonious model of
representational form will be specified.
Since it has been observed that representational form
has been declining in congressional elections and may be
declining for state legislative elections as well, a trend
or counter variable will be included in the model.

Of

course, a trend variable is not a causal variable in and of
itself.

However, should the model be misspecified,

it may

be useful to discover if there is a trend in representa
tional form to help in selecting variables for future
research.
The representational form model will be specified as:
RFORM - a, + bjMCOHP + bj (MCOMP) * (STANDEV)

(4.2)

+ bj (MCOMP)* (SKEW)*(CONTROL) + b4(MCOMP)*(KURT)
+ bjMAG + b6TAAG + t^NSEATS + b„NDIST
+ b,COUNTER + e
The dependent variable, RFORM, is the representational
form coefficient that is generated from the logit model of
the seats-votes ratio that was discussed in a previous
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section of the paper.

RFORM can vary theoretically from

0.00 to infinity, with 1.00 indicating a proportional
system and larger numbers a system more responsive to vote
shifts in the competitive or middle range of the vote
distribution (i.e., majoritarian between 1.0 and infinity
and winner-take-all at infinity).

MCOMP is an index mea

suring the mean level of district competition.

MCOMP

ranges from 0 (meaning that there is a low level of dis
trict competition in the state) to 1 (meaning that there is
a high degree of competition).3
tion increases,

As the level of competi

it is hypothesized that the electoral

system will become more sensitive to vote shifts; thus, the
representational form coefficient will increase.

The b,

coefficient, therefore, is expected to be positive.
STANDEV is the standard deviation of the Republican
percentage of the vote across districts.

The interaction

variable (MCOMP)* (STANDEV) represents a situation in which
the mean level of competition is rising at the same time
the standard deviation of mean Republican district-level
vote is rising.

In this case, a high standard deviation

indicates that some districts deviate from the high mean
level of competition.

Thus, the b^ coefficient is expected

to be negatively correlated with representational form.
SKEW is the skewness of the distribution of Republican
vote percentages in the state's districts.

The variable

(MCOMP)* (SKEW) represents the interaction between skewness
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and a rising level of district competition.

As noted

earlier in both Chapter Three and this chapter, however,
one must specify which party is winning more than 50% of
the vote in order for the impact of the interaction between
skewness of Republican district vote and party competition
on representational form to be consistent.

If one used

skewness of Democratic district vote percentages, the
relationship between (MCOMP)* (SKEW) would be reversed.

A

dummy variable must be created to control for this rela
tionship.

This dummy variable is named CONTROL.

The

complete interaction variable, therefore, becomes
(CONTROL)* (MCOMP)* (SKEW).

Since skewness of Republican

vote is used in this analysis,

it makes sense to code

CONTROL as plus one if the mean Republican vote exceeds
mean Democratic vote in a state and negative one if the
opposite is the case.

In this way, one can assure the b3

coefficient will be in the correct direction regardless of
which party wins the most votes.

It is expected that b,

will be positive.
KURT is the kurtosis of Republican district vote
percentages.

Kurtosis measures the degree to which obser

vations or cases in a distribution are found close to the
mean or at the tails given a particular standard deviation.
Positive kurtosis is found in situations in which more
cases are distributed close to the mean; thus, negative
kurtosis refers to a distribution with a high percentage of
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cases in the tails.

The variable (MCOMP)* (KURT) is the

interaction of partisan competition and the kurtosis of
Republican district vote percentages.

An increase in

competition with a positive kurtosis means that more dis
tricts are in the competitive range and that the represen
tational form variable will be large.

When competition is

high and kurtosis is low, districts will mostly fall into
the less competitive range and the representational form
value will decline accordingly.

Therefore, the coefficient

for the interaction of competition and kurtosis, b4, is
expected to be positive.
MAG is effective magnitude (the number of state seats
per district).

Because the U. S. states have plurality or

majority winner rules in state legislative districts,

it is

believed that the more seats there are for each legislative
district the more the state's electoral system will be
responsive to partisan vote shifts.

Controlling for the

other variables in the study, one should expect that pro
portionality would be enhanced if there were only single
member districts rather than the multimember districts
found in many state legislative elections.
magnitude,

Effective

in other words, should correlate positively with

representational form (Rae 1967 19, 114-25; Taagepera and
Shugart 1989, 112-25).
be positive.

Thus,

it is expected that bs should
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TAAG is the (Log Votes) / (Log Districts) variable
suggested by Taagepera.

When this variable is positive,

this indicates that the election districts are fairly large
in terns of population.

In a plurality system like that of

the United States, when there are a great number of people
per district the election system should deviate from pro
portionality.

Because of votes wasted on district losers,

this variable should be positively correlated with repre
sentational form.

Thus, bA should be positive.

NSEATS is the number of seats in the legislature and
NDIST is the number of districts in a state election sys
tem.

Controlling for other variables, one might expect

both of these to contribute to a rise in representational
form because of the greater likelihood that at least some
seats or districts in a state will change party hands the
more seats or districts there are to contest.

However

since NSEATS and NDIST are the same in single-member dis
trict election states, one should be careful in specifying
a model with both of these variables.

In addition,

it may

be that Taagepera's index taps into the same process as the
NDIST variable.

The hypotheses are that both bj and b, will

be positive, but checks for multicollinearity may result in
the need to exclude one or more of these two variables from
the model.
Finally, a COUNTER variable measuring time is included
in the model.

The values for this variable are constructed
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by subtracting 1968, the first year in the time series,
from every other year in the time series.

Thus,

1968

elections are coded 0, 1969 elections are coded l, etc., up
to the handful of 1987 elections that are coded 19.

Since

previous research on legislative elections suggests that
swing ratios are definitely declining in congressional
elections and may be declining in state legislative elec
tions, it is believed that the trend will be in the direc
tion of lower representational form values.

Thus, b, is

expected to be negative.
A Model of Partisan Bias
In the present study, the emphasis in explaining
partisan bias is placed on redistricting.

That is to say,

it is expected that gerrymandering will be the cause of
partisan bias in U. S. state legislative elections.

There

fore, the model of partisan bias will be specified as:
RBIAS - a, + b, (PART)* (REDIST)

(4.3)

In this model, RBIAS is the natural log of partisan
bias toward the Republicans exhibited by the election
system.

This variable is the constant generated in the

equation:
In (s / 1 - s) « In a + b In (v / 1 - v) + e

(4.4)

In most cases it is expected that RBIAS, will vary from
1.00 to -1.00.4
will equal 0.

If no bias exists, then this coefficient
A system biased toward the Republicans will
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be represented by a positive number, while negative numbers
indicate bias toward the Democrats.

Only in cases of

extremely large degrees of bias should RBIAS be greater
then 1.0 or less than -1.0.
PART is a variable that accounts for partisan control
of redistricting as formulated by King (1989).

In general,

PART is coded 1 if Republicans control the redistricting
machinery, 0 if the redistricting is performed by a bipar
tisan or nonpartisan commission, the courts (assuming the
courts are not stacked in favor of a particular party), or
if evidence indicates that a bipartisan plan was passed by
the legislature, and -1 if the Democrats control redis
tricting.

A party is assumed to be able to control redis

tricting in cases in which the party controls enough of the
redistricting machinery (at least a majority of the three
branches of government —

the two houses of the legislature

and the governorship) and there is evidence that an attempt
was made to gerrymander.

King (1989) has coded redis-

trictings as being controlled by a party if allegations of
partisan bias were raised and these allegations appeared to
be justified.

King accumulated the data for his coding

scheme from records of the redistricting process given in
state "Blue Books" that were provided by the state govern
ments.

Since the evidence indicates that partisan control

of redistricting is more apt to result in bias than is a
nonpartisan or bipartisan plan, this variable should have a
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positive effect on the dependent variable.

In other words,

for example, Republican bias should be more likely to occur
when the redistricting is controlled by the state Republi
can Party (Campagna and Grofman 1991; King 1989; Niemi and
Jackman 1991).
Party control of redistricting is hypothesized to have
an effect on all the elections succeeding redistricting.

A

dummy variable, REDIST, is created to identify each elec
tion year in which a redistricing occurred.

This variable

is created for each year and coded one if there was a
redistricting and zero otherwise.

When PART is multiplied

by REDIST, the interaction term, INTER, measures the effect
of each redistricting on elections that follow redis
tricting.

Each independent variable in the bias model is

coded with a suffix to differentiate it from the other
variables with the same name (e.g., 1970 election year
variables contain the suffix "70").

Therefore, b, in

Equation 4.3 should be positive.5
It is expected that bias will decrease over time as
legislatures become more hesitant to produce plans that are
obviously biased.

This could be expected from the threat

of intervention by the courts.

It should also be noted

that as redistricting becomes more sophisticated and incum
bent legislators are better able through the use of tech
nology to foresee the results of their actions, they may
opt to protect themselves via a "bipartisan" or
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"sweetheart" gerrymander rather than attempt to maximize
partisan seat gains by weakening existing incumbents.

It

may be expected, then, that even when one party controls
all the relevant machinery of government that highly parti
san redistrictings are less likely to occur in the latter
years of the time series.

Since it may be believed that

bias is decreasing over time, the hypothesis is that the
absolute value of b2, the coefficient associated with the
yearly dummy variables, will decline over time.

Table 4.2

contains a summary of the definitions of the variables used
in the representational form model.

Table 4.3 provides a

summary of the independent variables in the partisan bias
model.
ESTIMATION USING A POOLED MODEL
One can often employ ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression to test hypotheses using pooled models.

How

ever, there are potential problems posed by the use of
pooled data.

One problem is autocorrelation and the other

problem is heteroscedacticity.
Autocorrelation occurs in OLS when "individual distur
bance terms are not independent but instead are related to
each other in a systematic fashion (Ostrom 1990, 8)."

This

is a danger in time-series analysis; since pooling contains
elements of time-series analyses,
using pooled data.

it is also a danger in

If positive autocorrelation exists (the
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t a b l e 4.2. Description of independent
▼«riabl«s for Model of Rapraiaatitioul fora

Variable

Description

MCOMP

Mean level of district party
competition:
Continuous
variable ranging from 0 (no
party competition to 1 (perfect
party competition)

(MCOMP) * (STANDEV)

Interaction term created by
multiplying mean level of
district party competition with
standard deviation of distri
bution of Repub. district
vote %

(MCOMP) * (SKEW)
* (CONTROL)

Interaction term created by
multiplying mean level of
district party competition with
skewness of distribution of
Repub. district vote % and with
dummy variable coded 1 if
Repubs, win higher % of dis
trict votes in state than Dems.
and coded -l if the opposite
occurs

(MCOMP) * (KURT)

interaction term created by
multiplying mean level of
district competition with
kurtosis of distribution of
Repub. district vote %

MAG

Effective Magnitude:
Number of
seats in state divided by
number of legislative districts

TAAG

Taagepera's Index:
Log of
number of voters divided by log
of number of legislative dis
tricts

NSEATS

Number of legislative seats

NDIST

Number of legislative districts

COUNTER

Number of years minus 1968,
ranging from 1 (1969) to 19
(1987)
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TABLE 4.3. Description of Independent
Variables for Model of Partisan Bias
Variable
(REDIST)
INTER

COUNTER

Description
(PART) =

Interaction tern created by
multiplying dummy variable
coded 1 for elections immedi
ately following redistricting
and 0 otherwise with dummy
variable coded 1 if Repubs,
controlled redistricting and
attempted to gerrymander, 0 if
there was no evidence of
gerrymandering, and -1 if
Dems. controlled redistricting
and attempted to gerrymander
Number of years minus 1968,
ranging from 1 (1969) to 19
(1987)
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most common type of autocorrelation), hypothesis testing is
more difficult because the error variance is underesti
mated.

The practical consequence of this problem is that

the fit of the regression line to the data is more accurate
than it should be; thus, estimated coefficients are artifi
cially reliable even if they should really be unreliable.
Coefficients used to test hypotheses appear to be signifi
cant even when they may not be.

In the case of negative

autocorrelation, coefficients that are in actuality sta
tistically significant appear to be insignificant (Ostrom
1990, 16-26).
The Durbin-Watson statistic provides insight into
whether the error terms of the regression equations are, in
fact, correlated over time, or are randomly distributed
around the regression line.

The formula for this statistic

is:
d « 2 f<e, - e,.,)2 /*fe,2,

(4.5)

where the ets are the OLS regression residuals (Ostrom
1990, 27).

Positive autocorrelation produces small values

for d and negative autocorrelation results in large values
for d.

One can use the Durbin-Watson statistic to test for

the existence of first-order autocorrelation in the OLS
regression estimates.

While the results of the test for

autocorrelation depend on the number of independent vari
ables and the sample size, generally speaking, the further
the Durbin-Watson statistic deviates from a value of 2.0,
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the higher the probability that autocorrelation is present
(See Ostrom 1990, 28-29).
Should autocorrelation become a problem in this
dissertation, I will employ the two-step Prais-Winsten
technique to estimate the models.

This is an estimated

generalized least squares (EGLS) technique offered in the
SAS statistical software package.

This technique allows

the researcher to obtain OLS estimates of the independent
variable parameters and the residuals, to determine the
effects of the autocorrelated residuals, and

to use OLS to

reestimate the parameters of the independent

variables

while subtracting from both sides of the transformed equa
tion the value of the coefficient associated with the
residuals (Ostrom 1990, 34-35).

The two-step Prais-Winsten

application thus allows a more realistic estimate of the
effect of the independent variables on the dependent vari
able.

In this study, therefore, GLS regression results

will always be reported when autocorrelation

is found to

be

in existence.
The second potential problem is the possibility of
heteroscedacticity.

Heteroscedacticity is a problem that

may occur in cross-sectional research designs as well as
pooled research designs.

In reference to a pooled research

design, heteroscedacticity occurs when "the error term
contains an unobserved variable that is constant within
cross-sectional units but variable between cross-sectional
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units.

In other words, each cross-sectional unit has its

own peculiar intercept (Holbrook 1991, 101)."

One way to

test for this problem is to employ a dummy variable least
squares (DVLS) model.

The researcher simply adds dummy

variables for each cross-sectional unit to the OLS model
and conducts an F-test to determine if the sum of squared
error of the OLS estimates is significantly different from
the sum of squared error after the dummy variables are
added.

If heteroscedacticity does occur, one simply

reports the DVLS estimates of the effects of the indepen
dent variables on the dependent variable (See Holbrook
1991; Sayrs 1989).

Since one must control for heterosce

dacticity before autocorrelation can be detected (Sayrs
1989, 19), the DVLS models are compared with the OLS models
first.

Then, tests for autocorrelation are conducted.
SPECIAL SITUATIONS IN TREATING THE DATA

This project requires that decisions be made con
cerning how certain data will be treated.

First of all,

some decision criterion must be formulated for dealing with
uncontested elections.

Second, a rule concerning how

multimember districts will be coded must be developed.
Third, there must be a decision criterion for the treatment
of third-party candidacies.
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Uncontested Elections
Uncontested elections must be dealt with in an analy
sis of elections, and there are different views about how
the researcher should treat them.

Because the hypothetical

approach allows for estimates of changes in seats given
incremental shifts in the two-party vote, the representa
tion parameters will not be affected until the two-party
vote is plotted to extreme positions that are virtually
unattainable.

However, since hypothetical elections are

being plotted across the entire possibility of mean dis
trict-level Republican votes, uncontested elections could
affect the fit of the regression line and therefore might
affect the calculation of representational form and parti
san bias.
To examine how the decision rule for treating uncon
tested elections influences the calculation of election
results,

it is necessary to illustrate how district elec

tion results would be coded under various schemes.
Election totals for districts in a hypothetical state are
provided in Table 4.4.

The first column in Table 4.4

specifies the various districts.

The second and third

columns give the raw votes for the Democratic and Republi
can candidates, respectively.

The fourth and fifth columns

provide the percentage of the vote won by the Democratic
partisans and the Republican candidates' percentage of the
vote, respectively.

Notice that winners in uncontested
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races are awarded 100% of the vote while losers receive 0%
of the vote.
Awarding uncontested 11losers” no votes.
Brady, and

Ansolabehere,

Fiorina (1988), Holbrook and Tidinarch (1991),

Niemi and Jackman (1991), and Niemi, Jackman, and Winsky
(1990) suggest that the party that does not contest a seat
should be awarded no votes.

The results in Table 4.4,

therefore, mirror election results using the procedure
described by these three groups of researchers.

The mean

percentage of district votes for the Democrats is 49.36%
and the comparable figure for the Republicans is 50.64%.
Thus, the Democrats win five seats with a mean of less than
50% of the votes.

This example illustrates one weakness of

including uncontested elections and averaging district
percentages:

one can exaggerate the actual electoral

strength of a state party if that party happens to do
extremely well in a minority of districts.

Nonetheless,

this particular vote counting method is truer to the actual
election results than are many of the other approaches that
are suggested by scholars.
Excluding uncontested races.
(1990)

Gryski, Reed, and Elliott

exclude uncontested single-member district races and

they apparently exclude races for uncontested members as
well.

Excluding uncontested elections is problematic since

there are many multimember districts in which the
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Table 4.4. District Elsotion Results fro* a
Hypothetical State Legislative Election
DISTRICT

DEMO VOTE

REPUB VOTE

DEMO %

REPUB %

1

139

92

60.17

39.83

2

36

0

100.00

0.00

3

0

30

0.00

100.00

4

122

52

70.11

29.89

5

0

61

0.00

100.00

6

46

135

25.41

74.59

7

128

69

64.97

35.03

8

124

43

74.25

25.75
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Republicans cannot produce enough viable candidates to
contest for each seat (Niemi, Jackman, and Winsky 1990).
Using the data from Table 4.4 and dropping the uncontested
elections, the Democrats win five seats with 58.98% of the
mean district vote and the Republicans win three seats with
41.02% of the mean district vote.

In this example,

Democratic strength at the state level may be slightly
overestimated since districts won by Republicans are dis
proportionately uncontested.

Another argument against

using this method is the fact that a large amount of data
that could add to our understanding of state legislative
elections would have to be excluded from the analysis.
Averaging party percentages.

Jewell (1982), Jewell and

Breaux (1989), and Weber, Tucker and Brace (1991) offer
slightly different techniques designed to present a "more
accurate" measure of party competition.

Jewell's approach

is actually applied to party primary elections (Jewell
1982, 193, n. 2):
[With no uncontested elections] the percentage
[is] found by dividing the vote of each winning
candidate by the total vote for all candidates,
and multiplying that by the number of seats in
the district.
If [there are uncontested elec
tions], the average vote for all losing candi
dates [is] calculated.
This figure [is] added to
the denominator as many times as there [are]
missing candidates, before the percentage [is]
calculated.
The purpose of doing this is to
provide an approximate measure of the closeness
of each winner to the losers and avoid inflating
the margin of winners.
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Of course, this approach is unacceptable on its face
because it places winner and losers, rather than opposition
party candidates, in the numerator and denominator.

None

theless, the averaging technique may have some beneficial
qualities.
Jewell and Breaux (1989) and Weber, Tucker, and Brace
(1991), in reference to uncontested multimember districts,
calculate partisan averages by taking a candidate's votes
and dividing the votes by the number of candidates from the
same party running in the district (1989, 6).

"The purpose

is to provide a more accurate measure of the party's voting
strength in each district, and ultimately in the state.

It

assumes that, faced with less than a full slate of candi
dates, many partisans will reduce the number of votes they
cast rather than cross party lines (1989. 6)."

The problem

with this technique is that in some districts, when the
average partisan vote for a loser is substituted for zero
votes, there is the possibility that the "loser" will
receive more votes than were actually won by a winner.
One can conceivably produce a new calculation tech
nique by combining the approach of Jewell with the approach
of Jewell and Breaux and Weber, Tucker, and Brace.

For

instance, one can substitute in place of zero votes for an
"uncontested seat loser" and the actual votes won by an
"uncontested seat winner" the average for the relevant
party's contested seat losers and winners, respectively.
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To use the data from Table 4.4 as an example, the Demo
cratic winner in District 2 can be given 128 votes (the
mean for Democratic contested seat winners) and the Repub
lican winners in Districts 3 and 5 can be said to have
produced 135 votes (the mean for Republican contested seat
winners).

Likewise, the Democratic losers in Districts 3

and 5 can be credited with 46 votes and the Republican
loser in District 2 can be provided with 64 votes.
The hypothetical values in the above paragraph simu
late what possibly would have happened if the races had
been contested.

Once again, the strengths of such an

endeavor are that one does not have to exclude uncontested
elections, winners' margins should be less inflated, and a
more accurate picture of partisan voting strength in the
state is (arguably) produced.

The disadvantage of using

such a method is that one is tampering with actual election
returns to simulate what might have occurred if certain
conditions had been met.

The application of this approach

to the data in Table 4.4 gives the Democrats five seats
with a mean district vote of 51.55% and the Republicans
three seats with a mean district vote of 48.45%.

In this

particular example, the technique disinflates the Demo
cratic percent of the mean district vote as compared to the
Democratic vote generated by excluding uncontested elec
tions.

Yet, at the same time, this method (unlike the

approach in which one gives the uncontested winners 100% of
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the vote and the losers 0% of the vote), does give the
Democrats (who, after all, won a majority of the seats) a
majority of the two-party mean district vote.
Using a normal vote.

An approach that is similar in appli

cation and in rationale to the modified Jewell and Breaux
and Weber, Tucker, and Brace method is to substitute some
estimate of a district "normal" partisan vote for the
actual vote totals produced in uncontested elections
(Gelman and King 1990).

This technique is beneficial in

that it controls somewhat for candidates who are elec
toral ly strong because of factors that may be unrelated to
party affiliation.

Nonetheless, such an approach does have

its weaknesses.
Presumably, one needs to rely on previous election
results to arive at a normal vote figure for a district.
Backstrom, Robins, and Eller (1978) search for a single
recent election that typifies the state normal vote in
their study of Minnesota.

Such an approach is satisfactory

if one is dealing with a very small number of states,
particularly if one is intimately familiar with the history
of the state(s).

For purposes of the present effort,

however, it would be more realistic to choose another
method of dealing with uncontested elections.

Gathering

data on previous elections may be difficult, especially if
redistricting has occurred in the recent past.

One might

resort to precinct-level data to avoid the redistricting
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dilemma, but precinct-level data would be difficult or even
impossible to acquire for all the states (or even for a
large number of states) in a reasonable length of time.
Also, district-level data have only been gathered by the
ICPSR since 1968; thus, an additional effort would have to
be made to collect pre-1968 data to determine the normal
partisan district vote in the early elections in the 19681986 time series.

Finally , if a district has had one or

more uncontested seats for a number of elections the prob
lem of uncontested elections has not been solved.

One must

still come up with some method of dealing with such dis
tricts .
Unfortunately, there is no clear consensus in the
literature as to how uncontested elections should be
treated.

Any of the three or four methods discussed above

can be justified so long as the decision criterion is
applied to all uncontested races in the time series.
However, the technique of using actual data and coding
winners with 100% of the vote and losers with 0% of the
vote appears to be the most satisfying approach to take.
It is the method that is used in the present study.

Using

the actual results is simple in that it alleviates the
problem of calculating partisan averages for winners and
losers and alleviates the problem of tampering with actual
election returns.

Furthermore,

it is satisfying in that

the researcher is permitted to use all the available
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election results as the basis from which uniform partisan
swings will be calculated.
The consequence of including uncontested races is that
some seats will change hands only after a 50% (or, for
purposes of this study, a 51%) vote swing.

During the

estimation procedure, this could cause state representa
tional form coefficients to behave in different ways
depending on the number of uncontested elections in the
state.

In most states, using uncontested districts may

cause the regression line to be more flat in the middle of
the distribution than would be the case if only uncontested
races were included because much of the change in seats
will occur in the tails of the distribution.

However,

in a

state in which there is an extremely large number of uncon
tested elections, the representational form coefficient may
be quite high because a large number of seats will change
hands close to the 50% range of the minority party's vote
percentage.

The latter phenomenon is only prone to occur

in the Deep South, however.

The inflation of the

representational form value due to what amounts to an
artificial strengthening of party competition will be
accounted for in the analysis.

It can be argued, I think,

that the representational form parameters in most states
identify more closely the reality of the election system
than would be the case if uncontested elections were
excluded.
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Multiroember Districts
An additional challenge is to determine how multimember districts should be treated.

One option, of course,

would be to exclude multimember districts from the analysis
(Basehart and Comer 1991; Holbrook and Tidmarch 1991).
However, much data would be unused.

Furthermore, there

have been suggestions about how multimember districts could
be treated.
The consensus seems to be that researchers pair the
Democrat having the highest vote and the Republican having
the lowest vote, etc.

"The rationale is straightforward:

the Democratic candidate with the highest vote would not be
defeated until he or she received fewer votes than the
weakest Republican candidate, the next-highest Democrat
would not lose until he received fewer votes than the
second-lowest Republican, and so on"

(Nieroi and Jackman

1991, 200, n. 3; also see Jewell 1982, 193, n. 2 and Niemi,
Jackman, and Winsky 1990, 8-9).

If there is no Republican

candidate that can be paired with a Democrat (or vice
versa), then an uncontested seat is created.
In essence, the researcher using the aforementioned
approach creates "pseudo-pairs of individual candidates
that can be analyzed just as if they were [single-member
districts]" (Niemi, Jackman, and winsky 1990, 8).

In

multimember districts in which a number of pairs of candi
dates run against each other ("post" multimember

163
districts), the results already mirror single-member dis
trict elections.

It is in reference to "free-for-all"

multimember districts and floterial districts (a district
in which one or more represenative[s ] is [are] elected by
voters from a number of smaller districts) that are awarded
on a "free-for-all" basis that the creation of pseudosingle-member districts becomes necessary.

For example

consider the case in which three Democratic candidates win
530, 520, and 470 votes, respectively, and three Republi
cans respectively garner 510, 490, and 480 votes.

Clearly,

the Democrats would win two seats while the Republicans
would win one seat.

This election would be coded as three

single-member districts as follows:
Dem. votes:

470

520

530

Rep. votes:

510

490

480

Dem. % of two-party vote « 48.0, 51.5, 52.5
This procedure is beneficial for a reason other than
that it allows the researcher to match a candidate who won
a seat with a vote percentage greater than 50%.

The pro

cess permits the researcher to weight the races equally by
averaging all the race percentages to calculate the party
vote in the state.

Such an averaging approach alleviates

the problem of having districts with large turnout unduly
affect the results of
variables that affect

any given election.

In essence,

turnout in one district

and not in

others (i.e., idiosyncratically) are controlled
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(Holbrook and Tidmarch 1991, Niemi and Jackman 1991, and
Niemi, Jackman, and Winsky 1990).
Third-Party Candidacies
Another problem that may be manifested is the possible
existence of candidates from third parties.

Because this

project consists of data from only 1968 to 1986, there
certainly are fewer cases in which minor party candidates
and other groups that splintered from the two major parties
(or were antecedents of the latter) are contenders.

How

ever, given the strength of minor parties in certain
states, third-party candidacies must be faced.
King and Browning (1987) address this problem in their
study on the U.S. Congress.

They "delete the very few

representatives who had won seats under the independentparty label and subtract the votes received by their Demo
cratic and Republican opponent from the statewide total
(1987, 1260)."

Niemi, Jackman, and Winsky (1990, 6, n. 5)

suggest that three equally appropriate possibilities exist
at the state level.

According to the latter, minor party

votes can be eliminated if they make up a small percentage
of all votes, they can be counted as major party votes if
the minor party serves as a local version of a major party
(as with the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota),
or they can be combined with major party votes in states
such as New York where established minor parties endorse
candidates from the major parties.
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Garand, Parent, and Teague (1989) include third-party
votes and utilize them in a unique way in their electoral
college study.

Since they use the uniform partisan swing

approach, their technique is particularly well suited to
the present study.

They hold the minor party vote constant

when they apply the uniform partisan swing to the major
party candidates across states.

As they point out, "in

most years, the third party electoral vote remained con
stant across all hypothetical configurations of the popular
vote."

However,

in the cases in which a decrease in the

vote for a major party candidate winning the state allowed
the third party candidate to win the state, they "adjusted
the electoral vote total to reflect the minor party victory
in that state (1989, 20, n. 5). "

In other words, a minor

party candidate running a close second can be declared the
"winner" in a hypothetical election should the actual win
ner's vote percentage decline below that of the third party
candidate during a hypothetical vote swing.
Following the theory that as little data as possible
should be excluded,
candidacies.

it seems best to include third-party

The Garand, Parent, and Teague approach

appears to be particularly relevant to the data application
technique adopted in this study.

While it is more the

exception than the rule, third-party candidates do occa
sionally garner more than minimal votes and run first or
second in state legislative elections.

However, in cases
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where third-party candidates present a clear pattern of
running as members of a major party but decide for some
reason to deviate from their normal party affiliation for
one election, one could argue that such a person should be
coded as a member of the major party on whose ticket he or
she usually runs.

It seems reasonable that voters who are

accustomed to voting for a major party candidate who runs
as an independent or a third party candidate still see
themselves as voting for the candidate as a member of his
or her normal party.

In addition, one should expect that a

candidate who wins election as a minor party candidate but
who is regularly affiliated with a major party will vote
with rather than against the major party in roll-call
voting in the legislature.
Therefore, in cases where the minor party candidate
runs first or second and recieves more than 10% of the
district vote, the author examines the preceding and subse
quent elections.

In the three-election series formulated

by preceding, present, and subsequent elections, the candi
date is coded as a major party candidate if he or she runs
as a major party candidate twice or if he or she runs only
twice and runs once as a major party candidate.

The person

will be coded as a third-party candidate if he or she only
runs once (and runs as a third-party candidate) or if he or
she runs at least twice and runs as a minor-party candidate
two times.

In the cases of elections in 1968 and 1986, the
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presumption is taken toward coding the candidate as a
member of a major party unless the person only runs once
(and runs as a minor-party candidate) or if he or she runs
twice as a minor party candidate.
Two states present unique problems in the area of
third-party candidacies.

Minnesota has no candidates from

the Republican Party or the Democratic Party in elections
from 1968 to 1974.

However, the Minnesota House races do

have two "minor" parties that contest almost every seat
during this time period.

These two parties are the Demo

cratic Farmer Labor Party and the Independent Republican
Party.

Neither of these parties are tied to the national

Democratic or Republican parties, yet candidates from these
two parties win almost every seat in the state legislature
during the 1968-74 time period.

Despite the fact that

these parties are statewide parties only, it seems obvious
that the two parties serve the same general constituencies
and have the same relative ideological positions as the two
traditional American parties.

Therefore, candidates from

the Democratic Farmer Labor Party will be coded as Demo
crats and candidates from the Independent Republican Party
will be coded as Republicans.
The State of New York also presents some difficulties.
In New York, individual candidates are often endorsed by
more than one party.

This fact alone is not troubling.

What is problematic is the fact that election returns are
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reported separately for each party's candidate.

This means

that a person who receives more than one party's nomination
is listed more than once along with his or her vote totals
from each party ballot.

The problem is that a person can

win the most total votes (and be declared the winner) but
recieve less than a majority of the major party votes.
For example,

if Joe Smith won 15,000 votes from Repub

lican ballots and 5,000 votes from Conservative Party
ballots, he would win a total of 20,000 votes.

If John

Brown won 18,000 Democratic ballot votes and 1,000 Liberal
Party ballot votes, John Brown would have a total of 19,000
votes.

Joe Smith would win the election, but the Democrats

would have outpolled the Republicans 19,000 to 18,000.
Perhaps it would be wise to add all votes won by each major
party candidate and consider them to be major party votes.
However, this technique would be quite time consuming and
presents philosophical problems about the intentions of
voters from the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party.
There would also be the question of what to do with Conser
vative and Liberal candidates who run against major party
opposition from their respective ideological ends of the
spectrum.

For these reasons,

it seems most appropriate to

exclude elections from New York State from the analysis.
Other problems with parties also force the researcher
to drop Louisiana and Nebraska from the analysis.

In the

case of the former, the advent of open primaries has
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resulted In primary elections that serve as general elec
tions in most cases.

This is not problematic except for

the fact that the ICPSR has decided to report Louisiana
general election results in the primary election section of
the large state legislative data set.

For the latter,

nonpartisan elections make it impossible to measure parti
san bias and representational form.
Finally, the state of New Hampshire presents the
researcher with a unique dilemma.

In this state, particu

larly in the early part of the time series, it is common
for a person to receive the endorsements of, and actually
run in the general election under the banner of, both major
parties.

In the ICPSR data set, the winning party in such

a district (despite the fact that the winning and losing
candidates are the same person)
the most votes.

Therefore,

is the party that received

if candidate A wins 3,000 votes

as a Democrat and 5,000 votes as a Republican, the seat is
considered to be Republican.

The decision on how to treat

these vote percentages is to drop the votes for the losing
party and keep the votes for the winning party, thus making
this an uncontested seat.

The thinking is that despite the

fact that the candidate ran under the banner of both par
ties, he or she was identified by the voters primarily as a
member of one party.

The assumption is that this person

would behave in the legislature more closely as a member of
the party from which he or she got the most votes.
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Furthermore, since the person ran only against himself
or herself,

it seems reasonable to treat the district as

uncontested by the "losing party."

The treatment of these

districts seems valid because when one follows the legisla
tive election careers of these candidates they always
either receive the most votes from the same party or
receive opposition from other candidates endorsed by the
"losing party" in subsequent elections.
In summary, there are some decisions that have been
made on how best to treat the data in this dissertation.
First, uncontested elections are included in the analysis.
Winners are credited with 100% of the vote and losers are
given 0% of the vote.

This approach to uncontested races

is simple in application and is satisfying in the sense
that the researcher can make use of all the available data
in testing his or her hypotheses.

The result of using this

technique is that election systems may be found to be less
responsive to partisan vote shifts than would be the case
if uncontested elections were excluded from the analysis.
Second, multimember districts are
tion.

used in this disserta

The technique is to pair the highest vote winners

from one party with the lowest vote getters from the oppo
sition party to create pseudo-single member districts that
can be analyzed identically to single member districts.
Finally, third-party candidates are included in this study.
In cases where individuals who can be identified as major
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party candidates run as third-party candidates as a devia
tion to their common pattern, they will be recoded as
candidates of the party from which they typically run.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have discussed the data and the
methods I use to test the hypotheses concerning representa
tional form and partisan bias that were explained in Chap
ter Three.

I have described the district-level data on

state legislative elections from 1968 to 1987 that were
placed in machine readable format by the ICPSR and that are
used in this dissertation.

Explanation was provided of the

technique by which a logit model is used to identify repre
sentational form and partisan bias parameters for 441 state
legislative elections.

Furthermore, I provided a descrip

tion of the steps that were taken to manipulate the data
and a brief explanation of how pooled data is employed in
this study.
In addition, I presented my models that are used to
explain variation in representational form and partisan
bias.

Representational form is believed to be a function

of the distribution of partisan votes at the district level
and election rule variables such as the size of districts
(by population) and the number of seats in the state.
Partisan bias is expected to be a function of one party's
ability to control the redistricting machinery and willing
ness to redraw district lines to benefit their candidates.

Finally, I detailed the other dilemmas in treating the
data in this study and the steps that were taken to solve
these dilemmas.

Specifically, I have decided to:

(a) include uncontested elections, awarding the winners
100% and the losers 0% of the district vote;

(b) include

multimember districts, pairing the highest vote winner from
one party with the lowest vote winner in the other party to
create quasi single-member districts;

(c) include third-

party candidates, yet coding third party candidates that
typically run as major party candidates as members of the
major party with which they usually affiliate.

I also

discussed the decisions in dealing with party affiliation
in a handful of states that offered idiosyncracies that
were relevant to the coding process.
In Chapter Five, I describe the findings concerning
the parameter values for representational form and partisan
bias.

I provide figures and descriptive comments about the

frequency of particular values for representational form
and partisan bias in the aggregate.

In addition, I provide

a detailed analysis of representational form and bias
values for each election year.

I also highlight trends for

bias and representational form over the time series as a
whole.

I identify the states that produce extremely large

and extremely small values of representational form and
partisan bias.

I conclude the chapter with a discussion of

how my findings compare with other studies that have been
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made uelng the same approach to studying the seats-votes
relationship.
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NOTES
1. While it might be noted that the King and Browning
equation is slightly different from the equation used by
the majority of practitioners, it should be pointed out
that the more commonly used log transformation of the Tufte
linear equation is algebraically equivalent to the equation
used by King and Browning (Campagna and Grofman 1990, 1244;
Gryski, Reed, and Elliot 1990, 144-45, 156, n. 3).
2.
In order to quantify the average partisan district
vote, the data must be recoded such that each district is a
case.
A computer program is created which allows the
researcher to print out the election results by state, by
year, by district, and by party, respectively, and place
these data in a file.
Next, another program is created
that reads each district as a three-line set of information
and converts vote totals to percentages; each line contains
information on the candidate's name, party, vote total, and
a dummy variable indicating whether the candidate won or
lost.
The first line of each district contains information
on Democratic candidates, the second line provides the same
information on Republican candidates, and the third line
has information pertaining to third-party candidates, where
appropriate.
In cases in which there are uncontested
seats, a line must be manually included for each party that
does not have a candidate running (in which case the pro
gram reads the relevant candidate's percentage of the vote
as 0).
In addition, for multimember districts this is the
step in which the largest vote winner from one party is
paired with the smallest vote winner from the other party
to create quasi-single member districts.
In the multi
member district cases, the highest third-party vote winner
is placed in the same quasi-single member district as the
winner with the lowest vote total.
In the rare instances
in which there are more candidates from a single party
running in a district than there are seats in the district
(e.g., two Democrats running in a single-member district),
the smallest vote winner from the relevant party is deleted
from the analysis.
3. This index is computed in this study as 1 - (2 * :
Republican % of two-party vote - .5;). This is the folded
Ranney index used by Bibby, Cotter, Gibson, and Huckshorn
(1990) and Holbrook and Tidmarch (1991).
In this study, of
course, the index is applied only to mean district-level
partisan vote in the lower house state legislative elec
tions in the analysis.
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4.
It is because the natural log of bias measures bias as
deviation from zero that this measure, rather than the
antilog of the natural log of bias, is used to measure
partisan bias.
Since the hypotheses related to partisan
bias are tested with the assumption that bias is measured
as some deviation from zero (i.e., as being positive or
negative), one must employ the natural log of bias as the
measure of bias.
The antilog of the natural log of bias is
less acceptable since bias is measured as a deviation from
one.
5.
As noted by Niemi and Jackman (1989, 10), there is a
bit of circularity in the King approach in that party
control of the redistricting machinery is determined after
a content analysis of records of the redistricting has been
made.
Nonetheless, a mechanical coding of the redistrict
ing by which a party controls two (or three) institutions
of state government combined with the assumption that all
court plans will not be biased may miss the nuances of a
particular redistricting.
For the record, Niemi and
Jackman perform an analysis using the party control of
government method and the party control of redistricting
method formulated by King and find very little difference
in results.
In a majority of cases, the redistrictings in
the states are coded the same regardless of the coding
approach that is used.
In fact, 24 of the 39 (62%) redis
trictings in the 1970s and 35 of the 49 (71%) redis
trictings in the 1980s were coded the same (Niemi and
Jackman, 1989, Tables 1 and 3).

CHAPTER FIVE:
A DESCRIPTION OF THE
SEATS-VOTES CURVES
in this chapter, I describe the findings pertaining to
the values of the representational form and partisan bias
coefficients for the U. S. state legislative elections in
this analysis.

On one hand, then, this chapter presents

the results for the first goal of the dissertation.

On the

other hand, this chapter serves as an introduction to the
next chapter in which the results of the models used to
explain variation in bias and representational form are
reported.
At the beginning of the chapter, I display graphically
a variety of patterns of representational form and partisan
bias that are found in state legislative elections from
1968 to 1986.

Because the findings concerning representa

tional form values are especially provacative, I provide
tables listing the values of representational form parame
ters by state for each election in the time series.

In the

second section of the chapter, I focus more on the results
pertaining to representational form.

Comparisons are drawn

between my findings and the findings of other scholars
studying the seats-votes relationship.

I then provide a

descriptive account of the patterns of representational
form in each election year.

Figures are provided to illus

trate the trends in representational form (and bias, as
well) over time.
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In the third section of the chapter, I compare my
findings related to partisan bias with those of other
researchers who are concerned with U. s. state legislative
elections.

In addition to discussing these findings, I

also report the descriptive statistics associated with
elections in each year.

I also discuss the state-by-state

trends in partisan bias and refer to figures to illustrate
these trends.

Finally, I note the mean levels of represen

tational form and partisan bias in each state for the time
series as a whole.
FINDINGS CONCERNING SEATS-VOTES CURVES
As noted earlier, the uniform partisan swing approach
for studying seats-votes relationships,

in conjunction with

a log-odds model, produces two parameters that are of
interest in the present research.

In addition, one can use

these approaches and other techniques to visualize this
relationship between votes and seat allocation.

Using the

uniform partisan swing approach allows the researcher to
obtain 31 data points.

These data points permit one to

apply a regression model to estimate partisan bias and
representational form for an election system in a particu
lar year.

One can utilize the parameter estimates to chart

a new "best fit" seats-votes curve.
In theory, seats-votes relationships can take on an
infinite number of forms,

stated simply, there are a

number of patterns by which legislative seats change hands

178
from one party to the other in association with changes in
partisan percent of the vote.

Likewise, there is a wide

range of values that partisan bias can take.

Application

of the techniques previously explained results in a number
of patterns of partisan bias and representational form in
U. S. state legislative elections.
Figures 5.1(a) through 5.1(d) show observed and no
bias seats-votes curves for four elections.

These figures

present actual results taken from the U. S. states and are
intended to typify the various values for bias and repre
sentational form that are found in the U. S. states.
Before these seats-votes curves are described, an explana
tion of how these
To produce a

figures are produced is offered.
seats-votes curve in a particular state

legislative election, I calculated the percentage of seats
Republicans would

win if they win from 35% to 65% of the

vote (inclusive).

Applying Equation 4.4 to these data, I

produce the representational form parameter and the parti
san bias parameter for the election.

I next used the mean

Republican percentage of the district vote in the election
to calculate a log-odds ratio:
OREPPCT - REPPCT / (1 - REPPCT)

(5.1)

Then, I substituted the representational form value, the
partisan bias value, and the log-odds ratio into an equa
tion to produce a predicted value for Republican percentage

Figure 5.1(a):

Figure 5.1(b):

Seats-Votes Cum. North Dakota
Houao of Rapresentatives. 1968

Soata-Votaa Curve, Georgia
House of Representatives. 1984

•i
i
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Figure 5.1(c):
Soata-Votaa Cum. Utah
Houaa of Rapraaantativaa, 1984

OWNftMkiifViM

Figure 5.1(d):
Seata-Votea Curve, Georgia
Houae of Representatives, 1980
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of seats for each percentage of the vote won by Republicans
from 0% to 100%:
STATE1968 - (BIAS) * OREPPCT * FORM

(5.2)

A seats-votes curve that Is devoid of partisan bias can be
produced in a similar manner, except that a value of 1.0 is
substituted for the bias coefficient in Equation 5.2.
These values for both the "observed" and "no bias" curves
are then plotted on an x- and y- axis.
As Figures 5.1(a) through 5.1(d) make clear, there is
a wide variety of levels of representational form and
partisan bias present in U. S. state legislative elections.
However, closer scrutiny of the elections allows one to
make generalizations about the patterns that are revealed
by the data.

Figure 5.1(a) illustrates the results from

the 1968 election to the North Dakota House of Representa
tives, Figure 5.1(b) presents results from the Georgia
House of Representatives election of 1984, Figure 5.1(c)
shows the seats-votes curves for the 1984 Utah House of
Representatives election, and Figure 5.1(d) depicts the
curves for the Georgia House of Representatives election of
1980.

Each of these figures is intended to emphasize a

different value among the range of values for bias and
representational form that were discovered to exist among
the states.
The North Dakota House election in 1968, plotted in
Figure 5.1(a),

is characterized by the largest

181
representational form coefficient of any state in the time
series.

The form coefficient of 5.337 indicates that this

particular election system was very responsive to vote
changes at the middle range of the distribution.

The

seats-votes curve in this election is even more steep than
what would be generated in an election conforming to the
cube law standard of representational form.

For example,

at 40% of the votes. Republicans win only about 13% of the
seats.

However, Republican seat gains rise dramatically

between the 40% and 60% vote marks.

In fact, at 55% of the

votes Republicans win a whopping 79% of the seats.

Inci

dentally, there is a moderately large bias toward the
Republicans in this election.

Republicans win 56% of the

seats at 50% of the vote.1
Figure 5.1(b) is used to emphasize an unresponsive
representational pattern of seats-votes relationship.

The

Georgia House election of 1984 exhibits a representational
form coefficient, 0.098, that is much lower than the 1.00
produced by a proportional representation system.

The

extreme lack of responsiveness at most points on the dis
tribution can be visualized by noting that Republicans gain
very few seats by moving from 40% of the vote (30% of the
seats) to 60% of the vote (32% of the seats).

In fact, the

no bias curve in Figure 5.1(b), which charts the respon
siveness of seat change to vote change assuming the absence
of partisan bias, is virtually flat except at the points at
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which Republicans get 0% and 100% of the votes.

Of course,

the difference between the observed curve and the no bias
curve in Figure 5.1(b) does reveal a large Democratic bias
in the system.

For example, at 50% of the votes the Repub

licans actually win only 31% of the seats.
Figure 5.1(c) provides a graphic illustration of an
election bereft of partisan bias.

The 1984 Utah House

election had a representational form that was majoritarian,
but there was no partisan bias in the system.

That is to

say, the best fit curve of the observed values for seats
and votes reveals that Republicans receive 50% of the
legislative seats when they win 50% of the mean districtlevel votes.

At some points along the distribution Repub

licans win more or fewer percentage of seats than votes,
but any differences are due to the majoritarian nature of
the seats-votes relationship rather than to partisan bias.
The Georgia House election of 1980 provides a classic
case of high levels of partisan bias.

As one can see from

examining Figure 5.1(d), there is a large deviation between
the no bias curve and the observed values curve.
election,

This

like the Georgia election of 1984, is interesting

from the standpoint that the representational form coeffi
cient is less than 1.0.

Though seat changes are very

unresponsive to vote shifts over much of the distribution
(including the area near the 50% mark), it is the extremely
large Democratic bias that makes this election stand out.
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While almost all elections have some degree of bias, the
graph for the Georgia election of 1980 reveals a tremendous
level of bias.

At 50% of the votes, Republicans win only

26% of the seats.

In fact, to win a majority of seats

Republicans have to win 96% of the votes.

Such a remar

kable level of bias can perhaps be at least partly attri
buted to the existence of a large number of victories by
Democrats who ran uncontested.
When one looks at the mean values of representational
form for each state reported in Table 5.1, one is struck by
the proliferation of values that are smaller than 3.0.

In

fact, only four states exhibit coefficients that exceed the
3.0 value of the classic majoritarian scheme.

There are

three additional states, all in the south, that produce the
kind of artificially large form coefficient described in
Chapter Four.

It is a testimony to the lack of responsive

ness to vote changes at much of the seat-vote distribution
in U. S. state legislative elections that the highest mean
form parameter for non-southern states is 4.260.
In fact, a few states (11, if one counts the odd
southern states) have representational form values below
1.0.

With a lack of partisan bias in such an election

system, the graph of the seats-votes curve would resemble
the no bias curve in Figure 5.1(b).
system could be viewed in two ways.

Such an election
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Table 5.1. Mean Rap. r o n and Biti, by state

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Representational Form
4.209
2.803
1. 480
7.814
1.725
2 .190
2.799
2 .287
0.862
0.700
1. 308
2.227
0.817
3.245
2.795
1.959
1.032
1.946
1.2 00
0.843
1.314
2.379
6.278
1. 371
2.488
1.852
1.429
3.001
1.952
0.904
4.260
1.871
0. 607
2.448
1.654
1.911
1.536
3.477
0.834
0.553
2.759
0.890
2 .169
2.081
1.780
2.578

(0.759)"
<—

)

(0.202)

(—

)

(0.595)

Partisan Bias
0.440
0.286
0.328
0.628
0.019
0.169
0.097
0.031
0.011
-0.833
-0.100
0.026
-0.025
0.091
-0.042
0. 032
-0.134
0.192
0. 044
-0.314
0. 095
0. 110
0.596
-0.039
0.250
0. 006
0.078
0. 117
0.108
0.099
0. 041
0.071
-0.238
0.015
0. 110
0.003
-0.215
-0.115
-0.028
-0.338
0.045
-0.057
0. 073
0. 281
0.023
-0.208

(-0. 341)
(— -)

(-0 .875)

(—

)

(-0 375)

"Mean form and bias after dropping 24 problem elections
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First, one could bemoan the lack of responsiveness in
an election system that has a representational form value
of less than 1.0.

Such a system could perhaps be charac

terized by incumbents who, because of a lack of party
competition (particularly in the South) or beneficial
reapportionment schemes, rarely receive a serious challenge
in general elections.

In fact, most states have coeffi

cients in the 1.00 to 3.00 range.

The majority of the

states, therefore, do have election systems that are
slightly majoritarian.
On the other hand, however,

if the representational

form coefficient is only slightly less than 1.0, an argu
ment could be made that the election system is more clearly
responsive to public opinion than is a highly majoritarian
system.

A system that is nearly proportional places in the

legislature a ratio of partisans that more nearly reflects
the partisan nature of the vote than does a majoritarian
system.

Nonetheless, extremely unresponsive systems like

Texas (0.553), Oklahoma (0.607), South Carolina (0.595) and
Georgia (0.202) call into question the utility of voters
changing their voting patterns.

For example,

few demo

cratic theorists would praise the Oklahoma system in 1980
when Republicans would have won 30% of the seats at 3 5% of
the vote and only 40% of the seats at 65% of the vote.
The figures in Appendix A illustrate the representa
tional form values of each election in the 46 states from
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1968 to 1987.

As one can see in Appendix A, most values

clearly fall into the 1.00 to 3.00 range.

On the whole,

one could suggest that u. s. state election systems are
slightly majoritarian in nature.

That is to say, in most

elections, seat changes are more responsive to partisan
vote shifts in the competitive range than is the case in a
proportional system.

However, seat changes in the competi

tive range in these elections are less responsive to vote
shifts than would be the case in the classic "cube law"
electoral system.
Of course, there are some elections that deviate from
the general trend.

On one hand, approximately half the

states have at least one election in the time series in
which the representational form value is larger than 3.00.
On the other hand, however, 15 states have at least two
elections where representational form values fall below
1.00; in fact, most of these states have at least two
elections where the values are lower than 0.67.

Even the

most ardent advocate of the concept of proportional repre
sentation might be disturbed by the lack of responsiveness
in the latter election systems.
A word should be added about a number of election
systems in southern states.

It was the case in 417 of the

441 elections in this analysis that neither party would win
100% of the seats when Republicans would win between 35%
and 65% of the votes (inclusive).

In 24 election systems
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in 5 southern states. Republicans would win 100% of the
seats at some point in the 35% to 65% range of votes.

The

reason Republicans could have won all the seats within this
range of votes is because so few Republicans ran in the
actual elections that a 51% uniform vote swing gave Repub
licans all the seats.

This phenomenon creates the illusion

that such election systems are extremely responsive to vote
shifts, when in fact they are not.

High representational

forms in these election systems result from the fact that
Republicans won 0% of the vote in the majority of dis
tricts!

An example of this phenomenon took place in the

Arkansas election of 1972.
A look at the raw data from 1972 reveals that Arkansas
Republicans actually won 0.8% of the votes and 1.0% of the
seats.

When one implements the uniform partisan vote swing

(and this is before any regressions are run), one finds
that Republicans win only 2% of the seats when they win 35%
of the votes.

However, by the time the vote swing toward

Republicans gives the party 65% of the votes they win 100%
of the seats.

On closer inspection, one finds that Repub

licans actually win 100% of the seats when they win only
52% of the mean district level vote!
There are two relevant results of using uniform parti
san swing on the 1972 Arkansas election system.

First, an

extremely large representational form coefficient (10.974)
is produced simply because Republicans win 23% of the seats
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at 51% of the vote and 100% of the seats at 52% of the
vote.

As noted earlier, however, this extreme level of

responsiveness is due to the fact that most Republicans had
0% of the vote in the first place.

Second, this election

system and those that are similar to it produce high levels
of Republican bias.

It is true that Democrats win more

seats (77%) at the 50% mark than do Republicans (23%).
However, at most points on the graph Democrats are at a
disadvantage.

At the point in which each party wins 40% of

the vote, Republicans win 12% of the seats while Democrats
win no seats.

In fact, while Republicans win all the seats

when they win 52% of the votes, Democrats do not win all
the seats at any point in the 50% to 65% range.
Because of the unique nature of election systems in
which the minority party wins all the seats at a small
percentage of the vote, these election systems will be
reported in all the relevant tables but will be excluded
from the discussion.

These elections will also be excluded

from the data analysis.

However, the consequences of

including the data in the data analysis will be discussed
in relevant footnotes in Chapter Six.1 A more extensive
discussion of the representational form values will be
provided in the next section; a subsequent examination of
the values for partisan bias will follow this discussion of
representational form.
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DISTRIBUTION OF BIAS AND FORM VALUES
Distribution of Representational Form Values
Figure 5.2(a)

illustrates the aggregate distribution

of representational form values.
ranges from
1968).

Representational form

0.098 (Georgia, 1984) to 5.3 37 (North Dakota,

The mean for the form coefficient is 1.855.

median value for representational form is 1.751.

The

Over 50%

of the values for representational form fall between 1.00
and 2.50, with 20% of the values ranging from 1.50 to 2.00.
The standard deviation of the aggregate distribution of
mean form values is 1.022.

Surprisingly, 22% of the elec

tions exhibit form coefficients that are less than 1.0.
These figures are indicative of the fact that U. S. state
legislative election systems as a whole are slightly majo
ritarian in the manner in which seats are allocated on the
basis of votes.
This finding is somewhat surprising.

Considering the

fact that plurality winner rules are in effect in U. S.
state legislative election districts, one might expect that
representational form values would be larger.

One explana

tion for these low representatational form values is the
fact that uncontested elections are included in the analy
sis.

The presence of a large number of uncontested elec

tions means that only vote shifts of 50% plus one vote
would cause the relevant seats to change from one party to
the other; this is why responsiveness in many of these

Figure 5.2(a):
Representational Form,

1968-1987
100

Mn h - 1.855 Mad. - 1.751 S. 0. = 1.022
Mm . - 5.337 (North Dakota, 19681
Mki. - 0.096 (Goorgte. 1984)
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elections is enhanced at the extremes or "tails" of the
distribution rather than in the middle.
The representational form values for these state
legislative elections are similar to findings pertaining to
representational form patterns in previous research on
state legislative elections.

The results, on the whole,

exhibit values that are close to the values produced by
Campagna and Grofman (1990a) and Niemi and Jackman (1991)
in their studies of state legislative elections.

The

representational form values are smaller than the 42 state
study of Gryski, Reed, and Elliot (1990), however.
The representational form values in my study tend to
be comparable to, or slightly smaller than the form values
produced in studies of Congress.

Dahl (1956), Tufte

(1973), and Taagepera and Shugart (1989) find larger
representational form parameter values in congressional
elections.

However, recent studies that deal with congres

sional elections over time (King 1990, King and Gelman
1991) and individual congressional elections (Campagna and
Grofman 1990b) produce representational form values similar
to those found in my study.
There are additional comparisons that can be made with
other studies.

Garand and Parent (1991) find a highly

majoritarian pattern of representation operating in the
U. S. electoral college system.

Ansolabahere and King

(1991) report representational form parameters in
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presidential primary selection processes that are more
majoritarian than the patterns found in this dissertation.
However, Geer's (1986) study of presidential primaries
revealed patterns that resemble the state legislative
election results reported in this study.
While the representational form values in my study are
comparable to those of other work on U. S. state legisla
tures, there are some differences.

What accounts for the

differences in findings between my study and the works of
previous researchers?

Methodological differences and

different cases used in previous analyses account for
discrepancies in findings.

Niemi and Jackman (1991) use

the multiyear historical data collection approach in their
study of 47 state legislatures.

Campagna (1991) and Cam

pagna and Grofman (1990a) study 15 states that had only
single-member district elections throughout the time series
(thereby excluding all 11 former Confederate states).

In

addition, Campagna and Campagna and Grofman use the uniform
partisan swing method but only examine data points from 40%
to 60% of the Democratic vote rather than examining the
seats-votes curve between 35% and 65% of one of the party's
votes.

Gryski, Reed, and Elliott (1990) use the multiyear

historical method of data collection, study elections from
1976 to 1984, and exclude uncontested races from their
analysis.
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Figures 5.2(b) to 5.2(k) illustrate the distribution
of representational form in the respective even-numbered
election years.

An examination of the distribution of

representational form coefficients in each of these evennumbered election years reveals certain patterns and
trends.

There is a nearly linear trend toward lower repre

sentational form values over time.

In fact, the correla

tion between the mean value of representational form and a
trend variable is -0.275 (p < .001).
form registers a similar decline.

The median value of

The largest median

representational form value, 2.471, occurs in 1972.

After

1972, each successive two-year cycle produces a decline in
median form (except for 1982) until the median value falls
to 1.281 in 1986.

Furthermore, though the pattern is

irregular, the standard deviation of the mean value of
representational form declines over time.

Thus, there is a

pattern of decreasing representational form values that is
becoming more uniform over time.
The distribution of representational form in 1968 is
somewhat different from the aggregate distribution of form.
Figure 5.2(b) depicts this pattern.

The mean of the form

coefficient in 1968, 2.319, is the largest mean value found
in the time series.
this year.

The median form value is 2.237 for

In addition, the standard deviation of the form

values across states is the largest for all elections
(1.279).

While almost 20% of the form values fall between

Figure 5.2(b):

Figure 5.2(c)

Representational Form. 1968

Representational Form, 1970
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Figure 5.2(d):

Figure 5.2(e):

Representational Form, 1972

Representational Form, 1974
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Figure 5.2(f):

Figure 5.2(g):

Representational Form. 1976

Representational Form, 1978
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Figure 5.2(j):

Figure 5.2(k):

Representational Form, 1984

Representational Form, 1986
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1.0 and 1.50, there are a number of elections that exhibit
relatively large representational form values.

A majority

(61%) of the election systems produce form values between
1.0 and 3.0.

The highest representational form parameter,

5.337, is found in North Dakota.

The North Dakota election

for 1968 exhibits the highest representational form parame
ter of all the elections in this study.

Furthermore, North

Dakota produces the largest representational form value in
each even-numbered election year except 1970 and 1976.

The

lowest coefficient for this election year occurs in Texas
(0.365).3
Figure 5.2(c) shows a more narrow dispersion of repre
sentational form values in 1970 (standard deviation of
1.111) than in 1968.

In addition, the mean value for form

in 1970 declines to 2.079.
2.219.

The median value also drops to

The decline in standard deviation as the mean value

for form declines means that there is a uniform shift to a
more proportional seats-votes pattern in most state elec
tions.

Still, the overall decline in form values is small.

In fact, over 50% of elections range from 1.50 to 3.50,
with 20% categorized in the 3.0 to 3.50 range.

However,

the percentage of elections that have form values of 1.0 or
lower increases from 13.9% in 1968 to 23.1% in 1970.

The

most majoritarian system in this year is experienced in
Indiana (5.072).

The lowest representational form parame

ter value is once again found in Georgia (0.286).
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In Figure 5.2(d), one finds that values for represen
tational form increase somewhat in 1972 and are more widely
dispersed than in 1970.

The mean value for form is 2.285;

the median value, 2.471, is the largest for the time
series.

The standard deviation is 1.144.

Exactly 50% of

the form coefficients are between 2.0 and 3.50.

The value

in North Dakota is 5.063. Georgia again produces the lowest
coefficient, 0.107.
In 1974, as illustrated in Figure 5.2(e), the mean
(2.030) and median (1.898) of representational form
decrease in what eventually becomes a precipitous decline.
Thus, after 1974, the majoritarian nature of the aggrega
tion of election systems becomes smaller (i.e., election
systems are more proportional).

As shown in the figure,

over 56% of the values range between 1.0 and 2.50, with
23.1% falling between 1.50 and 2.0.
in this election year is 1.024.
tional form is 4.797.

The standard deviation

The highest representa

The lowest form coefficient is the

0.565 value produced in Massachusetts.
Figure 5.2(f), depicting the form distribution in
1976, is a peculiar election year.

The mean value of the

form coefficients is 1.975 and the median value is 1.891;
57.9% of the elections exhibit form parameters of between
1.50 and 3.0.

However, the standard deviation of 1.151 is

the second highest measure of dispersion found in the time
series.

The wide dispersion is evidenced by the fact that
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23.7% of states had values less than 1.0 (with North Caro
lina exhibiting a coeffient of 0.158), but 5.3% of the
states had values larger than 5.0.

The highest value in

this election year was the 5.323 experienced by South
Dakota.
As can be seen by examining Figure 5.2(g), the respon
siveness of elections at the competitive range of the
distribution declines again in 1978.

The mean representa

tional form value is only 1.716 and the median form coeffi
cient is 1.749.

As indicated in the figure, 26% of the

form values fall between 1.50 and 2.0; 58% are between 1.0
and 2.5.

This election year produces the smallest standard

deviation of any election year except for 1986, 0.816.
Thus, elections in this year almost universally exhibited a
less majoritarian representational pattern than in prece
ding years.

The largest representational form coefficient

is only 3.881.

North Carolina is once again the state with

the lowest representational form coefficient with a value
of 0.238.
Figure 5.2(h) shows that representational form pat
terns become more proportional with the coming of the
1980s.

The mean value for the form parameter in 1980 is

slightly larger than what one would find in a proportional
system:
able.

1.680.

The median form value, 1.692, is compar

The pattern is similar to that for 1978, with fully

two-thirds of the form values falling between 1.0 and 2.50.
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This distribution translates into a standard deviation of
0.871.

The 4.175 representational form coefficient found

in North Dakota is the only value greater than 4.0.

As is

the case for the remainder of the time series, Georgia has
the lowest representational form coefficient (0.143).
In 1982 , mean representational form rises to 1.736 and
the median form coefficient increases to 1.703.

Figure

5 . 2 (i) indicates that 44% of elections have form coeffi
cients between 1.50 and 2.50; another 20% are between 1.0
and 1.5.
is 0.835.

The standard deviation for this set of elections
The highest value for the representational form

coefficient is 3.952.

The lowest value for representa

tional form is 0.215.
In Figure 5.2(j), one can observe that 63% of elec
tions in 1984 produce representational form coefficients in
the 1.0 to 2.50 range.

The mean form value for this elec

tion year is 1.532, and the median value of form is 1.493.
Almost one-fourth of these elections, however, have form
coefficient values between 1.0 and 1.50; the standard
deviation is 0.824.

Amazingly, North Dakota is the only

state that has an election in which the value for the form
coefficient exceeds 3.5 (3.634).

Once again, Georgia has

the lowest value for a form coefficient in this election
(0.098).
Figure 5.2(k) illustrates form coefficient values for
the last election in the time series.

As noted earlier,
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the mean value for representational form (1.403), the
median form values (1.281), and the standard deviation of
the mean (0.644) reach their lowest points in the time
series in 1986.

Over 50% of elections in this year (53.6%

to be exact) have form coefficient values ranging between
1.0 and 2.0.

The largest value for a form coefficient in

this election year is only 3.164.
Georgia is 0.199.

The coefficient for

These low representational form coeffi

cients indicate that at most points on the seats-votes
curve, a one percent change in district partisan vote will
result in only slightly more than a one percent change in
partisan seat allocation in the legislature.
In addition to the figures cited above, Figures B.l to
B.41, displayed in Appendix B, provide graphic illustration
of the trend toward lower representational form coefficient
scores over time in each state.

The vast majority of

states exhibit clear declines in form over time.
eight or nine states have rising form values.

Only

There does

not seem to be strong regional patterns to these trends,
although southern and border states (Oklahoma, Florida,
Texas, and Virginia) may be overrepresented among the
states in which representational form declines over time.
These findings generally corroborate the findings of
Campagna and Grofman (1990a), King (1989), and Niemi and
Jackman (1991).

Some factor (or factors) is (are) causing

elections to exhibit a less majoritarian pattern over time.
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In fact, as noted in the above paragraphs, representational
form coefficients become so low that only North Dakota has
an election system in which seat changes are as responsive
in the competitive range as are election systems having a
"cube law" majoritarian pattern.

In the next chapter, part

of the discussion will center on what variables are affect
ing representational form in u. s. state legislative elec
tions .
Distribution of Partisan Bias Values
As is the case with representational form values,

it

is possible to analyze the distribution of the partisan
bias values in these state legislative elections.

This

section contains a description of the findings pertaining
to partisan bias.

A trend toward Democratic bias (or more

precisely, away from Republican bias) is evident
(r “ -0.12, p < .05), but the correlation between bias and
the "trend" variable is much weaker than the correlation
between representational form and the "trend" variable.
The trend for the median value of partisan bias closely
follows the trend for the mean bias value.
Figure 5.3(a) shows the aggregate distribution of
partisan bias for the years 1968 to 1987.

As a whole, the

findings for bias are similar to the direction of partisan
bias found in Campagna and Grofman (1990) and Niemi and
Jackman (1991).

However, the findings are less similar to

those of Gryski, Reed, and Elliott (1990) and King (1989).

Figure 5.3(a):
Partisan Bias, 1968-1987
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Interestingly enough, my results indicate that more states
have Republican biases than do other studies, with the
possible exception of Niemi and Jackman (1991).
It should be noted that the bias coefficient in the
logit equation measures bias as a deviation from 1.0.
Thus, to put the bias coefficient in a format where Demo
cratic bias is negative and Republican bias is positive
(i.e, bias as deviation from 0), one must transform the
bias coefficient produced from the estimate of Equation 3.4
by taking its antilog (exponent).

After performing this

transformation, one finds in Figure 5.3(a) that the mean
bias for all elections is 0.004,

indicating a very small

bias in favor of the Republicans.
bias, 0.035,
lican bias.

The median value for

illustrates a slightly larger level of Repub
Approximately 57% of the bias coefficients

are in the Republican direction.
for this distribution is 0.247.

The standard deviation
The largest Democratic

bias for the time series is -1.040, found in Georgia in
1980.

The largest bias in favor of Republicans is the

0.615 found in Arizona in 1974.

Republican biases exist in

57% of the elections in the analysis and Democratic biases
are found in 42% of the elections.

These findings indicate

that, even after controlling for representational form,
Republicans tend to win more seats at any particular vote
percentage than do Democrats at the same vote percentage.

205
Figures 5.3(b) through 5.3(k) illustrate the distri
bution of bias in elections in even-numbered years.

The

values can also be found in tabular form categorized by
state and by year in Appendix C.

Figure 5.3(b) shows that

in the 1968 election, 61% of the elections have bias coef
ficients in the Republican direction, with 36% falling
between 0.0 and 0.15.

The mean value for bias is -0.004

and the median bias is 0.074.

The standard deviation for

the distribution in this year is 0.223.

While over 61% of

these elections have a Republican bias, the states with
Democratic biases have biases of very large magnitude.

The

large magnitude of Democratic biases in this year and in
almost every other election year accounts for the fact that
mean biases are sometimes in the direction of the Democrats
even though most elections have a Republican bias.
example,

For

in 1968, Georgia produces the largest Democratic

bias (-0.749); at the same time the largest Republican
bias, only 0.305, occurs in Kansas.
The 1970 election is also biased toward the Republi
cans in most states.

The mean bias is 0.018, the median

bias coefficient is 0.031, and the standard deviation is
0.268.

The standard deviation, the second largest in the

time series, indicates that the bias toward the Republicans
is not very uniform across states.

As can be seen in

Figure 5.3(c), two-thirds of elections in 1970 have bias
parameters of between -0.15 and 0.30, but two elections

Figure 5.3(b):

Figure 5.3(c):

Partisan Bias. 1968

Partisan Bias, 1970

Figure 5.3(d):

Figure 5.3(e):

Partisan Bias. 1972

Partisan Bias, 1974

Figure 5.3(f):

Figure 5.3(g):

Partisan Bias. 1976

Partisan Bias, 1978

Figure 5.3(h):

Figure 5.3(i):

Partisan Bias. 1980

Partisan Bias, 1982
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Figure 5.3(j):

Figure 5.3(k):

Partisan Bias. 1984

Partisan Bias. 1986
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have Democratic biases that exceed -0.45.

Another indica

tion of the lack of uniformity of the biases in 1970 is the
fact that the number of states having a Democratic bias
rose from 39% in 1968 to 44% in 1970, yet the mean bias
moved in the direction of the Republicans.

There were four

elections (as opposed to 1 in 1968) in which Republican
bias exceeded 0.30; the largest of these biases —
occurred in Montana.

0.555 —

The largest Democratic bias is the

-0.880 found in Georgia.
In 1972, the mean bias coefficient grows to 0.085,
indicating the largest mean Republican bias found in the
time series.

The median bias, 0.103,

is also quite large.

The standard deviation is almost average, 0.241.

Figure

5.3(d) illustrates that over one-third of the elections in
1972 have a bias of between 0.0 and 0.15, while another 29%
have biases between 0.15 and 0.30.

Overall, Republicans

benefit from bias in an astounding 79% of elections in this
year.

There are five Republican bias values that exceed

0.30, with the largest bias existing once again in Montana
(0.474).

The largest Democratic bias is the -1.038 value

generated in Georgia.
Figure 5.3(e) reveals that the 1974 elections (judging
from the mean bias values) begins a trend toward elections
becoming more biased toward the Democrats.

The high levels

of Republican bias produced in the 1972 elections are only
slightly lower in 1974, but the trend noted above has its
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genesis in this year.

The mean value of bias declines to

0.075 and the standard deviation decreases dramatically to
0.218.

While the median bias becomes even more biased

toward the Republicans (0.108, the highest in the time
series), this value will decline dramatically (as will the
mean value) in 1976.

Thus, this year includes elections

that are uniformally biased toward the Republicans.

As in

1972, the majority of elections exhibit bias coefficients
ranging from 0.0 to 0.30.

Fully 69% of elections are

biased in favor of the Republicans.

Texas is the state

with the highest levels of Democratic bias (-0.532).

The

state with the largest Republican bias in this election is
Arizona (0.615).
Bias in the 1976 election swings dramatically toward
the Democrats.
year is -0.011.

In fact, the mean of the biases in this
As in 1970, however, approximately 55% of

the elections were biased toward the Republicans.

Again,

the median bias value, 0.037, deviates from the mean bias
value due to a few elections that have extremely large
Democratic biases.

The standard deviation, 0.244, is close

to the mean standard deviation for the time series.

As can

be seen in Figure 5.3(f), the majority of elections exhibit
bias coefficients that fall between -0.15 and 0.30.

Texas

again produces a large Democratic bias of -0.598; in con
trast, the largest Republican bias is the 0.440 experienced
in Colorado.

211
In 1978, the mean bias parameter value is 0.021 and
the median bias value is 0.024.

The standard deviation,

0.216 is tied for the smallest for any election year in the
time series.

This year, therefore, produces almost unifor

mally high levels of Republican bias.

Figure 5.4(g) shows

that the Democrats receive a bias in 47% of these elections
and the Republicans benefit from a bias in the other 53%.
In addition, fully 73.6% of all these elections produce a
bias between -0.30 and 0.15.

Incidentally, this is one of

the few election years in which Republican biases seem to
be larger than Democratic biases.

No Democratic bias

exceeds -0.45, but two Republican elections produce biases
larger than 0.45.

The largest of the two extreme Republi

can biases occurs in Idaho.

Texas again has the election

most biased toward the Democrats (-0.405).
The 1980s are ushered in by a year of state legisla
tive elections that resume the trend toward more mean bias
in favor of the Democrats.
is -0.007 in 1980.

The mean bias parameter value

However, this slight Democratic bias is

certainly not uniform as is illustrated by the standard
deviation of 0.324 (the largest in the time series).

In

addition, the median value of representation, 0.061, indi
cates that most states actually produce a bias that is
moving more strongly in the direction of the Republicans.
It can be seen in Figure 5.3(h) that 64% of elections have
bias values ranging from -0.15 to 0.30, but there are a
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large number of extreme bias values in this election.

As

usual, the Democratic biases are larger in magnitude than
the Republican biases.

The large Democratic biases,

led by

the -1.040 in Georgia (the largest in the time series),
accounts for the fact that there is a mean Democratic bias
even though Republicans are the beneficiaries of bias in
56.4% of these elections.

Once again, the deviation

between the mean bias and the median bias is great.
Republican bias of strongest magnitude, 0.521,

The

is experi

enced in Alaska.
Figure 5.3(i) reveals the distributional pattern of
bias in the 1982 elections.

The mean value of the bias

coefficients, -0.016, again rises in favor of the Democrats
in 1982.

Furthermore, the median bias, 0.009 (the one

closest to zero in the time series), also registers a shift
toward the Democrats.
distribution —

0.255 —

The standard deviation for the bias
is still quite large.

Over 60% of

the elections in this year have bias parameters ranging
from 0.15 to -0.15; in fact, Democrats actually benefit
from bias in 49% of these elections.

Once again, some

Democratic values are extremely large, paticularly in
Georgia (-0.886).

The most biased Republican election is

in Alaska; the coefficient in this election is 0.530.
In 1984, the trend toward more Democratic bias is
again temporarily sidetracked.

The mean value of the bias

parameter is 0.002 and the median value is 0.050 in this
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election year.

These elections produce the mean bias value

that is closest to zero.
Figure 5.3(j)

The standard deviation is 0.232.

illustrates the relative lack of bias by

showing that 65% of the elections have bias values ranging
from 0.15 to -0.15.

In this election year, the partisan

bias split in elections is 57.5% to 42.5% in favor of
Republicans.

While Georgia is still the state having the

election most biased toward the Democrats, the coefficient
in the Georgia election of 1984 is the lowest of the large
Democratic biases since 1978:

-0.809.

In addition, the

Republican bias in Alaska, 0.402, is the third smallest of
the large Republican biases.
Finally, by 1986, the pro-Democratic bias trend in
these elections reaches its zenith.

The mean of the party

bias coefficient is -0.096 and the median bias value
is -0.029.

The standard deviation is also tied with the

1978 standard deviation as the lowest in the time series,
0.216.

As can be seen in Figure 5.3(k), 61% of 1986 elec

tions have bias coefficients in the range of -0.15 to 0.15.
Additionally, for the first time in any election year,
Democrats benefit from bias in over 50% of the elections
(63%, to be exact).

The -0.726 produced in Georgia is the

most biased toward the Democrats.
bias, 0.312,

The highest Republican

is found in West Virginia.

Although there is a consistent Republican bias present
in U. S. state legislative elections, this advantage varies
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from year to year and, of course, from state to state.

As

noted earlier, there is a trend in bias in this time series
toward the Democrats.

Two other tendencies should perhaps

be noted.
First, in three of the four presidential election
years from 1972 to 1984, the standard deviation of the
distribution of bias values has been below the mean for the
time series.

In addition,

in these same three years, party

bias has moved toward the party winning the presidency.

In

1972 and 1984, two years in which Republican candidates won
the presidency, there were relatively large, uniform shifts
in partisan bias toward Republican state legislative candi
dates.

If one examines the median rather than the mean

values for bias. Republicans also benefitted from a shift
in bias in 1980.

Similarly,

in 1976, there was a large,

fairly uniform shift in bias toward the Democrats.

These

observations may suggest that national forces operated to
improve the fortunes of state legislative candidates apart
from any redistricting effects.
Second, there may be tentative support for the hypo
thesis that gerrymandering effects on partisan bias are
present.

The largest number of elections that immediately

follow redistricting occur in 1972, 1974, 1982, and 1984.
The standard deviation of the mean bias for these years is
larger than average for 1970, 1980, and 1982.

Furthermore,

the standard deviations for elections between these
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important redistricting years (1974-1978 and 1984-1986) are
much lower.

Such a decline in standard deviations after

redistricting could indicate that redistricting does bene
fit the party controlling the redistricting process but
that the bias benefit is short-lived.

Thus, Democrats

benefit from bias when they control redistricting and the
opposite is true for Republican-controlled states.
decade progresses, however,

As the

it may be that the redis

tricting effects decrease, thus causing the bias values of
each party and the standard deviation for these election
years to decline.
Figures B.l to B.41, in Appendix B, illustrate the
trends in partisan bias for each state.

Approximately 60-

65% of the states show clear trends in bias favoring the
Democrats.

Approximately 20% show trends in bias toward

the Republicans.
irregular trends.

A number of states, perhaps 10-15, have
Examples of the latter include Connecti

cut, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, Iowa, Kansas, and
Wisconsin.

The only regional patterns that emerge are that

states in the Midwest seem to have the least clear trend
pattern and states in the South seem to have trends toward
even more Democratic bias in their elections.

Standard

deviations of these elections do decline in value over
time, however, suggesting that extreme biases are becoming
less commonplace (particularly for Democrats).

216
Returning to Table 5.1, one finds the mean values of
representational form and partisan bias for each state.
Aside from the aforementioned southern states, North Dakota
and South Dakota have the highest mean representational
form coefficients, 4.260 and 3.477, respectively.

Texas

(0.553) and Oklahoma (0.607) produce elections with the
lowest mean value of representational form.

In the aggre

gate (and excluding the five Deep South states), 17 of the
41 states have mean values larger than 2.0.

There are 16

states in which the mean representational form value is
between 1.00 and 2.00 and 8 states in which the mean repre
sentational form value is less than 1.0.

Once again, the

slightly majoritarian nature of the seats-votes relation
ship is clearly evident in these figures.

However, two

states other than North Dakota and South Dakota —
(3.245) and New Jersey (3.001) —

Indiana

had mean representational

form coefficient values that were higher than 3.00.
In general, the representational form values may well
correspond to levels of district party competition.

New

Jersey and North Dakota, two states with high values of
representational form, certainly are known as strong twoparty states (Bibby, et al 1990, 92).

The low values of

representational form found in the southern states and in
Massachusetts may well reflect the fact that Democrats tend
to win by such large margins that a small shift in the
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partisan vote percentage would have very little effect on
the aggregate partisan distribution of seats.
In Illinois, the only non-southern state other than
Massachusetts that has low representational form values,
the low values do not reflect a lack of partisan competi
tion at the state level but do, perhaps, reflect a lack of
party competition at the district level.

In the case of

Illinois from 1968 to 1980, for example, each district was
a three-member multimember district in which each voter was
given three votes.

The voters could cast their three

ballots for the same candidate, give one vote to three
different candidates, or divide their three votes among two
candidates (i.e., each of the two candidates would win 1.5
votes).

For tactical reasons, it was common for each party

to nominate two candidates, thus ensuring that (in my
transformation of multimember districts into quasi single
member districts) many seats were uncontested (Inter
university Consortium for Political and Social Research
1989, 27).
As for partisan bias, 29 states (excluding Alabama,
Arkansas, and Mississippi), have a mean partisan bias in
the direction of the Republicans and 12 (excluding Georgia
and South Carolina) have a mean partisan bias that favors
Democrats.

Arizona has the largest Republican bias, 0.328.

The second highest level of Republican bias is found in
Alaska (0.286).

Of the states with a Democratic bias,
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Texas has the largest mean coefficient (-0.338) and Massa
chusetts has the second largest mean parameter value
(-0.314).
By and large, it seems that partisan bias exists in
direction and magnitude roughly in proportion to the tradi
tional electoral strength of the parties in the various
states.

For example, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Oklahoma,

Texas, and Hawaii, which have long been Democratic strong
holds, have high levels of partisan bias in favor of the
Democrats.

States in which Republican candidates for

national, state, and local offices tend to do well —
Colorado, Montana, Alaska, and Arizona —

are states with

high levels of Republican bias.
There are some exceptions to the general rule that
partisan bias tends to accompany party electoral strength
in a state.

West Virginia and Maryland, states generally

thought to be Democratic bases, register party biases
toward the Republicans (a large Republican bias in West
Virginia).

Likewise, Wyoming and South Dakota, two tradi

tionally Republican states have large Democratic biases.
While the reason for these four exceptions is not readily
apparent,

it could be the case that minority party voters

waste fewer votes than voters from the majority party by
electing a relatively large number of legislators in mino
rity party districts while casting a relatively small
number of votes across all districts.

It may also be the
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case that state legislators in the majority party do not
feel the need to engage in gerrymandering since they tend
to overwhelm their minority party opponents without manipu
lating district boundaries.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, a description of the values of repre
sentational form and partisan bias in legislative elections
in 46 U. S. states has been provided.

After excluding

elections from five southern states, the results indicate
that when one includes uncontested elections and analyzes
the seat-vote relationship between 35% and 65% of the mean
Republican vote on the seats-votes curve, U. S. state
legislative election systems are slightly majoritarian in
nature.

Host election systems are somewhat more responsive

to vote changes in the middle of the seats-votes distribu
tion than are proportional representation systems.

Fur

thermore, there is a clear trend toward less majoritarian
election outcomes over time.
In general, election systems are more majoritarian in
the Northeastern states and the upper Midwest and Great
Plain states and less majoritarian in the South.

However,

Illinois and Massachusetts are examples of non-southern
state having elections with extremely low values for repre
sentational form.

The findings for representational form

do not deviate greatly from the results of other studies
dealing with seats-votes relationships in the U. S. states.
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However, my findings do tend to produce slightly lower
coefficients than one finds in other studies.

This slight

deviation in findings is probably due to my decision to
include uncontested elections in the analysis.
The generation of bias coefficient values for the
states also produces some interesting results.

It was

found that 57% of the elections were biased toward the
Republicans and 42% of elections produced Democratic
biases.

Translating these election results to mean levels

for each state over the time series, one finds that 29
states have elections with Republican biases and 12 states
have elections that are biased toward the Democrats.

The

magnitude of these biases varies greatly across states.
Democratic biases are frequent in most southern states and
are quite large in Oklahoma, Texas, and Kentucky.

Large

Republican biases are frequently found in western states,
although West Virginia and Maine also tend to have elec
tions with large Republican biases.
What can explain the variation in representational
form and partisan bias across states and across time?

Do

election rules have an effect on representational form or
can form patterns be explained by the partisan nature of
the district-level votes?

Does redistricting have an

effect on the level of partisan bias or is there some other
causal explanation for the patterns that are observed?
These questions will be explored in Chapter Six.
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NOTES
1.
Partisan bias can occur at any point on the seats-votes
curve.
For instance, a system could be determined to be
biased if Republicans won 60% of the vote and 70% of the
seats while Democrats won 60% of the vote and 65% of the
seats.
Nonetheless, the discussion is centered on the 50%
point since many researchers prefer to discuss bias at 50%
of the vote distribution.
2. The 24 elections that are excluded are the Alabama
elections of 1970, 1974, 1978, and 1982; all 10 elections
in Arkansas; the Georgia elections of 1974, 1976, and 1978;
all 5 elections in Mississippi; and the South Carolina
elections of 1968 and 1978.
3.
It should be noted that the descriptive statistics and
discussions pertaining to individual election years exclude
those elections that are held in odd-numbered years.
To
include these elections would have involved recoding the
elections held in odd-numbered years in the relevant states
to even-numbered years.
The decision to exclude these
elections in the discussion affects only four states:
Alabama (only in 1984), Kentucky (until 1984), New Jersey,
and Virginia (except in 1982).
However, because the repre
sentational form and partisan bias values found in elec
tions in these five states span the spectrum of possible
values, there should not be a substantial impact on the
descriptive statistics due to the exclusion of these elec
tions.
Furthermore, and more importantly, the elections
that were excluded from the analysis of individual election
years in this chapter were included in the pooled analysis
described in the next chapter and in the aggregate findings
reported in this chapter.

CHAPTER SIX:
EXPLANATIONS OF VARIATION IN
PARTISAN BIAS AND REPRESENTATIONAL FORM
In the last chapter, the discussion was centered
around the distribution of representational form values and
partisan bias values across states and across elections.
In this chapter, I identify variables that explain varia
tion in representational form and partisan bias coeffi
cients in these elections.
chapter is straightforward.

The organization of this
First, I test the model of

representational form described in detail in Chapter Four.
The representational form model contains variables that
operationalize district party competition and election rule
variables.

Second, I test the partisan bias model to see

if partisan control of the redistricting machinery and
intent to gerrymander translate into partisan bias in the
election subsequent to redistricting.

Third, I provide a

summary of the results in the last section of the chapter.
EXPLAINING REPRESENTATIONAL FORM
The first step in testing the representational form
model is to report the simple correlations among the inde
pendent variables and between each independent variable and
the dependent variable.
reasons.

This process is important for two

First, the simple correlations between the inde

pendent and dependent variables describe the bivariate
relationship between these variables.

This gives the

researcher a first glimpse as to whether the hypotheses he
222
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or she has presented will hold up under stricter scientific
scrutiny.

In addition,

if the bivariate relationships

between the dependent variable and one or a few independent
variables are extremely strong, the researcher may be able
to produce a more parsimonious model than the original
model he or she specified.

Second, the simple correlations

between each pair of independent variables provide the
first clue as to whether or not multicollinearity may exist
in the model.

The simple correlations also may help the

researcher decide which variable or variables to drop
should it be determined that multicollinearity is a prob
lem.
The correlation matrix in Table 6.1 contains the
simple correlation coefficient (the Pearson's r statistic)
for each pair of variables in the representational form
model.

Table 6.1 provides preliminary confirmation of the

accuracy of the hypotheses mentioned in Chapter Four.

The

variables related to competition show strong correlations
with form and are in the correct direction.

In fact, the

Pearson's r value for the relationships between form and
the district competition variables are all significant at
the .001 level.
The election rule variables are also highly correlated
with representational form, but not always in the direction
suggested by the hypotheses.

On one hand, Taagepera's

index and representational form produce a Pearson's r
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Table 6.1. Correlation Matrix for the Variables
in the Representational form Model
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■This is the Pearson correlation coefficient (the
Pearson's r) used to measure the simple correlation
between the variables.
bThis is the significance level of the Pearsons'

r.

cThis is the number of cases used to calculate the
Pearson's r.
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of 0.242 (p < .001).

Effective district magnitude is also

highly correlated with representational form (0.124,
p < .05).

Additionally, the correlation between the coun

ter variable and representational form follows the negative
pattern (-0.275, p < .001) suggested by the literature.
However, two other variables exhibit coefficients that
indicate that the relationships between the independent
variables and the dependent variable are in the opposite
direction from what one might expect.

Both the number of

districts and the number of seats (-0.315 and -0.276,
respectively) have correlations with representational form
that are opposite of what one should expect.
Of course, simple correlations are not the final
statistics of preference in measuring a relationship
between variables.

One must specify a model to control for

the effects of other independent variables when attempting
to define the precise nature of the relationships between
an independent and dependent variable.

Multivariate

regression controls for the effects of other independent
variables by providing regression coefficients to represent
the covariation between each of the independent variables
and the dependent variable.

In other words, multivariate

regression enables the researcher to measure the indepen
dent effects of each independent variable on the dependent
variable.

Therefore, it is necessary to use multivariate

regression to test properly the hypotheses that have been
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presented.

Nonetheless, simple correlation coefficients do

allow one to make preliminary judgments about research
hypotheses.
Perhaps an even more important use for a correlation
matrix is that it helps the researcher to test for collinearity among pairs of independent variables.

When colline

arity exists between two or more independent variables,
inclusion of the affected variables in a multivariate
regression model can produce t-scores that misrepresent the
strength of the relationship between one or more of the
independent variables and the dependent variable.
This misrepresentation occurs because when independent
variables that are highly correlated are used in the same
regression equation, the standard errors of the variables
tend to be inflated.

Thus, the null hypotheses regarding

collinear variables may be falsely accepted (i.e, the
coefficients for these variables may not appear to be
statistically significant)

(See Lewis-Beck 1980, 58-63).

The correlation matrix of the independent variables
(excluding the counter variable)

illustrates that five

pairs of independent variables exhibit correlations greater
than 0.50.

The 0.50 mark is a conservative figure, since

multicollinearity is more commonly a problem when Pearson's
r approaches 0.80.

In fact, only one pair of variables has

a correlation exceeding 0.80.
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One of these pairs, with r > .50, is party competition
and the interaction variable derived from the standard
deviation of the Republican district vote and mean level of
party competition (0.509).

since interaction terms often

have high correlations with their component variables and
because there are strong theoretical reasons for including
the party competition interaction terms, however, the
latter should not be excluded simply because they are
highly correlated with another independent variable.
independent variables are highly correlated.

Other

As expected,

the number of legislative districts is highly correlated
with a number of other variables.

Number of districts and

district magnitude produce a Pearson's r of -0.538, number
of districts and Taagepera's index exhibit a simple corre
lation of -0.818, and the correlation between number of
districts and number of seats is 0.719.

Another very high

correlation is found to exist between district magnitude
and Taagepera's index (0.763).

These relationships should

be taken into consideration when the model explaining
representational form is created.1
In addition, one should be aware of the dangers of
using pooled data to test hypotheses.

As noted in Chapter

Four, one must be aware of the possible existence of heteroscedacticity and autocorrelation when pooled data are
employed.

Since one must control for heteroscedacticity

before autocorrelation can be detected (Sayrs 1989, 19),
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the dummy variable least squares (DVLS) models are compared
with the OLS models first.

Then, tests for autocorrelation

are conducted.
For the model of representational form, tests for
heteroscedacticity resulted in the finding that unit ef
fects were present (F of 4.53 > critical value of 1.39).
Subsequent tests for autocorrelation using DVLS-OLS were
inconclusive (DW = 1.74; dL < DW < dy) .

To be on the safe

side, it was decided to control for possible autocorrela
tion by employing GLS.

Therefore, Table 6.2 reports the

results using DVLS-GLS.

For the sake of space, only the

coefficients associated with the independent variables

(and

not the dummy variables) are reported whenever DVLS is
employed.

In addition, because inconclusive tests for

autocorrelation do not require use of GLS, I will note any
differences between the findings for GLS and OLS.

Finally,

the significance levels in the following tables are pre
sented as one-tailed tests if the coefficients are in the
hypothesized direction and as two-tailed tests if they are
in the "wrong" direction.
Table 6.2 provides the results obtained from esti
mating the model of representational form using DVLS-GLS
regression.

The model as a whole explains a good bit of

the variation in representational form.

The adjusted R2 of

0.914 is quite respectable, indicating that 91% of the
variation in representational form across states and over
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Table 6.2. GLS Coefficient Batiaataa for
Representational Tor* (full Modal), 1968-87
Variable*

Coefficient

MComp.

seb

t-score

prob

2 .647

0. 293

9.049

0.0001

MComp. *
Stan. Dev.

-4.583

0.720

-6.363

0.0001

MComp *
Skew *
Control

0. 109

0. 043

2.504

0.0064

MComp. *
Kurt.

0. 288

0. 024

12.008

0.0001

Mag.

0.246

0. 182

1. 356

0.0880

-0.226

0.219

-1.034

0.3017

NDist.

0.002

0. 002

0.839

0.2012

NSeats

-0.003

0. 003

-1.241

0.2153

Counter

-0.015

0. 004

-4.120

0.0001

Taag.

Number of cases
R2

398
0. 914

N o t e : The dependent variable is the representational form
coefficient of the legislative elections by state.
T h e s e estimates are generated using dummy-variable least
squares (DVLS) regression.
The variable list excludes
dummies that were included for 44 states,
in addition,
DVLS does not require the inclusion of a constant term.
bXn this column, the standard errors of the coefficients
are reported.
*p < .10, one-tailed test.
**p < .05, one-tailed test.
”*p < .01, one-tailed test.
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time can be explained by the model.

Certainly, the high R2

is in part due to the inclusion of the state dummy vari
ables.
Host of the variables are in the hypothesized direc
tion and achieve statistical significance.

The coeffi

cients associated with the variables related to the
distribution of Republican votes across districts are
especially strong.

The mean level of district party compe

tition variable and the variables formed by the interaction
of competition and the standard deviation, skewness, and
kurtosis of the Republican district vote are all in the
expected direction and significant at the least at the .01
level (one-tailed).2

The most intuitive hypotheses related

to the effects of partisan competition on representational
form are confirmed.
Rising partisan competition, particularly when accom
panied by a low standard deviation among the districts in a
state, results in an increase in the representational form
coefficient (i.e., a more majoritarian system).

Control

ling for other variables, the results for the competition
variable can be interpreted to mean that a change from a
mean of no party competition to a mean of perfect party
competition causes a 2.65 increase in the value of repre
sentational form,

considering that the largest representa

tional form coefficient in the study was 5.38, this
represents a large increase in the representational form
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coefficient.

To illustrate further the importance of the

two partisan vote distribution variables with the highest
t-scores, assume that a state went from a .40 party compe
tition score in one election to a .60 party competition
score in the next election.

Assume also that the kurtosis

of the Republican vote moved from -0.9 (away from district
party competition)
more competition)

in the first election to 1.6 (toward
in the second election.

Holding the

other variables in the study constant and assuming that the
representational form coefficient was 2.00 in the first
election, the second election would produce a representa
tional form coefficient of 2.91.

If the values for kurto

sis had been reversed in the elections but the change in
competition had been the same, the representational form in
the latter election would have increased only to 2.19.
Skewness is also significant at less than the .01
level.

As an example of the substantive significance of

skewness, assume that Republicans were the partisans who
recieved the highest percentage of the mean district-level
vote in a state.

Skewness in the direction of Republican

votes at the district level would cause a .109 increase in
the representational form of the election system.

This

increase in the majoritarian nature would occur because the
majority party, the Republicans, would win more seats as
the district-level vote became more favorable to them.
the Democrats were the beneficiaries of a skewed

If
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district-level vote, then (if they were the minority party)
representational form would decline by .109.

The decline

would be the result of the fact that the district-level
vote was skewed in favor of the party that received the
lowest mean district-level vote; such a phenomenon should
cause the election system to become more nearly propor
tional in seat allocation.
The effective magnitude variable is significant at the
.10 level (one-tailed).

The findings suggest that if a

state moved from a single-member district format to a
multimember district arrangement with two members per
district, representational form would increase by 0.24 6.
The effect of effective magnitude partly explains why
Indiana, New Jersey, North Dakota, and south Dakota, all of
which have multimember districts in every election in the
time series (and the three latter states almost exclusively
so ) , have the highest values for representational form.

In

addition, the counter variable confirms that for some
reason other than party competition and the election rule
variables in the model, there is a significant decline
(p < .001, one-tailed)

in representational form over time.

From one election to the next (assuming a two-year election
cycle), representational form values decline by 0.030.
Three variables do not behave as expected, however.
The coefficients for the Taagepera Index and for the number
of seats are in the wrong direction (although the
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coefficients ere not significantly different than zero).
The relationship between the two independent variables and
representational form could also be influenced by the
specification of the full model since the simple correla
tions between these variables and representational form
reported in Table 6.1 are significant and in the hypothe
sized direction.

Finally, although the variable for the

number of districts does exhibit a positive relationship
with representational form, the coefficient for this vari
able is not significantly different than zero.3
Certainly, there are theoretical reasons for specify
ing any given model.

Additionally, however, there are

statistical reasons for making adjustments to the theoreti
cal model.

As noted earlier, it may be in the interest of

the researcher to attempt to avoid multicollinearity and to
specify a more parsimonious model by dropping one or more
variables.

Analyzing the correlation matrix in Table 6.1

and applying regression-based tests for multicollinearity,
it was decided that the magnitude variable and the number
of districts variable would be excluded from the analysis.4
It was believed that the number of districts might be
having a detrimental effect on the Taagepera Index variable
and the number of seats variable and that the effective
magnitude variable was affecting the testing of the
Taagepera Index variable.
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The parsimonious model was estimated using DVLS-GLS.
The F-test for DVLS, 6.68, exceeded the critical value of
1.39; thus, unit effects were present.

Additionally, the

Durbin-Watson statistic, 1.75, was again in the range where
the test for autocorrelation was indeterminate.
In Table 6.3, the results of a more parsimonious model
(from which the counter variable is excluded) are reported.
Dropping effective magnitude and the number of districts
variables has little impact on the party vote distribution
variables.

The coefficients for mean level of district

party competition and the standard deviation interaction
term do become a bit larger, as do the associated t-ratios.
The coefficients for the skewness and kurtosis interaction
variables remain virtually identical.

Thus, the four party

competition variable coefficients do not change direction
and the significance levels remain unchanged.5
As expected, the election rule variable coefficients
and significance levels change somewhat when effective
magnitude and the number of districts variables are
excluded from the model.

The coefficient associated with

the number of seats variable, which had been negative in
the full model, does take on a positive value in accordance
with the hypothesis.

However, the coefficient and the

t-ratio of the number of seats variable remains small and
the variable does not achieve statistical significance.
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Table (.3. GL8 Coefficient E a t i u t a i for
Representational Form (Farsiaonious Nodal), 19(3-07
Variable"

Coefficient

HComp.

86°

t-score

prob

2.985

0. 283

10.564

0 . 0 0 0 1 *“

HComp. *
Stan. Dev.

-5.758

0.664

-8.665

0 . 0 00 1 "*

HComp *
Skew *
Control

0.110

0. 044

2.476

0. 0069***

HComp *
K u rt.

0.290

0.024

11.896

0 . 000 1 *"

Taag

0. 105

0. 071

1.477

0.0703*

NSeats

0 . 001

0 .002

0.683

0.2474

Number of cases

398
0.909

No t e ; The dependent variable ia the representational form
coefficient of the legislative elections by state.
"These estimates are generated using dummy-variable least
squares (DVLS) regression.
The variable list excludes
dummies that were included for 44 states.
In addition,
DVLS does not require the inclusion of a constant term.
bIn this column, the standard errors of the coefficients
are reported.
*p < .10, one-tailed test.
**p < .05, one-tailed test.
***p < .01, one-tailed test.

236
It is the Taagepera Index variable that changes dra
matically in the parsimonious model.

The coefficient

becomes positively related to representational form (as was
hypothesized) and the standard error of the coefficient
decreases to the point that the variable becomes signifi
cant at the < .10 level, one-tailed.

The substantive

strength of the Taagepera Index shows that as the log of
voters increases by one with respect to the log of dis
tricts in a state, the representational form value will
increase by 0.105.6 The effect of the Taagepera Index
variable provides some explanation as to why Alaska, with
approximately 300,000 voters in 19-27 districts (Taagepera
Index of 3.8-4.5), has representational form values in the
2.0-3.5 range while Kansas, with approximately 775,000
voters in 125 districts (Taagepera Index of 2.8), has
representational form values in the 1.5 to 2.5 range.
The adjusted R3 of the parsimonious model declines
negligibly (from .914 to .909) when the three variables
from the full model are excluded.

Inclusion of the counter

variable back into the model might provide some useful
information, however.

First, one could test to see if any

of the independent variables are weakened by the addition
of a counter variable.

If not, then the independent vari

ables do have a nonspurious correlation with the dependent
variable.

Second, if a counter variable still has an

effect on the dependent variable, then the researcher may
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have

a clue as to other variables that may

dependent variable over time.

be affecting the

If the counter variable

coefficient is negative, for example, the researcher can
test

the effects on the dependent variable

that

is known to be declining over time.

of a variable

Addition of the counter variable to the parsimonious
model once again requires the use of DVLS-GLS.

Heterosce-

dacticity was present in the OLS estimates; the F, 7.39,
once again exceeded the critical value of 1.39.

The test

for autocorrelation again proved to be inconclusive as the
Durbin-Watson statistic,
lower bound values.

1.75, fell between the upper and

To be on the safe side, GLS was used

to control for any possible autocorrelation.
The results for the parsimonious model with the coun
ter variable are presented in Table 6.4.
for the model increases to .914.

The adjusted R2

Such a small increase in

adjusted R2 indicates that the variables in the model
already account for a great deal of the variation in repre
sentational form across states and over time.
To be sure, some of the variables in the model do
experience declining coefficients after the counter vari
able is added.

However, only the coefficient for the

Taagepera Index, which reached the .10 level of statistical
significance in the equation in which the counter variable
was dropped, loses statistical significance.7

Since there

are only tenuous theoretical reasons for including a
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Table 6.4. GL8 Coefficient Bstimates for
Representational Form (Parsimonious Model With
Counter), 1*68-87
Variable*

Coefficient

HComp.

seb

t-score

prob

2.604

0.290

8 .972

0.0001

-4.482

0.716

-6.261

0.0001

0. Ill

0.043

2.560

0.0055

H Comp. *
Kurt.

0.289

0.024

12.137

0.0001

Taag.

0 .014

0. 073

0.197

0.4220

NSeats

-0.001

0. 002

-0.534

0.5936

Counter

-0.015

0. 004

-4.203

0.0001

HComp. *
Stan. Dev.
MComp. *
Skew *
Control

Number of cases
R2

398
0.914

N o t e : The dependent variable is the representational form
coefficient of the legislative elections by state.
T h e s e estimates are generated using dummy-variable least
squares (DVLS) regression.
The variable list excludes
dummies that were included for 44 states.
In addition,
DVLS does not require the inclusion of a constant term.
bIn this column, the standard errors of the coefficients
are reported.
*p < .10, one-tailed test.
**p < .05, one-tailed test.
*"p < .01, one-tailed test.
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counter variable in the model, the importance of the
Taagepera Index as a theoretically meaningful (and statis
tically significant) variable is not diminished by this
finding.

Finally, the counter variable coefficient,

-0.015, is significant at the .0001 level (one-tailed).8
An example using the range of values for the indepen
dent variables may be helpful in demonstrating the substan
tive strength of the explanatory variables.

In turn, the

minimum and maximum values for each independent variable
will be substituted holding each of the other variables at
their mean values.

In this way, one can identify the range

of representational form values given the range of values
for each independent variable.

Thus, the substantive

impact of each explanatory variable can be assessed.
For this purpose, the counter variable is excluded
since the concern is for a particular election at a point
in time rather than as one election in a sequence of elec
tions.

The parsimonious equation without a counter vari

able is:
FORM -

a, + b,COMP + bj (COMP) * (STANDEV)

(6.1)

+ b3(COMP)*(SKEW)* (CONTROL)
+ b4(COMP) * (KURT) + bjTAAG + bsNSEATS + e
As an example of this process, one can apply the coeffi
cients in Table 6.3 to the values for the independent
variables.

Then, one substitutes the minimum (0.293) and

maximum (1.00) values for COMP (in this case),
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respectively, and the mean values for the other independent
variables into two equations:
FORM =

0.562 + (2.985)*{0.293)

(6-2)

- (5.758)*(0.293)*(0.253)
+ (0.110)*(0.293)*(0.105)*(-1)
+ (0.290)*(0.293)*(0.307) + (0.105)*(3.338)
+ (0.001)*(110.664) 0.562 + 0.875 - 0.427 - 0.003 + 0.026 + 0.350 + 0.111 1.494.
FORM =

0.562 + (2.985)*(1.00)

(6-3)

- (5.758)*(1.00)*(0.253)
+ (0.110)*(1.00)*(0.105)*(-1)
+ (0.290)*(1.00)*(0.307) + (0.105)*(3.338)
+ (0.001)*(110.664) 0.562 + 2.985 - 1.457 - 0.012 + 0.089 + 0.350 + 0.111 2.628.
In this case the predicted value for party representa
tional form at the maximum level of mean district party
competition is 2.628.

The predicted value for form given

the minimum level of mean district party competition is
1.494.

The difference in these two values,

1.134, repre

sents the range of possible effects on representational
form values of district level competition while holding
constant the effects of the other independent variables.
Following the previously noted technique, I find the
following range of effects on representational form of each
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independent variable:

(a) mean district party competition,

1.134;

(b) competition-standard deviation interaction term,

1.600;

(c) competition-skewness interaction term, 0.382;

(d) competition-kurtosis interaction term, 2.330;
(e) Taagepera's Index, 0.259;

(f) Number of seats, 0.362.

As can be observed, the values for mean level of competi
tion, the competition-standard deviation interaction term,
and the competition-kurtosis interaction term are all quite
strong in relation to the values produced by the other
variables.

The large values observed in this illustration

combined with the extremely large values of the coeffi
cients in Table 6.3 lead one to conclude that the mean
level of district partisan competition, the competitionstandard deviation interaction term, and the competitionkurtosis interaction term have strong substantive impacts
on representational form.
The other three variables have much weaker effects on
representational form.

The competition-skewness interac

tion term and Taagepera's Index, which reach statistical
significance in Table 6.3, have a relatively trivial impact
on representational form.

The effect of the number of

seats, 0.362, is even larger than the substantive impact of
Taagepera#s Index and is only slightly smaller than the
substantive effect of the competition-skewness interaction
term.
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To summarize this section on representational form,
. -*

one can state that the variables associated with party
competition have a strong effect on the dependent variable.
Tables 6.2 through 6.4 show that the competition variables
are significant and in the expected direction.

Three of

these variables, mean district party competition, the
competition-standard deviation interaction term, and the
competition-kurtosis interaction term have strong substan
tive impacts on representational form, as well.

It does

seem to be the case that the higher the level of party
competition at the district level and the more districts
that fall into the competitive range, the more majoritarian
is the election system.
Election rule variables are less effective in explain
ing variation in representational form than are party
competition variables.

The Taagepera Index and the effec

tive magnitude variables do achieve the most liberal level
of statistical significance, suggesting that election
systems that have a large number of voters per district and
have multimember districts may be associated with slightly
more majoritarian patterns than other systems.

However,

the findings for effective magnitude may be a statistical
artifact, since effective magnitude is highly correlated
with Taagepera's Index and the number of districts vari
able.

Finally, none of the election rule variables have
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the substantive impact on representational form that the
party competition variables have.
As was noted at the beginning of the chapter, there is
a definite trend toward less responsive elections over
time.

Inclusion of a counter variable in the above equa

tions illustrates that a large trend toward less responsive
elections still exists after controlling for the effects of
all the other independent variables.

In fact, the counter

variable achieves statistical significance at the .0001
level (one-tailed).

Nonetheless, including the counter

variable adds very little to the R2 of any equation in
which it is added.

Furthermore, the party competition

variables are almost unaffected by the inclusion of the
counter variable.

Only Taagepera's Index seems to be

greatly affected by the use of a counter variable.
The results as a whole suggest that representational
form in state legislative elections is closely associated
with the distribution of partisan votes across election
districts.

As party competition becomes more prevalent at

the district-level, the state election system becomes more
majoritarian in nature.

This dissertation does not include

an examination of the factors that might increase partisan
competition.

However, it is clear that whatever leads to

greater party competition in a larger number of districts
will cause state election systems to have a more majori
tarian and less proportional form of democratic
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representation.

Additionally, assuming a constant level of

party competition across districts, the larger the size of
the election districts in terms of population the more
majoritarian will be the seats-votes pattern.
EXPLAINING PARTISAN BIAS
In this section, the results of regression equations
used to explain variation in partisan bias are examined.
As was noted in a previous chapter, X have hypothesized
that party control of redistricting will determine partisan
bias.

To measure this phenomenon, a variable is created

for each year, coded "1" if redistricting occurred in that
year and "0" otherwise.

Next, a variable is created which

is coded "I" for a Republican-controlled redistricting,
"-1" for a Democratic-controlled redistricting, and "0" for
all others.

These two variables are then multiplied to

produce an interaction term.

Next, the natural log of bias

is regressed on the interaction term for each election
year.

Since the natural log of bias is coded in such a way

that positive values reflect a Republican bias, one may
expect that there should be a positive relationship between
bias and each party redistricting/election year interaction
term.

Of course, only those elections having variation in

the interaction term variable (i.e., having at least two
types of redistrictings in a single year) are included in
the analysis.

Finally, a dummy variable for each of the

years in which redistrictings are analyzed is included in
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the equation so that the mean bias for the elections coded
"0" vary with each election.
Table 6.5 shows the results of the analysis using OLS
regression.

As one can see, the coefficient for each

election year except 1972 is in the correct direction.
However, most of these coefficients are quite small.

In

only 1970, 1976, and 1982 do the party redistricting coef
ficients reach statistical significance.

In 1970, the

coefficient is significant at the .10 level (one-tailed).
In 1976, the coefficient reaches the .01 level of statisti
cal significance (one-tailed).

In 1982, the coefficient is

significant at < .05 (one-tailed).

In 1978 and 1983, the

coefficients are also quite large.

However, probably due

to the small numbers of redistrictings that occurred in
these years,

large standard errors associated with the

coefficients prevent these variables from achieving statis
tical significance.9
It is interesting to observe the effects of the 1972
and 1982 redistrictings.

These are the two election years

in which the most redistrictings occurred.

To be specific,

in 1972 there were 33 elections held after redistrictings,
and in 1982 there were 32 states that had elections immedi
ately following redistrictings.

The next highest number of

elections held in a year after redistricting took place was
16 in 1974.

The results suggest that the 1972 redis

tricting had virtually no effect on partisan bias.

In
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Table 6.5. coefficient E i t i u t « a for
Partisan Bias, 1970-64
Variable

Coefficient

se*

t-score

prok

Constant

0. 005

0. 012

0.379

0.7046

Inter70

0. 373

0.246

1.519

0.0648

Inter72

-0.032

0.061

-0.525

0.6000

Inter7 3

0. 037

0.174

0.212

0.4163

Inter74

0. 008

0. 093

0.085

0.4662

Inter76

0. 358

0. 142

2 .531

0.0059

Inter78

0.237

0.246

0.964

0.1679

Inter82

0. 110

0.056

1.956

0.0256

Inter83

0. 126

0. 174

0.725

0.2345

Inters4

0. 003

0.082

0.035

0.4861

Number of cases

417

Note: The dependent variable is the partisan bias coeffi
cient of the legislative elections by state.
'In this column, the standard errors of the coefficients
are reported.
*p < .10, one-tailed test.
”p < .05, one-tailed test.
***p < .01, one-tailed test.
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fact, the coefficient is in the opposite direction from
what was hypothesized.

In 1982, however, there is a

strong, positive redistricting effect that is significant
at the .05 level (one-tailed).
Table 6.6 contains another illustration of the find
ings pertaining to the redistrictings of 1976 and 1982.
The coefficients indicate what the predicted log of bias
would be in the particular year given nonpartisan or bipar
tisan redistricting, Democratic redistricting, and Republi
can redistricting.

For both election years, the predicted

mean partisan bias in elections having a nonpartisan or
bipartisan redistricting is 0.005 (indicating a very slight
Republican bias).

The predicted mean partisan bias in

Republican-controlled elections in 1976 is 0.363; alterna
tively, a Democratic redistricting produces a predicted
bias value of -0.353.

There is quite a large change in the

predicted value of bias according to partisan control and
intent to engage in gerrymandering in 1976.

Partisan

control of redistricting in 1982 produces substantive
findings that are somewhat weaker than in 1976.

In 1982, a

movement of one unit in the Republican (Democratic) direc
tion of control of redistricting increases (decreases) the
log of partisan bias by .110
What accounts for the bias pattern found in these
election years?

Because most legislative redistrictings

take place after the decennial census,

it could well be the
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Table 6.6. Predicted Maan Valuaa of Log of
Partisan Bias by Partisan Control of
Radiatrioting, 1976 and 1992
Year
1976

1982

-0.353

-0.105

Bipartisan/Nonpartisan

0.005

0. 005

Republican

0.363

0.115

Party Control of Redistricting
Democratic
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case that the dominant party can take advantage of the
routine redistricting process to obtain a partisan advan
tage in the drawing of district boundaries.

It seems,

however, that gerrymandering vas prevalent in 1982 but not
in 1972.
On the contrary, reapportionment in years other than
1972 and 1982 often occur because of legal challenges to
redistricting plans that were drawn after the census (i.e.,
in 1972 and 1982).

These other reapportionment plans are

particularly likely to be scrutinized by the courts for
racial discrimination or, in the 1980s, for obvious parti
san bias.

Certainly,

if the nondecennial redistricting

plans are ordered by the courts in the first place,

it

would seem that a party would be less able to participate
in blatant gerrymandering.

Generally, the results support

this theory, although the elections of 1970 and 1976 are
exceptions to the rule.
Another way to illustrate the effects of redistricting
on partisan bias is presented in Tables 6.7 through 6.10
using data from 1972, 1974, 1976, 1982, and 1984.10 Table
6.7 shows actual (rather than predicted) mean bias for the
given election year, mean bias in the previous election,
and the mean change in party bias for four categories of
states.

The first set of figures are for states having

Democratic control of redistricting.

Table 6.8 provides

the same figures for the states in which Republicans
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Table 6.7. Naan Changes in Partisan Bias, by Year
and Democratic Control of Redistrioting
Year

Mean Bias

Mean Bias at t - 1

Mean Change

1972

0.1480
(10)"

0.1031
(10)

0.0449
(10)

1974

-0.0120
(6)

0.1515
(6)

-0.1635
(6)

1976

-0.5980
(1)

-0.5315
(1)

-0.0665
(1)

1982

-0.1218
(12)

-0.1298
(12)

0.0080
(12)

1984

0.0457
(7)

0.0085
(7)

0.0372
(7)

Tabla 6.8. Naan Changes in Partisan Bias, by Year
and Republican Conrtol of Redistricting
Year

Mean Bias

Mean Bias at t - 1

Mean Change

1972

0.1577
(6)

0.0683
(«)

0.0894
(6)

1974

-0.0400
(1)

0.0657
(1)

-0.1057
(1)

1976

0.2411
(2)

0.2874
(2)

-0.0464
(2)

1982

0.0870
(7)

0.0560
(7)

0.0310
(7)

1984

0.1614
(2)

0.3049
(2)

-0.1435
(2)

"The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of elections on
which the mean bias figures are based.

251
Tablt 6.9. M a n Changaa In Partisan Bias,
by Year and Bipartisan or Nonpartisan
control of Redistrioting
Year

Mean Bias

Mean Bias at t - 1

Mean Change

1972

0.0059
(15)*

-0.0837
(15)

0.0896
(15)

1974

0.0970
(8)

0.1665
(9)

-0.0695
(8)

1976

0.1500
(1)

0.1330
(1)

0.0170
(1)

1982

0.0290
(12)

-0.0089
(12)

0.0379
(12)

1984

0.0490
(4)

-0.0616
(4)

0.1105
(4)

Table 6.10. Mean Changes in Partisan Bias, by Year
and with No Redistrioting
Year

Mean Bias

Mean Bias at t - 1

Mean Change

1972

0.0996
(7)

0.0320
(7)

0.0677
(7)

1974

0.0938
(24)

0.0930
(24)

0.0008
(24)

1976

-0.0129
(34)

0.0774
(34)

-0.0903
(34)

1982

-0.0158
(10)

0.1108
(10)

-0.1266
(10)

1984

-0.0284
(27)

-0.0494
(27)

0.0210
(27)

*The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of elections on
which the mean bias figures are based.
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controlled redistricting.

Tables 6.9 and 6.10, respec

tively, are for states that were redistricted with
bipartisan or nonpartisan plans and states that did not
redistrict.
Column one of Table 6.7 through 6.10 illustrates that
in most cases the mean bias is at levels and in the direc
tion one should expect.

This is particularly true in the

election years after 1974.

For example, the -0.1218 bias

for Democratic states in 1982 is large and in the expected
direction.

The bias in Republican redistricted states is

smaller (0.0870) but is in the hypothesized direction.

The

mean biases in 1982 are negligible in bipartisan and non
partisan redistricted states and states that did not redis
trict.

Therefore, as expected, the biases in elections in

states that had bipartisan/nonpartisan redistricting or no
redistricting fall between the magnitude and direction of
the biases in states that experienced partisan redis
trictings in 1982.

Except for states controlled by Repub

licans in 1972, states that had bipartisan/nonpartisan
redistrictings in 1974, and nonredistricted states in 1974,
the mean biases for these election years occur with the
strength and in the direction one would expect.
However, the most important tale is told in the third
column of Tables 6.7 through 6.10.

In this column, one can

observe the mean change in partisan bias from the last
election before redistricting to the election immediately
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following redistricting.

The findings in column three

suggest that, in the major redistricting years, strong
changes in bias do not occur as one might expect.
In 1972, Democratic redistricting resulted in a slight
increase in Republican bias.

Furthermore, a bipartisan or

nonpartisan redistricting resulted in a slightly larger
increase in Republican bias than did Republican redis
tricting.

In 1974, Democratic redistricting did result in

a large increase in the magnitude of Democratic bias, but
Republican control of redistricting also resulted in a
large increase in Democratic

bias.

In 1984, party redis

tricting resulted in gains to the party that did not con
trol redistricting.
Only in 1976 and 1982 were there effects of redis
tricting on bias that were in line with the gerrymandering
hypothesis.

In 1976, states that did not experience redis

tricting and states that were redistricted by the Democrats
both had large increases in Democratic bias.

In Republican

redistricted states there were also increases in Democratic
bias; however, the increases of Democratic bias in these
states was much smaller than in states that did not redis
trict or in which Democrats controlled redistricting.

In

1982, there were also redistricting effects on bias.
Republican redistricting resulted in an increase in Repub
lican bias, but Democratic redistricting had virtually no
effect on bias.

However, it might be noted that states
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that did not redistrict experienced an inexplicably large
increase in Democratic bias while states that had biparti
san or nonpartisan redistricting had an increase in Repub
lican bias.

In short, even in the years in which the

hypothesis concerning gerrymandering seems to be supported
one must mention caveats.
If one looks closer at the movement of the mean levels
of bias after controlling for party control of redis
tricting, there seems to be a pattern that suggests that
national political forces could be dominating the model.
In all the years in Table 6.7 except 1982, the party that
benefits from presidential coattails or from the lack of
presidential coattails in off-year elections also receives
the benefit of a gain in bias in state legislative elec
tions.

This pattern is true for all categories of states

in 1972

(Republican national forces), for the 15 states

that redistricted in 1974 (Democratic national forces), for
all states except the one state that experienced a biparti
san or nonpartisan redistricting in 1976 (Democratic
national forces), and for all categories of states except
Republican redistricted states in 1984.

In addition,

in

1984, it may be that Republicans simply could not keep
their previous bias of .3049; the Republican bias of 0.1614
in 1984 is still one of the largest bias values in the time
series.
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To summarize the findings concerning partisan bias,
control of the redistricting machinery does result in an
increase in partisan bias on most occasions (see Table
6.5), but these increases are usually quite small.

The

evidence presented in Tables 6.5, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, and 6.10
shows that any large redistricting effects on partisan bias
seem to be sporadic.

Some evidence of gerrymandering does

exist for 1970, 1976, and 1982, but for other years there
is little evidence of a correlation between partisan con
trol of redistricting and partisan bias in the seats-votes
relationship.
In general, these results deviate from the findings of
Niemi and Jackman (1991, Table 4) that gerrymandering as a
result of party control of redistricting is more prevalent
in the 1970s than in the 1980s.

However, the results of

the present analysis may correspond more closely to the
suggestion made by Niemi and Jackman that protection of
incumbents has been the primary goal (or at least one of
the major goals) of state legislators all along (1991,
199).

After all, tampering with legislative district

boundaries to gain partisan advantage yields more uncer
tainty than ensuring the safety of all incumbents.

"As in

Congress, preservation [emphasis mine] of partisan advan
tage by minimizing rates of responsiveness, rather than its
creation via partisan gerrymandering, may now be the
greater concern (Niemi and Jackman,

1990, 20)."
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Furthermore, the data in Tables 6.7 to 6.10 suggest
that if there were attempts to use the redistricting
machinery to partisan advantage, forces that affected the
fortunes of the national political party also had an impact
on state legislative party candidates.

It could be the

case that attempts to gerrymander are thwarted as voters
respond in state legislative elections to the appeal of
candidates for president and/or Congress.

The data from

Tables 6.7 through 6.10 may indicate that gerrymandering
and national political forces operate simultaneously.
For example,

in 1972 Republican bias increased in both

Democratic and Republican redistricted states, and the same
thing happened to the Democrats in 1974 and 1976.

However,

in 1972, Republican gains in bias were larger in Republican
redistricted states than in states in which the Democrats
controlled redistricting.

Democratic bias gains were

larger in states in which Democrats controlled redistrict
ing than in Republican controlled states in 1974 and 1976.
Furthermore, Republicans benefitted from the Reagan land
slide in 1984 in all states except states in which Republi
cans controlled redistricting; however, the latter already
had tremendous levels of Republican bias before 1984.
Thus, while redistricting does have a small effect on bias
in many election years, these effects tend to be offset or
enhanced by partisan tides in presidential and congres
sional elections.
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CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have tested the models of represen
tational form and partisan bias that were discussed in
Chapter Four.

The results of the analyses have led to the

tentative acceptance and the rejection of some of the
hypotheses that have been advanced in this dissertation.
The results for the two models can be briefly summarized.
Representational form in U. S. state election systems
was found to be a function of the partisan distribution of
votes at the district level.

Though a number of character

istics of the partisan vote distribution were found to be
significantly correlated with representational form, three
variables exhibited especially strong substantive effects
on representational form.

Party competition at the dis

trict level was found to have a strong, positive impact on
representational form.

In addition, the interaction of

party competition and the standard deviation of mean dis
trict Republican vote had a strong, negative effect on
representational form.

The findings for the party competi

tion variable and the standard deviation interaction term
suggest that as party competition increases across a large
number of districts the state election system takes on a
more majoritarian (i.e., less proportional) pattern.

In a

state with a great deal of party competition across dis
tricts, a small shift in the partisan percentages of the

258
votes will result in a large shift in party control of
legislative seats.
The skewness variable also has an impact on represen
tational form.

When competition is controlled and the mean

district vote is skewed toward the party that already wins
the most votes, the representational form coefficient
increases in value.

Alternatively, when mean district vote

is skewed toward the losing party, the form coefficienct
decreases.
Finally, the kurtosis variable has a strong, positive
effect on representational form.

When mean district party

competition is growing and more districts fall toward the
mean rather than into the tails of the distribution, repre
sentational form will increase.

When mean district party

competition is increasing but a large number of districts
fall into the tails of the distribution of the districts, a
number of districts will not be in the competitive range
and representational form will decline.
Election rule variables are less effective in explain
ing the form of democratic representation in a state's
election system.

However, after controlling for the dis

tribution of the partisan vote, some election rule vari
ables do have a small effect on representational form.
Depending on the exact specification of the model, elec
tions with more seats per district (i.e., higher effective
magnitude) and elections having large election districts by

259
population produced higher values for representational form
than did elections with fewer seats per district and elec
tions with districts in which there was low voter turnout,
respectively.

The election rule findings suggest that,

barring a change in the partisan distribution of the
district-level vote, an increase in the size of districts
or an increase in the number of seats per district would
produce a less proportional (and more majoritarian) rela
tionship between party vote and partisan seat allocation in
the legislature.
The results for the party bias model indicated that
redistricting does have a small impact on partisan bias.
The coefficients for the election variables suggest, how
ever, that the effect of redistricting is sporadic and is
not strong enough to warrant undue concern about partisan
gerrymandering.

Only in 1970, 1976, and 1982 is there

evidence of the effects of gerrymandering.

The findings

seem to indicate that partisan bias may result from a
natural dispersion of partisan identifiers across districts
and from presidential and congressional coattails.

By and

large, Republican-dominated states tend to provide Republi
cans with higher levels of partisan bias and Democraticdominated states seem to have Democratic bias or small
Republican bias.

Parties in control of the redistricting

machinery do not seem to use redistricting to their advan
tage.

It may well be that after the 1960s, concern about
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judicial intervention and concern about the safety of the
districts of incumbents from the respective parties led to
a more status-quo oriented or "sweetheart" arrangement
where blatant attempts to achieve partisan advantage were
eschewed.
In the next chapter, I will provide a conclusion to
this dissertation.

I will reiterate the importance of the

topic, discuss the hypotheses and the models, and restate
the basic findings.

Finally, I will share what I believe

to be the questions that remain unanswered by the disserta
tion and the new questions that arise as a result of the
dissertation.
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NOTES
1. Another test for multicollinearity is to regress one
independent variable on all the others. This test is
better than the correlational test because the regression
test allows the researcher to identify an independent
variable that is highly related to a c o m b i n a t i o n of inde
pendent variables.
If the R2 of regression equation is
high, then multicollinearity is a possibility.
The cor
relational test, of course, allows one to test exlusively
bivariate relationships.
A regression test is performed on
the independent variables; the results are included later
in the chapter.
2. Another way of testing the effect of an interaction
term is to compare the sum of squared residuals of the
regression equation with the sum of squared residuals of a
regression equation in which the interaction term is
dropped.
One performs an F-test to determine if there is a
significant decline in the sum of squared residuals after
the interaction term is placed back in the model.
After
performing such a test on each of the party competition
variables, it was discovered that the F's of each of these
variables exceeded the critical F value (upper 5%) of 3.84.
3. There are some minor differences between two coeffi
cients depending on whether one uses DVLS-GLS or DVLS-OLS
regression.
Using DVLS-GLS, the CONSKEW coefficient is
0.109 with a significance at < .01, one-tailed.
If one
uses DVLS-OLS, the same coefficient is slightly weaker
(0.103) and is significant only at < .05, one-tailed.
Of
even more significance is the difference between the
coefficient for effective magnitude (NAG). The DVLS-GLS
coefficient, 0.246, is significant at the .10 level, one
tailed.
The DVLS-OLS coefficient for HAG, 0.194, is not
statistically significant.
It should also be noted that
while almost all the coefficients are slightly affected
when the COUNTER variable is dropped from the model (most
see a slight increase in the t-ratio), the significance
levels are not greatly affected and the R1 is virtually the
same.
4. The R2 for each regression equation in which each
independent variable is regressed on all other independent
variables represents the extent to which the variable that
is regressed is a linear function of the other variables.
In essence, each independent variable becomes a dependent
variable in this procedure.
The R2 associated with each
"dependent" variable is as follows:
Party competition,
0.664; standard deviation of mean Republican district vote
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interaction term, 0.672; skewness of mean Republican
district vote interaction term, 0.331; kurtosis of mean
Republican district vote interaction term, 0.502; effective
magnitude, 0.894; Taagepera's Index, 0.876; number of
districts, 0.883; number of seats, 0.879; counter, 0.144.
When the variables with the two highest R2's, effective
magnitude and number of districts are dropped from the
model, the new R2's for each variable are as follows:
Party competition, 0.627; standard deviation of mean Repub
lican district vote interaction term, 0.642; skewness of
mean Republican district vote interaction term, 0.323;
kurtosis of mean Republican district vote interaction term,
0.452; Taagepera's Index, 0.287; number of seats, 0.301;
counter, 0.142.
5.
F-tests on the interaction terms once again reveal that
each of the party competition variables are statistically
significant.
6. Using DVLS-OLS, the coefficient for CONSKEW, 0.104
(p < .05, one-tailed), was slightly weaker than when DVLSGLS was used.
No other variables exhibited any dramatic
differences in the magnitude or significance levels of
their coefficients.
7. All the F's for the interaction terms still exceed the
critical value of 3.84. Thus, the statistical significance
of the party competition variables are not artifacts of the
fact that they are interaction terms.
8.
For this particular model, there would have been virtu
ally no difference in the value or the significance level
of any of the coefficients if DVLS-OLS rather than DVLS-GLS
would have been used as the estimation technique.
9. The coefficients and significance levels of the inde
pendent variables change only minimally when a counter
variable is added to this model.
However, the coefficient
for the counter variable, -0.005, is significant at the .05
level (two-tailed). This variable suggests that there is a
nontrivial trend toward Democratic bias in state legisla
tive elections after controlling for partisan redis
tricting.
10.
Except for 1976, these years were chosen simply
because they contain far more redistrictings than do other
election years.
The year 1976 was included because redis
tricting seems to have a significant effect on partisan
bias in elections for this year.

CHAPTER SEVEN:

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In Chapter Six, I used models to test my hypotheses
pertaining to representational form and partisan bias.

The

results of these tests indicated that the distribution of
partisan votes across districts is strongly related to the
representational form of an election system.

Some election

rule variables were found to have small but nontrivial
effects on representational form.

It was also found that

partisan bias is affected by partisan attempts to gerryman
der in some election years; however, gerrymandering was
only a significant determinant of partisan bias in three
election years.
For purposes of practical politics, the findings
suggest that there is a slightly majoritarian pattern
present in U. S. state election systems.

To increase the

responsiveness of seat changes to vote changes, the most
important change that must occur is that minority parties
in each state must become more competitive at the district
level.

Minority parties in the states must attract

stronger challengers in state legislative elections and
increase the amount of money and campaign support that
their candidates receive.

A more responsive system in the

competitive range of seat-vote distributions could also be
produced if election districts were made larger in terms of
population (or an increase in voter turnout) and/or if
there were a move toward more multimember districts.
263
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However, as indicated in Table 6.1, the trend over the
last 20 years has been toward less competition at the
district level (note the correlations between the party
competition interaction terms and the counter as well as
the correlation between mean competition and the counter),
more single-member districts, and fewer voters per election
district.

Consequently, we have seen the rise of state

legislative election systems in which partisan seat changes
are increasingly less responsive to partisan vote changes.
The result of the latter phenomenon could be that state
legislators have (or will) become insulated from electoral
defeat and less inclined to respond to constituency needs
or desires.
In this chapter, I will discuss the questions I sought
to answer in this dissertation and why I feel the research
design was a good one.

I will briefly reiterate what I

tried to do and what was accomplished in this study.

I

will also explain the contribution this dissertation makes
to the literature on the relationship between seats and
votes in legislative elections.

This chapter will also

include a discussion of the questions about the seats-votes
relationship that remain unanswered and the new questions
that have emerged as a result of this dissertation.
EXPLANATION OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN
In this dissertation I have been concerned with the
relationship between partisan votes and partisan seats in
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legislative elections.

Specifically,

I have asked ques

tions related to the causes of partisan representational
form and partisan bias in legislative elections.

Does

partisan competition at the district level affect the
representational form of the seats-votes relationship for
the electoral system?

Do election rule variables related

to the size and number of districts affect an electoral
system's representational form?

Do a party's control of

redistricting and willingness to manipulate district bound
aries to gain an electoral advantage incorporate partisan
bias into an election system?
I have sought to answer these questions by testing
hypotheses on lower house legislative elections in 46
states from 1968 to 1986.

The questions I have raised and

the electoral contexts I have chosen to study have provided
a number of advantages to other possible research designs.
First, the results from this study have been found to be
generalizable to a relatively large number of election
systems, each providing its own political, economic, and
social context to the elections.

Second, the large number

of cases employed in this study generate more confidence in
the findings because of the positive statistical qualities
associated with large samples.

Third, the results gene

rated in studies of U. S. state legislative elections
contribute to knowledge in the areas of legislative poli
tics and in U. S. state politics.

Fourth, such a study may
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raise new questions that are of interest to scholars of
legislative elections and to scholars of U. S. state poli
tics.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
This dissertation makes at least three contributions
to the state of knowledge pertaining to legislative elec
tions and U. S. state politics.

The first contribution

made by this dissertation is the description of the seatsvotes relationship in the U. S. states.

The simple act of

describing the representational form and partisan bias for
the individual elections in the time series provides the
democratic theorist a "plumb line" with which to judge the
ability of each state to act in accordance with traditional
normative concerns about democracy.

The dissertation makes

a second contribution to the literature about legislative
elections.

The study fleshes out the empirical

relationship between the district vote and aggregate repre
sentational form and election rule variables and represen
tational form.

Third, the dissertation contributes to our

understanding of U. S. state politics by addressing the
issue of how partisan bias may be introduced into a state
election system.
Normative Concerns About Representation
While classical definitions of representation are hard
to pin down, there have been a number of scholars who were
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concerned with the methods by which the will of the people
is translated into concrete political realities.

Eulau and

Karps (1978) and Fenno (1978) suggest that the activities
of representatives on behalf of the people (usually defined
in terms of constituents) are the most important components
of representation.

A host of other scholars point out that

the translation of partisan votes into legislative seats
constitutes one of the most basic acts of representation.
Of course, in my study, I am more concerned with the repre
sentative nature of election systems in the U. S. states
than with the activities of representatives.
Obviously, the translation of partisan votes into
partisan seats can take a variety of patterns.

It is

common for scholars to debate the virtues and vices of
proportional patterns of representation and majoritarian
patterns of representation (Garand and Parent 1991).

Some

theorists hail proportional representation systems as being
more democratic because they allow for a more direct trans
lation of public preferences into legislative seats.

Other

scholars stress the fact that majoritarian systems permit
an inflated majority of seats to the party that receives
the most votes, thus creating a legislature that is more
likely to have clear majorities that (arguably) can pass
legislation desired by a majority of the people.
In previous studies, the electoral systems of U. S.
states had been determined to be majoritarian in nature.
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although the exact degree of the seat inflation given a
certain percent of the vote had varied from study to study.
However,

in earlier works scholars had examined seats and

votes in the aggregate or studied district-level voting
returns but excluded uncontested seats.

In this disserta

tion, I have controlled for turnout across districts by
reporting partisan district vote percentages and I also
have included uncontested election districts.

The justifi

cations for my methodology are twofold.
First, much knowledge is lost when uncontested elec
tions are excluded from election analyses.

For example,

use of only contested elections in Arkansas means that
inferences about the election system must be made on the
basis of only ten percent of the elections in the time
series,

similar problems would occur in other states

(particularly in the South)

if uncontested elections were

excluded from the analysis.
Second, while partisan turnout differences are impor
tant in explaining seats and votes in the aggregate, it
must be remembered that results in each district determine
how the seats are to be distributed.

One can examine the

percentage of the district votes won by each party and
still make valid and reliable inferences about partisan
representational form and partisan bias.

In fact, if

uncontested elections are to be included in a study, use of
the aggregate vote in the state might create a false
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impression of the seats-votes relationship since voter
turnout tends to be much smaller in uncontested elections.
Thus, the seats-votes relationship is measured as the
percentage of mean district votes won by Republicans and
the percentage of legislative seats won by Republicans.
When I used mean percentage of district party votes
and did not exclude uncontested elections, I found that the
form of the relationship between seats and votes is
slightly majoritarian but less majoritarian than the "cube
law" standard.

At most points above the 50% vote mark,

Republicans receive a percentage of the seats that is
inflated when compared with the percentage of the vote they
win.

The reverse, an inflated seat loss, occurs at points

in which Republican vote falls below the 50% mark.

Small,

uniform hypothetical changes in the partisan percentage of
the district votes tend to result in very few seat changes
at the extremes of the seats-votes curves but do produce
larger seat changes in the competitive range of the distri
butions.
The U. S. state legislative election systems are
balanced in that they are more responsive to vote changes
in the competitive range of the distribution than is the
case in a proportional system, yet there is not a gross
exaggeration of seat changes given any particular vote
swing.

Normative theorists who advocate a more

proportional form of representation than that provided in
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many single-member district election systems should be
pleased by these findings.

The findings suggest that voter

preferences are fairly closely translated into legislative
seats in U. S. state legislative elections when one treats
the partisan votes in all districts as equally affecting
election outcomes.

However, some normative theorists may

prefer even a more majoritarian system.

In light of the

results reported in this dissertation, proponents of a more
majoritarian seats-votes relationship might consider it a
weakness that U. S. state election systems are not even
more responsive to vote changes when partisan competition
is high.
Empirical-Theoretical Contributions Pertaining to
Partisan Representational Form
Obviously, the finding that U. S. state legislative
elections produce lower representational form parameters
than one might expect has empirical ramifications that
extend beyond the concerns about representation held by
normative theorists.

These results, at most, call into

question previous methodologies discussed in the previous
section.

At the least, the use of uniform partisan swing,

district vote percentages, and uncontested races offer an
alternative to other techniques designed to measure the
relationship between seats and votes.
In addition to simply describing the seats-votes
relationship in lower house elections in the U. S. states,
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I have attempted in this dissertation to answer questions
about the causes of partisan bias and representational form
in U. S. state legislative elections.

In the process of

answering these questions, I have hoped to generate find
ings that can be generalized to elections in other contexts
and to increase knowledge about subnational units of gov
ernment in the U. S.

I believe that the results of my

study have lived up to my aspirations.
As Tufte suggested as early as 1973, variation in
representational form parameters was found to be a function
of the distribution of partisan votes across election
districts.

I found that party competition and the interac

tion between party competition and the standard deviation
and kurtosis of the distribution of Republican votes across
districts to be particularly important determinants of
representational form.

The higher the level of partisan

competition and the more districts there were in the com
petitive range, the larger were the values for representa
tional form.

In other words,

in states where there was a

great deal of party competition at the district level, more
seats would change party hands given a particular vote
swing than in states in which there was very little dis
trict-level competition.

These results correspond to the

findings of Garand, Parent, and Teague (1989) concerning
the translation of popular votes to electoral college votes
in u. S. presidential elections.
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It has also been discovered that, after controlling
for the distribution of the partisan district-level votes,
the log of the number of voters per district in the elec
tion system affected representational form.

As the parsi

monious model in Table 6.3 suggests, the larger the
district size, ceteris paribus, the more majoritarian is
the pattern of the seats-votes relationship.

Taagepera's

observation that larger districts (in terms of population)
produce higher representational form parameters was con
firmed in this dissertation.
The findings suggest that, to a large extent, repre
sentational form is dependent on the level of party compe
tition at the district level and (to a smaller degree) on
the size of election districts.

This suggests that

attempts to manipulate the election system by changing the
rules to produce more majoritarian or more proportional
seats-votes relationships may meet with only moderate
success.

It seems that, holding everything else constant,

the creation of larger districts (on the basis of popula
tion) is likely to make U. S. state election systems some
what more majoritarian.
However, partisan competition, the strongest determi
nant of representational form, is not so easily manipu
lated.

In order for party competition to increase at the

district level, the weaker party in the state must run
stronger candidates.

Perhaps weak parties can benefit from
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the coattails of strong gubernatorial or presidential
candidates, but these coattails probably will not exist for
long.

It is likewise improbable that weak parties will be

strengthened by redistricting.

More likely is a scenario

in which the party that controls redistricting receives
electoral benefits or incumbents from both parties run in
districts that have been made safer from a successful
challenge.

Thus,

it seems that until losing parties are

willing to contest elections that have long gone uncon
tested and to run better candidates across the board, the
states are likely to be saddled with electoral systems that
are less responsive to slight or moderate changes in parti
san voting than many observers would like to see.
Empirical-Theoretical Contributions Pertaining to
Partisan Bias
In my opinion, the findings concerning partisan bias
contribute more to the literature in U. S. state politics
than to

the literature in legislative elections.

On the

whole, and somewhat surprisingly. Republicans tend to
benefit from partisan bias in state legislative elections.
Part of this bias is perhaps a result of the methodology
used in this study.

The decision to include uncontested

elections means that Republicans (who are less likely to
contest state legislative elections than are Democrats),
would benefit from a bias i_£ they contested each election
and attained a uniform vote following across districts.
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However,

in states where there are few uncontested elec

tions (i.e., where Republicans are likely to contest
elections), a Republican bias is indicative of either
Republican control of the redistricting machinery or the
distribution of partisan votes according to demographic
characteristics of the population.
The results of the bias model offer both confirmation
and contradiction with the findings of Niemi and Jackman
(1991).

They find that partisan gerrymandering does occur

in the states, but is less prevalent in the 1980s than in
the 1970s.

Unlike Niemi and Jackman, however, I disag

gregate for each redistricting year.

My results do show

redistricting effects on partisan bias in 1970 and 1976 but
do not illustrate redistricting effects for the large
number of elections held in 1972 and 1974.

In 1983 and

1984 I find, as do Niemi and Jackman, no effects of redis
tricting.

However,

in the large number of elections that

took place in 1982 redistricting does seem to enhance
partisan bias.
I think that my results for bias are somewhat surpri
sing.

If parties truly desire to engage in gerrymandering,

they should be more aware of state demographics immediately
after the census before migration effects can be felt.

It

is the case that in 1982, a year in which elections immedi
ately follow redistrictings that are based on the decennial
census, there tends to be a bias toward the party that
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controls redistricting.

However, the 1972 elections do not

show redistricting effects.
It should perhaps not be surprising that parties are
unwilling or unable to institute blatant partisan gerryman
dering in the 1980s.

Increased judicial scrutiny to iden

tify racial discrimination and the Supreme Court ruling
that charges of partisan gerrymandering are justiciable
would lead one to expect that the parties would be more
hestitant to engage in gerrymanding over time.

The 1982

elections do illustrate moderately strong redistricting
effects, but the almost equally important year of 1984
shows no effect of redistricting on partisan bias.
In light of the relatively unsuccessful attempts by
scholars to identify the widespread use of gerrymandering
in U. S. state legislative elections, it has also been
suspected that incumbents of both parties have used techno
logical improvements, primarily in computers and software,
to manipulate district boundaries virtually to ensure their
own reelections.

The suggested existence of a "sweetheart

gerrymander" may well be factual since state elections are
becoming less competitive over time.

Lack of evidence that

redistricting increases the level of partisan bias in favor
of the party controlling redistricting over much of this
time series may also point to a bipartisan or sweetheart
gerrymander explanation.
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In addition, as was noted in Chapter six, national
elections (particularly presidential elections), may be
exerting a coattail effect on state legislative elections
(Campbell 1986).

In this case, the effects of redis

tricting could be blurred by voters' tendency to favor the
party of the presidential winner in presidential election
years and to oppose the party of the president in off-year
or midterm congressional elections.

There is some evidence

from Tables 6.7 through 6.10 that this phenomenon may be
occurring.

If presidential coattails are operating in

state legislative elections, this may explain why redis
tricting effects seem to be present but are not very strong
(See Table 6.5).

It could be that presidential coattails

in presidential elections and the lack of coattails in
nonpresidential election years are stronger influences on
the seats-votes relationship than are the effects of redis
tricting.
AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
While the findings for representational form and
partisan bias offer a contribution to our knowledge of
U. S. state legislative elections, much remains to be
explained for both of these characteristics of state elec
tion systems.

One could point to a number of variables

that could be included in future analyses of elections.
Which variables might one suggest as possible explana
tions for variation in representational form?

Tufte,
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commenting on national elections, suggests that the "more
nationally oriented the politics of a country or the more
nationalized the forces prevailing in a given election, the
greater the swing ratio —
547)."

other things being equal (1973,

This should occur because the more nationalized the

forces are in an election, the more uniform will be the
electoral swings across the nation.

Of course, Tufte's

explanation is applicable to studies in which actual election results, rather than the uniform partisan swing
approach, are used.

However, since the uniform partisan

swing method already assumes that all districts are uni
formly affected by a partisan vote swing, then Tufte's
suggestion must be modified to fit into the framework
adopted in this dissertation.
It does seem reasonable that national- or state-level
forces that counteract the prevailing electoral tendencies
in a state should contribute to a higher level of party
competition at the district level.

In Georgia, for exam

ple, if a popular Republican runs for President, for the
U. S. Senate, or for Governor at the same time state legis
lative elections are held, one might expect that the Repub
lican state legislative candidates would benefit from a
coattail effect (See Campbell 1986).

If so, one would

expect that partisan competition would be enhanced and
representational form values would increase.
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District-level factors may also affect the representa
tional form value of a state electoral system.

Both King

(1989) and Tufte (1973) point out that Incumbency voting
could affect the swing ratio.

King (1989) has illustrated

that this factor decreases responsiveness in congressional
elections.

Incumbency could play a role due to voter

loyalty to incumbents or to incumbents' ability to use
legislative spending (i.e., spending on the institution
itself, such as for personal staff who can engage in con
stituency casework) to insulate themselves from electoral
defeat (Holbrook and Tidmarch 1991, Weber, Tucker, and
Brace 1991).

Incumbency effects can also be asserted due

to the unwillingness of challengers to face incumbents
(Holbrook and Tidmarch 1991, Jewell and Breaux 1991) or to
considerations granted to incumbents in redistricting
(Basehart and Comer 1991, Niemi and Jackman 1991).
Whatever may be the basis for incumbency advantages,
an increase in voting in favor of incumbents should reduce
the value of the representational form parameter in state
legislative elections.

Interestingly enough, all the

previously mentioned variables that might increase incum
bency voting (and the variable "incumbency voting" itself)
are increasing over time in lower house state legislative
elections.

Finally,

if the size of districts is important

in explaining representational form, one could analyze
state senate elections with the expectation of finding
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larger representational form values since state senate
districts are larger than state representative districts.
What factors might affect partisan bias in a state?
As noted in Chapters Three and Six of this dissertation,
the literature centers around redistricting effects.

In

addition to the attempts by King (1989) and Basehart and
Comer (1991) to identify elections where the record indi
cated a partisan attempt to gerrymander, there are other
objective characteristics of parties that might give a clue
about willingness to utilize redistricting for partisan
gain.

There is some evidence that parties in two-party

competitive states are less willing to engage in partisan
gerrymandering.

On the one hand, Niemi and Jackman (1990,

16) suggest that dominant parties in a strong two-party
environment use restraint in redistricting because of fear
that they may be victims of gerrymandering should they
become the minority party.

On the other hand, Niemi and

Jackman believe that majority parties in a strong two-party
state may be more afraid of close scrutiny by the opposi
tion party and, potentially, by the courts.
Another factor that could contribute to partisan bias
is difference in partisan turnout across districts.

For

example, Campbell (1991) has found that Democratic candi
dates in U. S. congressional elections win dispropor
tionately in electoral districts that have low total voter
turnout and low voter turnout for the winning candidate.
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This means that Republican candidates have been the victims
of partisan bias because they expend more votes to win a
seat than do their Democratic counterparts.

In order to

test this turnout theory, one must use the historical
method of calculating seats and votes.

Using the uniform

partisan swing method as I have done virtually necessitates
using an aggregated mean district vote percentage so that
the one percent incremental swings can be applied to the
election data.

However, use of the mean district vote

controls for turnout and consequently weighs each district
equally when party votes are aggregated to the state level.
One must adopt the actual total votes from the districts
and the state to test the theory that turnout differences
affect partisan bias.

In the absence of extremely strong

findings pertaining to partisan gerrymandering, however,
such a study may well be warranted.
In addition,

it does seem to be the case that presi

dential coattail effects operate in state legislative
elections.

The impact of presidential coattails on a

party's seat total has been noted by Campbell (1986), but
the question of the interaction between redistricting
effects and coattail effects has not be answered.

The

question of redistricting effects versus coattail effects
is certainly worthy of future research; some attempt to
introduce a coattail variable into the partisan bias model
would be a step in the right direction.

The relationship between seats and votes in democratic
election systems has long been a subject of scholarly
inquiry.

Congressional elections have been the focus of

much of the research on seats and votes undertaken by
scholars of American politics.

This dissertation is a

contribution to the emerging seats-votes literature per
taining to the U. S. states.

Hopefully, the findings in

this study will generate additional attempts to discover
why certain seats-votes patterns exist in the election
systems of both legislative houses of the U. S. states.
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Appendix

a

. Representational Form by state
and by Year
Year

1909

1970

1972

9.482

—

1974

1970

State
Alabama

—

7.018

—

Alaska

4 .831

3. 316

3.493

2.924

2.207

Arizona

1.386

0.867

1.334

1.262

1.902

Arkansas

9.996

2.464

10.974

9.411

10.941

Calif.

1.418

1.455

1. 877

2.494

2 .352

Colorado

2.537

2.533

2.568

2.808

1.645

Conn.

2.967

2.739

3.333

3.291

3 .178

Delaware

4.009

3.211

2.665

2.271

2 .126

Florida

1. 124

0.422

1.426

0. 611

0.521

Georgia

0. 369

0.286

0. 107

1.481

2 .541

Hawaii

1. 343

1.750

1.212

1.638

1.721

Idaho

1.990

2.250

2.985

2.271

3 .208

Illinois

0. 631

0.537

0. 807

0.748

0.637

Indiana

5. 096

5.072

4. 161

4 .059

3. 115

Iowa

3.490

3.672

3 .581

2.805

2 .601

Kansas

2.791

2.219

2 .488

2.289

2 .149

"Election was

actually held in 1969

bElection was

actually held in 1971

cElection was

actually held in 1973

^Election was

actually held in 1975

'Election was

actually held in 1977
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Year
1909

1970

1972

1974

1970

Kentucky

1.735'

1.503"

1.236'

0.990d

0. 899

Maine

2.395

2.556

2 .467

1.685

1.907

State

Maryland

—

1.643

—

1.066

—

Mass.

1.495

0.716

0.969

0.565

0.852

Michigan

1.410

0.962

1.556

1.260

1. 630

—

2.649

2 .683

—

6.861d

Minnesota

—

Miss.

—

—
9.367"

—

Missouri

2. 316

1.536

2 .040

1.298

0.996

Montana

3.613

2.481

3.009

2.838

2 .737

Nevada

1.723

1.440

2 .191

2.001

1. 619

New Hamp.

1.185

1. 108

1.615

1.236

1. 856

New Jer.

4 .126*

3.935b

3.870'

3 .099d

3.042'

New Mex.

3.319

2.668

2 .492

2.034

1.726

1.682

1. 139

1.619

0. 158

N . C a r o.

—

N. Dak.

5. 337

3 .477

5.063

4.797

5. 117

Ohio

2.400

1.838

2 .476

1.751

1.809

Oklahoma

0.818

0.646

0. 650

0. 584

0. 649

Oregon

2.173

3.163

2.945

2.991

2.258

'Election was

actually held in 1969

"Election was

actually held in 1971

‘Election was

actually held in 1973

dElection was

actually held in 1975

'Election was

actually held in 1977

290
ifvflr
1909

1970

1972

1974

1970

Penn.

2. 301

2.311

2. 333

1.898

1.879

R. Isl.

2.939

2 .901

3.037

1.728

1.967

S . Caro.

7.784

1. 246

0.891

0.668

0. 641

S . Dak.

1.874

3 .233

4.823

4.230

5.323

Tenn.

0. 615

0.986

1. 180

1.119

0. 406

Texas

0.365

0. 330

0. 699

0.878

0.325

Utah

3 .553

3.100

2. 683

2.259

2.899

Virginia

1. 066‘

1. 2 6 5b

0.704'

0.424“

0.510'

Wash.

1. 684

2 .015

2.761

1.999

2 .265

W. Virg.

3.209

3 .170

2.652

1.775

1.071

Wiscon.

2.004

2.336

1.825

1.669

1.772

Wyoming

2.760

3 .193

3 .308

3.120

3 .140

State

‘Election was

actually held in 1969

bElection was

actually held in 1971

‘Election was

actually held in 1973

dElection was

actually held in 1975

'Election was

actually held in 1977

291
Year
1978

19 8 Q

1982

1984

1998

3.702

0.891b

0. 626

State
Alabama

3.535

Alaska

2. 100

2 .010

2.791

2.818

1.541

Arizona

1.820

1.692

1.966

1.316

1.250

Arkansas

8. 192

7. 353

9. 594

5.511

3.702

Calif.

2.104

1. 929

1. 526

1.130

0. 968

Colorado

1. 528

1. 940

2. 137

1.970

2 .235

Conn.

2.914

2 .531

2.521

2 .501

2 .016

Delaware

1.788

2. 327

2. 110

1. Ill

1.247

Florida

0. 855

0.386

1.205

0.859

1. 209

Georgia

1. 557

0. 143

0.215

0.098

0. 199

Hawaii

0.902

0. 399

1.466

1.145

1.507

Idaho

2.087

1.868

1.703

2.175

1. 729

Illinois

0.537

0.404

1. 532

1.353

0. 979

Indiana

2. 564

2.304

2. 438

1.950

1. 686

Iowa

2.537

2.487

2.783

2.175

1.817

Kansas

1.861

1.523

1.789

1.363

1. 120

Kentucky

0. 763f

0.668'

0. 667

0.823

Maine

1. 508

1.965

1.526

1. 673

Maryland

1.081

—

—
1. 778
0.975

Election actually held in 1979
'Election actually held in 1981
^Election actually held in 1983

—

1.237

292

1979

1999

1992

1994

1999

Hass.

0.971

0.791

0.751

0.766

0.549

Michigan

1.210

1.395

1. 133

1.534

1.048

Minn.

2.515

1. 962

2.378

2.446

2.017

Miss.

4 .076f

Missouri

1.329

1. 186

1. 363

0. 621

1.027

Montana

2. 156

2. 459

2.269

2.039

1.281

Nevada

1.107

1.739

2.054

2 .268

2.375

New Hamp.

1.471

1. 636

1.587

1.459

1.140

New Jer.

2 .67 lf

2 .334*

2. 324"

2. 644'

1.966*

New Mex.

1.709

1. 159

1. 528

1.409

1.476

N. Caro.

0.238

1.457

0.628

0. 312

N. Dak.

3.881

4. 175

3.952

3.634

3. 164

Ohio

1.858

1. 361

2.062

1.586

1.572

Oklahoma

0.647

0.267

0.428

0.663

0.713

Oregon

2.223

2 .093

2. 120

2.235

2.282

Penn.

1.625

1.442

1. 192

0.908

0. 648

R. Isl.

0.942

1.458

1. 004

1.368

1.768

State

—

5. 653h

fE lection actually held in 1979
•Election actually held in 1981
"Election actually held in 1983
'Election actually held in 1985
JElection actually held in 1987

—

5.435*

—

293
rear
1979

1990

1992

1994

1999

S. Caro.

2.812

0.248

0. 617

0.126

0.323

S . Dak.

3.692

2.771

3.689

2.864

2.273

Tenn.

0.867

1.213

0. 631

0.490

0.828

Texas

0. 592

0.822

0.823

0.207

0. 489

Utah

2.571

3.240

2.584

2.367

2 .338

Virginia

1. 180f

0.595*

1.432

0. 843h

1.084

Wash.

1.827

2.087

2 .867

2.298

1.882

W. Virg.

1.482

2.783

1.212

1.928

1. 529

Wiscon.

1.940

1.689

1. 865

1.679

1. 024

Wyoming

2. 170

2 .162

2 .086

1.918

1.922

State

'Election actually held in 1979
'Election actually held in 1981
hElection actually held in 1983
'Election actually held in 1985
kVirginia exhibited a coefficient of 0.691 in the 1987
election

Figure B.2

Representational Form and Partisan Bias
ovtr Tima for Alaska. 1968-1986

Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tfane for Arizona, 1968-1986
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Figure B.3

Figure B.4

Representational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima for CaKfomia. 1968-1986

Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima for Colorado. 1968-1986

Appendix fi. Raprasantational rorm and Partisan
Bias ovar Tina, by State, 1968*1987

Figure B.1

Figure B.5

Figure B.6

Representational Form and Partisan Bias
over Time for Conn.. 1968-1986

Representational Form and Partisan Bias
over Time for Delaware, 1968-1986
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Figure B.7

Figure B.8

Representational Form and Partisan Bias
over Time for Florida. 1968-1986

Representational Form and Partisan Bias
over Time for Hawaii, 1968-1986
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Figure B.9

Figure B.10

Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima for Idaho, 1968-1986

Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima for Mmois, 1968-1986
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Figure B.11
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima for ImBana. 1968-1986
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Figure B.12
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima for Iowa, 1968-1986

Figure B.13

Figure B.14

Representational Form end Partisan Bias
over Time for Kenses, 1968-1986

Representational Form and Partisan Bias
over Tana for Kentucky. 1969-1986
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Figure B.15

Figure B.16

Representational Form and Partisan Bias
over Time for Maine, 1968-1986

Representational Form and Partisan Bias
over Time for Maryland, 1970-1986
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Figure B.17

Figure B.18

Representational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Time for Massachusetts, 1968-1986

Representational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Time for Michigan, 1968-1986
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Figure B.19
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima for Minnesota, 1974-1986
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Figure B.20
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima for Missouri, 1968-1986
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Figure B.21

Figure B.22

Representational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima for Montana. 1968-1986

Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Time for Nevada. 1968-1986
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Figure B.23

Figure B.24

Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima for Now Hampshira, 1968-1986

Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
over Tima for New Jersey. 1969-1987
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Figure B.25

Figure B.26

Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima for Now Maxico, 1968-1986

Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima for North CaroKna, 1970*1984
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Figure B.27

Figure B.28

Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima for North Dakota, 1968-1986

Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima for Ohio, 1968*1986
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Figure B.29

Figure B.30

Representational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tkna for Oklahoma, 1968-1986

Representational Form and Partisan Bias
over Time for Oregon. 1968-1986
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Figure B.32

Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tkna for Pennsylvania, 1968-1986
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Representational Form and Partisan Bias
over Time for Rhode Island, 1968-1986

Figure B.33

Figure B.34

Representational Form and Partisan Bias
over Tima for South Dakota, 1968-1986

Representational Form and Partisan Bias
over Time for Tennessee, 1968-1986
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Figure B.35
Representational Form and Partisan Bias
over Time for Texas, 1968-1986
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Figure B.36
Representational Form and Partisan Bias
over Time for Utah, 1968-1986
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Figure B.37

Figure B.38

Representational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima lor Virginia, 1969*1987

Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tana for Washington, 1968-1986
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Figure B.39

Figure B.40

Re^. jsentational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima for Wast Virginia, 1968-1986

Representational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Time for Wisconsin, 1968-1986
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Figure B.41
Representational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Time for Wyoming, 1968-1986
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Appendix c. Partisan Bias by Stats
and by Ysar
Year
19$8

197 Q

1972

1974

2.462

—

0.866

197$

State
Alabama

—

—

Alaska

0.190

0. 358

0.153

0.242

0. 337

Arizona

0.199

0. 378

0.426

0.615

0.233

Arkansas

1.803

-0.069

2.151

0.991

0.400

Calif.

0.096

0. 035

-0.051

0. Ill

0.024

Colorado

0.185

0.031

0.199

0. 134

0.440

Conn.

0.049

0. 099

0.158

0.016

0. 151

-0.210

-0.006

0.057

0.035

-0.136

Florida

0.093

-0.064

0.211

-0.005

-0.132

Georgia

-0.749

-0.880

-1.038

-0.764

-0.501

Hawa i i

-0.107

0.110

0.033

-0.083

0.117

Idaho

0. 14 5

-0.191

0.312

-0.256

-0.077

Illinois

0. 072

-0.002

0.038

-0.129

-0.057

Indiana

-0.366

-0.010

0.119

0. 056

0.315

Iowa

-0.066

-0.108

0.068

0.270

-0.125

0.305

-0.169

0.030

0.095

-0.054

Del.

Kansas

'Election was

actually held in 1969

bElection was

actually held in 1971

'Election was

actually held in 1973

dElection was

actually held in 1975

'Election was

actually held in 1977
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Year
1968

1970

Kentucky

0.170*

0.093"

Maine

0.057

1972

1974

1976

-0.195*

-0.090

-0.239*

0.203

0.454

0.222

State

Maryland
Mass.
Michigan

—

Missouri

0.285

—

0. 108

-0.030

-0.141

-0.130

-0.311

-0.465

0. 120

0.090

0. 156

0.158

0. 052

—

0.275

0. 043

—

0. 556d

Minn.
Miss.

0.263

—

—

—
1.801"

0. 085

0. 153

0. 151

0.001

-0.067

0. 555

0.474

0. 337

0.241

0. 079

0. 186

-0.004

-0.037

-0.079

New Hamp. 0. 087

0. 110

0. 066

-0.040

0.249

0.016*

0.229d

0.115*

-0.068

0.131

0.124

0. 062

0.405

0. 326

0.191

-0.390

Montana
Nevada

New Jer.

0. 033‘

New Mex.

0.215

N. Caro.

—

0.370"

-

0.101

N. Dak.

0.225

-0.339

0. 023

0.133

0. 150

Ohio

0.02 3

0.268

0. 046

0. 087

0.032

Okla.

-0.122

-0.316

-0.021

-0.235

-0.390

Oregon

-0.342

-0.160

0.121

0. 209

0. 186

‘Election was actually held in 1969
"Election was actually held in 1971
‘Election was actually held in 1973
dElection was actually held in 1975
‘Election was actually held in 1977

Year
1969

1970

1972

1974

1979

0.110

0. 122

0. 184

0. 157

0.234

-0.117

0. 022

0.211

0.040

0. 044

1.250

0.138

0.073

-0.209

-0.382

-0.399

-0.171

0.194

0. 128

-0.226

Tenn.

0.243

0. 152

0. 244

-0.071

-0.235

Texas

-0.228

-0.555

-0.183

-0.532

-0.598

Utah

0.233

-0.012

-0.092

0.310

0.093

Virg.

—0. 780*

0.352b

0.131‘

-0.227d

-0.003

Wash.

0. 077

0. 107

0. 087

0. 135

0.051

W. Virg.

0. 150

0.274

0.408

0.284

0.251

Wiscon.

-0.136

0. 022

0.011

0.284

-0.173

Wyoming

-0.2 51

-0.278

-0.183

-0.167

-0.310

State
Penn.
R. Isl.
s . C a ro.
S . Dak.

‘Election was

actually held in 1969

bElection was

actually held in 1971

‘Election was

actually held in 1973

“Election was

actually held in 1975

‘Election was

actually held in 1977
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Year
1976

1960

1962

1964

1966

-0.015

-0.309"

-0.372

State
Alabama

0.009

Alaska

0. 378

0. 521

0.530

0.402

-0.250

Arizona

0.455

0.415

0.249

0. 178

0. 132

Arkansas

0.559

0.320

0.916

-0.160

-0.635

Calif.

0.026

0. 142

-0.061

-0.019

-0.117

Colorado

0.347

0. 205

-0.085

0.051

0. 180

Conn.

0.086

0. 139

0. 062

0.087

0. 123

Delaware

0.029

0. 200

0. 217

-0.012

0. 134

Florida

0. 021

-0.123

0. 150

-0.034

-0.012

Georgia

-0.940

-1.040

-0.886

-0.809

-0.726

Hawaii

-0.195

-0.544

-0.018

-0.067

-0.242

Idaho

0. 506

-0.103

-0.142

0.070

-0.005

Illi.

-0.023

0.061

0. 121

-0.095

-0.235

0.170

0.428

0.227

-0.074

0. 035

Iowa

-0.125

-0.201

0. 064

0.049

-0.245

Kansas

-0.164

0.156

0.078

0.040

0.001

Kent.

-0.319f

-0. 187*

-0.108

-0.331

Maine

0.271

0.152

0.167

-0.010

Mary.

-0.031

Indiana

—

—
0.142
-0.068

rElection actually held in 1979
•Election actually held in 1981
bElection actually held in 1983

—

-0.073

309

Year
1976

1960

1962

1964

196$

Hass.

-0.232

-0.347

-0.430

-0.385

-0.669

Mich.

-0.018

0.061

0.236

0.092

0. 003

Minn.

0.175

-0.024

0.239

0.057

0.005

Miss.

0. 227f

—

0.066*

State

—

0.331"

Missouri -0.182

-0.096

-0.075

-0.207

-0.114

0. 171

0.435

0.088

0.312

-0.047

-0.154

0.096

-0.132

0.110

-0.010

New Hamp. 0. 060

0.032

-0.042

0. 138

0.116

New Jer.

0. 191f

0. 090‘

0. 066"

0. 023'

0.040*

New Mex.

0. 098

0.214

0.097

0.232

N. Caro. -0.176

0. 379

-0.063

0.121

0.072

-0.162

-0.029

0. 346

-0.009

Ohio

-0.018

0.123

0. 060

-0.009

0. 098

Okla.

-0.279

-0.487

-0.426

-0.122

0. 021

Oregon

-0.062

0.156

-0.073

0. 054

0. 064

0. 063

0.150

0. 009

0.062

0.006

-0.164

0.024

-0.032

0.059

-0.062

Montana
Nevada

N . Dak.

Penn.
R. isl.

rElection actually held in 1979
‘Election actually held in 1981
"Election actually held in 1983
'Election actually held in 1985
jElection actually held in 1987

-0.029
—

310
Year
199Q

1992

S. Caro. -0.396

-0.850

-0.627

-0.572

-0.570

S . Dak.

-0.227

-0.205

0. 080

-0.079

-0.249

Tenn.

-0.016

-0.015

-0.204

-0.178

-0.201

Texas

-0.405

-0.131

-0.278

-0.295

-0.172

Utah

0.064

0. 128

-0.086

0.000

-0.190

Virginia

0.079'

0. 130*

0.127

-0.150"

-0.154

Hash.

0. 040

-0.023

0. 173

0.113

-0.030

W. Virg.

0.426

0.202

0. 141

0.364

0. 312

Wiscon.

0.069

-0.089

0. 282

0.152

-0.197

Wyoming

-0.269

-0.241

-0.279

-0.118

0.018

1979

1999

State

rElection actually held in 1979
•Election actually held in 198?
"Election actually held in 1983
‘Election actually held in 1985
"Virginia exhibited a coefficient of -0.132 in the 1987
election
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